Peace Policies and Practices in Yugoslavia and Beyond



PEACE, UNCONDITIONAL!

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Published by
Institute for Recent History of Serbia
Založba ZRC, Institute of Culture and Memory Studies ZRC SAZU

Series "Zbornici radova", Volume No. 31

Series "Kulturni spomin", Volume No. 12
Editor **Tanja Petrović**

For the Publishers
Vladan Jovanović, Oto Luthar

Edited by
Sanja Petrović Todosijević and **Martin Pogačar**

Design and layout
Tanja Radež

Artworks used
© **Stane Jagodič**

Proofreading
Miljana Protić

ISBN 978-86-7005-208-6

The publication of this volume was made possible with the support of the Ministry of Science, Technological Development and Innovation of the Republic of Serbia.
The publication was made possible by the Slovenian Research and Innovation Agency's research programme "Historical Interpretations of the 20th Century" (J6-0347).

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Belgrade, Ljubljana
2025

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https://doi.org/10.31212/peace.2025.31.filipovic

Stane Jagodič, *The Militarist's Menu,* assemblage, 1971

Luka Filipović*

From Czechoslovakia to Chile, in the Shadow of Vietnam: Anti-War Movements and the European Communists, 1968–1974

Abstract After the global neoliberal reforms, the role of the communist parties in the anti-war movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s has been neglected to a certain extent. Therefore, the following text aims to showcase the impact of anti-war movements on the development of party ideologies and relations between the most influential left-wing parties, as well as contributions made by communist and socialist parties of Europe towards the pacifist cause. This discussion of the paths of mutual influences will be based on an analysis of the sources from Yugoslav archives, which will be contextualized in the contemporary social reality by comparing them with the results presented in previous studies in the fields of history, sociology and political science.

Keywords Anti-war movements, European far left, Eurocommunism, Communist Party of Italy, League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

Articulating the change – protesting against the frames of social reality through anti-war movements

To understand the connection between the development of anti-war movements and the party ideologies of the leading European Marxist parties, it is necessary to place the development of anti-war movements and new ideas of the European communists into the historical context of the great social changes that happened after the Second World

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War. The introduction of welfare state[1] policies in the countries of Western Europe and the United States created the necessary conditions for a structural transformation of Western societies. According to the estimations of numerous historians, sociologists and economists, the depth of the ensuing social changes was unparalleled in the latter half of the 20th century.[2] Eric Hobsbawm defined the period from the time of reconstruction after the Second World War until the beginning of the neoliberal economic reforms in the early 1980s as the *thirty glorious years,* dubbing the political and cultural consequences of the structural changes in Western societies *a silent revolution*. This term was specifically chosen, according to Hobsbawm's later testimony, to remind the readers that, although the revolts of the late 1960s and early 1970s were anything but silent, the social forces that carried them out had gradually emerged over the course of a long-term historical process.[3] The accumulated tensions and animosities originating from rapid social changes needed a channel through which they could be articulated into a political and cultural agenda, and that is what anti-war movements provided.

Mobilization for the war in Vietnam triggered mass student rebellions in the United States (1968–1969), which influenced and inspired similar rebellions in European countries and around the world, with every university movement defining its own demands reflecting its own experience of social circumstances. The vast majority of university circles that rebelled in the United States integrated the agenda of previous civil rights activist groups; subsequently, the anti-war movements also became movements for the rights of women, African Americans and many marginalized social groups.[4] On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, the French demonstrations of solidarity with the Americans who protested against the war in Vietnam in 1968 and 1969 quickly transformed into protests against the authoritarian regime of De Gaulle and the Gaullist attempts to impose traditional social norms in schools and universities.[5] Student protests in communist countries (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary) also included, at least to a certain extent, a pacifist agenda and symbolic expressions of solidarity with their Western colleagues into their official demands, as well as in their never formally defined agenda, which was expressed through speeches, articles, symbols of their movements and art. While protesting against the political oppression of totalitarian regimes, students in Czechoslovakia and Poland strongly insisted on the idea of overcoming the tensions between the two geopolitical blocs, defining the rivalry of the national and imperial interests of the USA and the USSR as the leading cause of wars around the world.[6] Numerous studies on Japanese artistic rebellions in the late 1950s and early 1960s against the system of traditional values, which was considered to be connected with the elements of militant nationalism that had survived the demilitarization of the country following the Second World War, recall the far-reaching influence of rebellions and protests that had started as anti-war movements and of their pacifistic agenda.[7]

Many Yugoslav students and university professors demanded further reforms of the socialist system that had recreated social inequalities, corruption and authoritarian tendencies. They defined the disappearance of the nation-state – whose ideology is bound by necessity to constantly recreate ethnic and religious divisions, as well as identities influenced by ideas of militaristic expansionism – as a precondition of creating a classless society in the future.[8] Ideas expressed by many groups within the heterogeneous Yugoslav university movement was described by contemporary authors in the Italian and French Marxist press as an expected consequence of ideological development within the economically most successful and least authoritarian socialist model in Europe.[9] On the other hand, it should be noted that two decades after the student protests of 1968 in Belgrade, the French communists who had abandoned the rebellious enthusiasm of their youth and reverted to defending the classics of Marxist literature proposed that the idealism of many former Yugoslav anarchists and communist dissidents had significantly influenced their passionate acceptance of new liberal ideologies in the late 1970s and early 1980s.[10]

Documents from the various ideological commissions of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) testify that even leading Marxist philosophers in European countries, of whom many were actively engaged in studies of current social and economic changes, found themselves in a state of shock and insecurity after witnessing the scale of the student rebellions in 1968, with some beginning to question their own theoretical works.[11] For decades, tensions had been simmering behind the closed doors of ever larger and luxurious party offices of the leading Marxist parties in the Western Bloc, where, from

1 The welfare state was a concept defined by American sociologists as an "umbrella term" for numerous social and economic policies whose introduction and subsequent constant expansion became common in most countries of the Western Bloc in the years that followed the aftermath of the Second World War. Among other policies, the welfare state model includes state-funded or state-subsidized education, healthcare, policy of general employment and providing substantial financial aid to the poor and unemployed, David Garland, "The Welfare State: A Fundamental Dimension of Modern Government," *European Journal of Sociology* 55, no. 3 (2014): 327–364).

2 Leonard Krieger, "The Idea of the Welfare State in Europe and the United States," *Journal of History of Ideas* 24, no. 4 (1963): 553–568; Harold James, "The multiple context of Bretton Woods," *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 28, no. 3 (2012): 411–430; Gwilym Gibbon, "The Beveridge Report," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 105, no. 4 (1942): 336–340.

3 Erik Hobsbaum, *Kraj Kulture: Kultura i društvo u XX veku* (Beograd: Arhipelag, 2014), 157–165.

4 Simon Hall, *Peace and Freedom: The Civil Rights and Anti-War Movements in the 1960s* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 1–12.

5 Alain Silvera, "The French Revolution of May 1968," *The Virginia Quarterly Review* 47, no. 3 (1971): 336–354.

6 Marcin Zaremba, "1968 in Poland: The Rebellion on the Other Side of the Looking Glass," *The American Historical Review* 123, no. 3 (2018): 769–772.

7 Linda Hoaglund, *Protest Art in 1950s Japan: The Forgotten Reportage Painters* (Cambridge: MIT, 2012), 2–8.

8 State Archives of Serbia (DAS), fond of the Security Information Agency (BIA), XIII-1-8, Izveštaji o stavovima, aktivnostima i zahtevima profesora i studenata univerziteta u Beogradu, od maja do septembra 1968.

9 Archives of Yugoslavia (AJ), fonds of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (507), Commission for International Relations and Ties (IX), 48/I-392-426; AJ, 507/IX, 33/I-210-255, Izveštaji o pisanju partijske štampe KP Italije i KP Francuske o događajima u SFRJ, 1968.

10 AJ, 507/IX, 30/I-313-367, Izveštaji o razvoju saradnje sa Komunističkom partijom Francuske.

11 DAS, Commissions of Central Committee of LCY, 121, 1969–1972, Komisija za demokratizaciju društvenog i političkog života; AJ, 507, Ideological commission (II)/2-b-(244-252), Materijali sa sednica ideološke komisije.

the mid-1960s onwards, Italian and French communists waged passionate debates over the question of appeasing the demands for changing party policies coming from the increasingly influential reformist factions.[12] To this day, it remains a question of debate within various fields of social sciences and humanities to what degree the contemporary Western Marxists were aware of the true depth of structural changes in their societies, whose effects they were beginning to notice more frequently in their own social habitat as the "decade of rebellions" came to its eruptive close.[13] Recorded conversations between Yugoslav and Italian communists testify that already in the early 1960s some members of the Italian party's leadership expressed the idea of creating a new Marxist ideology capable of addressing the growingly complex theoretical dilemmas.[14] According to their own testimonies, the Italian communists developed many of those dilemmas after witnessing the consequences of the complex social changes. After student revolts erupted in Rome and other major Italian cities, the Italian communists concluded that the introduction of the new party ideology should not be delayed any longer.[15]

Rebellions against authoritarianism in the socialist world in the wake of a global anti-war rebellion

The reformist factions of the Italian, French, Spanish and Greek communist parties gradually emerged during the course of the same long-term changes that created the environment for the student rebellions and anti-war movements. The reformist factions of the Mediterranean communists later played a crucial role in defining the relationship between the European far left and anti-war movements. The reformists gathered around the idea that the principles of the Bolshevik socialist model are not universal either in the sense that they are an integral part of timeless Marxist ethics, which transcends historical circumstances, or in the sense that they are bound to be successful in attracting popular support for communist parties anywhere in the world, regardless of the specific conditions that influence the currents of local political, economic and social development.[16] During frequent private meetings with representatives of the Yugoslav party, the Italian communists repeatedly conveyed to their Yugoslav counterparts that they were just now rediscovering the same direction of thought which had been followed by Antonio Gramsci, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Kautsky before it was abandoned during the period in the history of Western Marxist parties that was already being referred to as "the years of Stalinization".[17] This time was marked by the radicalization of authoritarian tendencies in the development of party policies and ideologies of the Mediterranean communists, as well as by increased internal control, censorship and purges within the Italian, French, Spanish and Greek parties. This period in the history of the European communist movement was also characterized by a dependence of the Mediterranean communists on financial support and other forms of aid from the Soviet Union.[18]

Over the years that followed the introduction of welfare state policies in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Italian and French communist parties became some of the largest and most influential political parties in Western Europe, with control over numerous politically and financially powerful unions. In the early 1960s, the leaderships of the Spanish and Greek communist parties, which were in exile after the end of the civil wars in Spain (1936–1939) and Greece (1946–1949), started to rely on help from the Yugoslav state, which was constantly expanding its economic strength and geopolitical influence.[19] During the "decade of rebellions" in the 1960s, the development of new humanitarian and pacifistic ideas and values that followed the structural changes in Western societies influenced both the European moderate left, comprised of socialists, social democrats and left-wing liberals, and the far left, dominated by the communist parties of the Mediterranean. These changes created the necessary conditions for the Italian, French and Yugoslav communists to contemplate launching numerous large-scale left-wing initiatives within the constantly expanding institutional frames of the European Economic Community.[20] However, according to the analysis of the Yugoslav communists who were trying to mediate in resolving conflicts between communist and socialist parties in Italy and France, the abandonment of the communist attempts at appropriating the principles of the Bolshevik socialist model in local circumstances and the development of a new Marxist ideology was slowly turning out to be a necessary precondition for expanding cooperation between European left-wing parties. According to Yugoslav sources, the Italian and Spanish communists assessed that a broad far-left international initiative would be able to ensure the continuation of the expected evolution of capitalist systems in Western European countries towards different forms of socialism through continuous improvements of welfare state systems.[21]

12 AJ, 507/IX, 48/I-392-426; AJ, 507/IX, 33/I-210-255, Izveštaji o saradnji sa KP Italije i KP Francuske.

13 Silvio Pons, *The Rise and Fall of Eurocommunism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 45–65, Vjekoslav Mikecin, *Evrokomunizam i socijalizam* (Zagreb: Globus, 1979), 148–221.

14 AJ, President of the Republic's Office (837), I-3-a/44-25, Poseta delegacije KP Italije na čelu sa generalnim sekretarom Palmirom Toljatijem, 1964.

15 However, PCI still delayed the formal introduction of the new party ideology until the military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, after which they finally decided to hold the "historical" XII Congress of the Italian Communist Party in February of 1969 in Bologna.

16 AJ, 507/ IX, 122/1-52-81; AJ, 507/IX, 48/I-392-426; AJ, 507/IX, 33/I-210-255; AJ, 507/IX, 33/I-712-779, Informacije o razvoju saradnje sa komunističkim partijama Italije, Francuske, Španije i Grčke, 1968.

17 AJ, 507/IX, 48/I-436-437, Stenografske beleške razgovora sa Berlinguerom, Pajetom i Galucijem, 1969.

18 Luka Filipović, "Finansijska politika Saveza komunista Jugoslavije prema komunističkim partijama Italije, Francuske, Španije i Grčke krajem šezdesetih godina 20. veka," Istorija 20. veka 39, no. 2 (2021): 461–478.

19 AJ, 507/IX, 122/I-113, Analiza predloga o pomoći KPŠ i KPG, beleške sa sednice PB CK SKJ, 3.5.1972.

20 AJ, Socialist Alliance of Working People (142), Office for international cooperation, A-074-078, Informacije o saradnji sa partijama levice u Francuskoj i Italiji.

21 AJ, 507/IX, 48/I-429, Informacije o XII Kongresu Komunističke partije Italije, februar 1968.

On the other hand, many Western Marxists in the late 1960s still expected Brezhnev's leadership of the Soviet party to finish implementing the reformist program of Khrushchev's administration, as well as to lead the communist parties of Europe and the world into the "new age" of democratic socialism. This would allow the communist parties of the Western Bloc to regain the popularity they had enjoyed during the "Red Spring of Europe" (1946–1949), the communist parties of the East to strengthen their positions through internal democratization, and the tides of the global "battle for the souls" to yet again turn in favour of Marxist forces.[22] These expectations failed to materialize as a consequence of the influence exerted on international communist organizations by anti-reformist factions, spearheaded by the leaderships of the East German, Polish and Czechoslovakian parties, and the constant success in swaying the Soviet party against endorsing the reformist agenda. During his visit to Yugoslavia in the late spring of 1967, Secretary General of the Communist Party of Spain (PCE), Santiago Carrillo, openly conveyed to Josip Broz Tito his assessments that the leaders of the German Democratic Republic's (GDR), Poland's and Czechoslovakia's parties (Walter Ulbricht, Wladyslaw Gomulka and Antonin Novotny respectively) were in constant fear that continuing to spread reformist ideas in the countries of the Eastern Bloc would endanger their own positions, consequently trying to exploit every perceived opportunity to swing the "calculated indecisiveness" of the Soviets against the reformist factions.[23] During the latter half of 1967, after it became clear that the Soviet party would refrain from taking a leading role in the reformist movement, the leaderships of the Yugoslav and Italian parties held numerous formal and informal meetings, during the course of which Josip Broz Tito and Secretary General of the Italian Communist Party, Luigi Longo, devised different plans about organizing international conferences of the Mediterranean and European communist parties to discuss defining the general principles according to which individual parties should reform their policies and, ultimately, their party ideologies.[24]

Demonstrations of solidarity in Czechoslovakia between the call for peace on the ground and the *casus belli* for an ideological war against Stalinism

The implementation of the plans made by Josip Broz Tito and Luigi Longo in 1967 demanded that the Italian Communist Party (PCI) remain resolved to participate in the organization of international conferences about reformist agenda despite the lack of approval from the Soviet party. Anti-reformist forces around the world thus found a cause to portray the Italian communists as instigators of the clash between the Italian and the Soviet party, which increasingly seemed as the unavoidable outcome.[25] According to the assessments of the LCY leadership, by the end of 1967, the Italian communists had already grown so resentful towards the ways in which the Soviet party controlled international Marxist organizations that the party leadership needed a pretext to finish the already initiated process of breaking away from the Soviet sphere of influence. On the other hand, the Spanish and Greek communists feared a potential uprising of the strong Stalinist factions in their own parties if party leaderships started to conduct reforms or otherwise cause a decline in the relations with the Soviet party.[26] These fears eventually became apparent in January 1968 when the conservative Greek communists in the Soviet Union rebelled against the reformist leadership of party institutions operating in exile, violently taking control over the election process in local Greek immigrant communities and expelling the reformist leadership from the party, which caused the Greek communists who still remained in the country to openly refuse to recognize the authority of the new conservative leadership in emigration, thus paving the way for the future split in the Greek party.[27] Analysts from the Yugoslav party offices assessed that the conservative Greek communists attempted a violent takeover as a "pre-emptive strike" against the reformist faction, motivated by mounting fears among the conservative factions of European communist parties after the successful rebellion of the Czechoslovakian reformists between the autumn of 1967 and January 1968. This revolt led to the downfall of the conservative party leader Novotny and the rise of a new party leadership, which later adopted the reformist program created by Alexander Dubček, Secretary General of the Communist Party of Slovakia.[28]

The most decisive opposition against the now openly discussed plans of the Italian and Yugoslav communists to form a large initiative of the European reformist parties came from the French Communist Party, whose leadership, after the events in Czechoslovakia, suddenly decided to abandon the practice of appeasing the reformist faction and to return to the old ways of expelling reformist thinkers from the party. At the same time, the French party started to ignore the questions of the Italian and Yugoslav communists about the implementation of the previously made plans for expanding cooperation between the French Communist Party and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.[29] Mere weeks before the Soviet troops entered Czechoslovakia in August of 1968, while the remnants of the revolts that had started in the early summer were still raging in Paris, the French communists

22 AJ, 507/IX, 48/I-432, Stenografske beleške razgovora Stana Dolanca sa Antonijem Minučijem, 1969.

23 AJ, 837, I-3-a/110-4, Prijem generalnog sekretara KPŠ Santjaga Karilja kod Josipa Broza Tita, 1967.

24 AJ, 837, I-3-a/44-38, Poseta delegacije KPI na čelu sa generalnim sekretarom Luđijem Longom, 1967.

25 AJ, 507/IX, 48/I-411, Izveštaj o poseti člana CK KPI Đankarla Pajete Jugoslaviji, 1968.

26 AJ, 507/IX, 122/1-52-81, AJ, SKJ, IX, 48/I-392-426; AJ, SKJ, IX, 33/I-210-255; AJ, SKJ, IX, 33/I-712-779, Informacije o razvoju saradnje sa komunističkim partijama Italije, Francuske, Španije i Grčke, 1968.

27 AJ, 507/IX, 33/I-728, Izveštaji o rascepu u KPG nakon XIII Plenuma, februar 1968.

28 AJ, 507/IX, 33/I-723, Informacije o novom Ujedinjenom Centralnom Komitetu KPG, 1968.

29 AJ, 507/IX, 30/I-211, Analiza odgovora KPF na predloge o saradnji sa SKJ koje je Nijaz Dizdarević podneo direkciji KPF februara 1968; AJ, 507/IX, 30/I-220-222, Odgovor SKJ direkciji KPF, mart 1968.

even tried to organize an international conference of European communists to condemn the reforms conducted in Czechoslovakia, while simultaneously attempting to pressure Aleksander Dubček into accepting the Soviet terms under the pretext of mediating the talks between the two communist parties.[30] Subsequently, as the streets of Paris became a stage for mass demonstrations of solidarity with the Czechoslovakian people, which lasted during the entire conflict and months into the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the French Communist Party saw a decline in the popularity and strength of its political position. According to the assessments of LCY analysts, members of the French party's leadership briefly tried to formally condemn the invasion while abstaining from criticizing the policies and ideology of the Soviet party in an attempt to preserve both the influence of the party at home and its relations with the Soviets. Yet, under the threat of political isolation and a split within the party, they were soon forced to denounce the current authoritarian tendencies of the Soviet administration, as well as their own Stalinist past.[31]

On the other hand, as soon as demonstrations against the invasion of Czechoslovakia started to crop up on the streets of major European cities, leading Spanish communists in exile marched with the protesters in Paris, holding protest signs with messages that condemned both the Soviet invasion and the Stalinist tendencies of the French party. The Spanish party had already defined Stalinist ideas as being still present in almost every major communist party in Europe, invigorated by the reactionary views on progressive social and cultural changes, as well as deeply connected to the real causes of the aggression against Czechoslovakia.[32] Although many prominent Spanish communists were still living in the countries of the Eastern Bloc, with many Civil War veterans and experts incorporated into the military, educational or healthcare system of the Soviet Union, the Spanish party remained resolute in its rejection of Soviet proposals to help legitimize military intervention in Czechoslovakia by lending the weight of the Spanish party's international prestige to the critics of Czechoslovakian reformist policies. Instead, the Spanish communists protested the joint statement on the events in Czechoslovakia during the 1969 summit of European communist parties in Moscow, thus creating an official cause for one of the most impactful splits on the European far left in the 20th century.[33]

The movements against aggression in Czechoslovakia had a significant impact on the currents of European Marxist thought and on the relations between left-wing parties, whether they contributed towards convincing the major communist parties of Europe to denounce their conservative tendencies and Stalinist past, as was the case with the French communists, or served as a pretext to declare rebellion against the Soviet influence on the European left, as was the case with the Italian communists, who proclaimed intentions of changing their party ideology only days after the troops from other Eastern Bloc countries entered Czechoslovakia. While the reformist ideas of early Mediterranean Eurocommunists, as well as the followers of other new ideologies on the far left, which could be described as belonging to a spectrum of democratic socialism, developed over the years of witnessing the effects of structural changes within Western societies, the final push to break free from the Stalinist heritage became inevitable only when the largest communist parties of Europe joined the labour unions, university movements and artists in the protests against the invasion and subsequent occupation of Czechoslovakia. To a certain extent, the demonstrations for peace and solidarity with the Czechoslovakian people were the bridge that helped traditional Marxist parties and new rebellious movements of 1968 to overcome their differences and join forces against the Stalinist legacy of militant authoritarianism on the European far left.[34]

Armageddon in Indochina and new divisions of left-wing parties at home

While the communist parties of Italy, Greece and Spain, which the press would soon dub Eurocommunist parties, gathered around the movement against the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Yugoslav communists were providing financial aid to the reformist French communists and other minor anti-Stalinist factions on the European far left, while mediating the talks about cooperation between communists, socialists and social democrats in Italy and France.[35] Even before the Eastern Bloc countries took military action against the new government of Czechoslovakia, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was already at loggerheads with the Soviet party over relentless Yugoslav support for Czechoslovakian reformist policies and continuous refusal of LCY to even participate in the debates of Marxist parties about the issue, with the explanation that the Yugoslav communists would take no part in legitimizing the Soviet narrative about the presumed seniority of geopolitical interests over matters of ideology and ethics.[36] Now, after the events in Czechoslovakia that shocked the world and after the beginning of another major split on the European left, the Yugoslav state was able to assert the strength of its international position, while the Yugoslav party could finally assume the role of a leader and unifier of the European far left in the struggle against the legacy of Stalinism and the influence of the Soviet party.[37]

30 AJ, 507/IX, 30/I-220-223, Informacije o odustajanju KPF od održavanja konferencije KP Evrope, 1968.

31 AJ, 507/IX, 30/I-228, Informacije o značajnim stavovima Komunističke partije Francuske, 1968.

32 AJ, 507/IX, 122/1-81, Analiza razgovora Kire Hadži Vasileva sa Santjagom Kariljom, 1968.

33 AJ, 837, I-4-b/7, Izveštaj o savetovanju komunističkih partija Evrope u Moskvi 1969.

34 Luka Filipović, *Evrokomunizam i Jugoslavija 1968–1980* (Novi Sad: Akademska knjiga, 2023), 185–200.

35 AJ, 142, A-074-078, Međunarodna saradnja, informacije o održavanju Mediteranskih konferencija.

36 AJ, 507/IX, 122/I-88, O razgovorima predstavnika SKJ sa Santjagom Kariljom, 28. oktobar 1969.

37 AJ,837, I-4-b/7, Izveštaj o savetovanju komunističkih partija Evrope u Moskvi 1969.

Apart from representing a model for the successful abandonment of Stalinist tendencies in the process of defining new party policies, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia also supported Eurocommunist and other reformist forces on the European far left to follow the patterns set by the Yugoslav communists in forming party attitudes about the major participants involved in the wars raging in the region of Indochina. It is interesting to note that the earliest case of the Italian and Yugoslav parties purposely adjusting their stances on global events happened mere weeks after the Italian communists adopted their new party ideology, when the delegations of the two parties, led by Josip Broz Tito and the newly appointed PCI Secretary General, Enrico Berlinguer, agreed to declare joint support for the forces of the former king Sihanouk in Cambodia, who led the social-democratic government against the radical far left rebels gathered around the Khmer Rouge movement.[38] This particular case later became one of the issues used to articulate the animosities between the Eurocommunists and many radical movements of the New Left in Italy and France since a majority of the European Marxists and Anarchists at the time supported the Khmer Rouge movement, as did rather significant parts of more moderate leftists and even some future left-wing liberals.[39] And it was during the talks about the situation in Cambodia that Josip Broz Tito famously said: "When making a choice is unavoidable, I prefer dealing with progressive, democratic monarchists, such are some in Great Britain, rather than with the forces of a conservative, authoritarian system that presents itself as socialist but instead stands as a negation to the principles of equality and solidarity, and other fundamental leftist values". The later joint statements of the Yugoslav and Italian communists about upholding the fundamental values of the left by supporting progressive social democrats against Stalinists and Maoists included the values of pacifism and resistance against imperialism of all sorts and militant nationalism that served the interests of the ruling classes into the concept of "fundamental leftist principles".[40]

The idea that the principles of pacifism and resistance against imperialism should never be separated and then individually prioritized in order to serve other interests or agendas separated the Yugoslav and Italian parties, as well as many other democratic socialists, from the rest of the European far left during the debates about the war in Vietnam during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Almost the entire European left at the time was in some way actively supporting anti-war movements and criticizing US military aggression, but, like in the case of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, many prominent leftist parties and personalities refrained from mentioning the Soviet and Chinese involvement in East Asia.[41] At the same time, many leftist movements justified all the actions of Viet Cong and Viet Minh, the communist armies of Southern and Northern Vietnam, arguing that they were manifestations of a collective reaction caused by French and American imperialist policies and military interventions in the region, while simultaneously stating that any form of criticism against the ideology of the Vietnamese party in the time of war was an act of "treason" against the "Vietnamese cause", which should unite the entire global left in solidarity with the victims of imperialist ambitions.[42] On the other hand, Yugoslav, Italian and Spanish communists and representatives of many other leftist groups that adopted the principles of democratic socialism in defining their ideology claimed that, while the "red terror" in Indochina was indeed, to a significant degree, an expected consequence of imperialist rule and crimes against humanity committed by foreign militaries, this fact shouldn't be used either to justify future violence that could end with the "liberators" repeating the crimes of the "oppressors", or as a reason to support an authoritarian ideology that could lead from a desired dictatorship of the proletariat towards a dictatorship of the party.[43]

This division on the European left was inseparably connected with the division based on different attitudes towards the political, social and cultural agenda brought forward by the anti-war movements in the United States and Western Europe. The Yugoslav and Italian communists discussed on a number of occasions the perceived causes of what the PCI Secretary General, Enrico Berlinguer, referred to as "the great irony of time", where a great many of those who avoided criticizing the ideology of communist parties involved in wars against imperialism in Indochina concurrently had no qualms about condemning all the negative tendencies that could be attributed to new ideologies and subcultures of the anti-war movements and student rebellions.[44] On the other hand, authors of newspaper articles close to the French Eurocommunist faction rather frequently reminded their overly enthusiastic Yugoslav and Italian allies in the struggle against Soviet influence on the European far left that they themselves were not above accusations of hypocrisy, as they were quick to disregard all the negative tendencies of the new leftist movements and ideologies that had emerged from the anti-war rebellions to defend the narrative about the constant progressive evolution of both welfare state societies and their leftist movements.[45]

38 AJ, 837, I-3-a/44-48, Prijem zamenika generalnog sekretara KPI E. Berlinguera, 1969.

39 Donald W. Beachler, "Arguing about Cambodia: Genocide and Political Interest," in *The Genocide Debate*, ed. D.W. Beachler (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 35–58, Breanna Atwood, "Khmer Rouge: Evolution of the Academic Debate" (Master Thesis, California Polytechnic State University, 2010), 1–37.

40 AJ, 837, I-3-a/44-48, Prijem zamenika generalnog sekretara KPI E. Berlinguera, 1969.

41 AJ, 507/IX, 48/I-430-516, Razgovori sa članovima KPI o saradnji i razvoju odnosa marksisitčkih partija Evrope, 1969-1972; AJ, 507/IX, 48/I-507, Informacije o razvoju saradnje sa KP Italije, 1972.

42 Bernard Fall, "Tribulations of a Party Line: The French Communists and Indo-China," Foreign Affairs 33, no. 3 (1955): 499–510; Daniela Saresella, "The Vietnam War, the Church, the Christian Democratic Party and the Italian Left Catholics," *Social Sciences* 7, no. 4 (2018): 2–12.

43 AJ, 507/IX, 48/I-426-513, Informacije o značajnim stavovima KP Italije, 1971.

44 AJ, 837, I-3-a/44-25; AJ, 837, I-3-a/44-34; AJ, 837, I-3-a/44-48; AJ, 837, I-3-a/44-59, Izveštaji o posetama Luiđija Longa i Enrika Berlinguera Jugoslaviji 1967–1969.

45 AJ, 507/IX, 30/I-251, Informacije o pisanju partijske štampe KP Francuske, 1968.

As many times during the decades of increasingly globalized social changes, the line that demarcated new divisions between the leftist organizations in Europe followed the lines drawn by the earlier conflicts between reformist and anti-reformist parties, which were themselves a manifestation of an even older conflict between "conservative" and "progressive" factions of the European Marxists that had spilt over into the moderate and even the centrist left-wing forces. Consequently, European left-wing parties ended up deeply divided over the issues related to the war in Vietnam and anti-war movements, which were expected to bring forward integrating causes for creating a united leftist anti-war initiative that would allow for at least a temporary end to the era of endless divisions on the left. Instead, the debate on the new currents of war and anti-war movements became yet another international forum through which leftist parties started expressing their own agendas and articulating animosities towards leftist competition at home.[46]

Later reflections on "the long year of European socialism" and the role of anti-war movements in pushing left-wing parties towards the zenith of their influence

In his writings published long after the beginning of neoliberal reforms in the early 1980s, the ageing former Secretary General of the Spanish Communist Party, Santiago Carrillo, often reminded his readers that the divisions within both communist parties and more moderate leftist movements were but an expected occurrence in a world that seemed on the verge of ascending to a form of socialism amidst the continuous evolution of welfare state era economy, politics and society.[47] Carrillo assessed that numerous influential groups and individuals on the European left needed to distinguish themselves by establishing a unique ideological identity or inventions in political practice, as this was the only way to assert influence on the growingly competitive left-wing spectrum. This spectrum was in the 1970s, according to the analyses of some contemporary British scholars, large and all-encompassing to the extent that, before the rise of Ronald Regan and Margaret Thatcher, it appeared as though right-wing parties would either be forced into changing their ideologies or would simply disappear after European politics "drowned in the sea" of communists, anarchists, social democrats, left-wing liberals or New Left movements.[48] The Italian communists warned about the possible downsides of the constant and unsustainable expansion of labour unions and leftist parties' influence in the Western Bloc countries. During one of the meetings with LCY representatives in the late 1970s, some Italian party leaders humorously remarked that while the French Communist Party would do more harm than good to the Marxist cause in France if it entered a socialist government, nevertheless, being a socialist in France had become so commonplace that the meaning of the term itself got so inflated that French cardinals of the Catholic Church could be expected to start introducing themselves as conservative socialists.[49]

What is significant about this observation is that it was made only a few years before the forces of the New Right, a term used to describe the political predecessors of Regan's and Thatcher's neoliberal movements, started to dominate the political spectrum of the largest European economies and just before the largest Marxist parties in Europe embarked on a path of rapid decline in public support and political influence, leading to their almost unnoticed disappearance from the historical stage.[50] This process was, among many important factors, influenced by the speed and scale of the former leftists' conversion into enthusiastic neoliberals. Having in mind the aforementioned estimations of Italian communists made in the early 1970s, it is necessary to question the extent of the actual conversion in the cases of many organizations and individuals or, rather, the extent to which the perceived conversion was just a consequence of repainting the ideological façade of the same system of beliefs and values.[51] In the context of the relationship between anti-war movements and European left-wing parties, posing this question is important for understanding various hypotheses about the possible influence of the anti-war movements on making the identity of belonging to a leftist ideological group a significant status symbol, subculture mark or the necessity of coming to a compromise with the dominant social expectations in some (mostly urban, educated and middle-class) environments.

Besides the ability to articulate resentment towards the social and cultural changes of the 1960s and 1970s, the political propaganda of early neoliberal movements exploited the "moral panic"[52] in Western Europe and the United States, which had produced the belief that many social environments had become decadent and dangerous during the time of political instability within the wealthiest states of the Western Bloc, later defined in the social sciences as "the crisis of the welfare state".[53] However, it could be argued that the period the New Right presented as a political crisis by analysts, which started in the late 1960s and reached its peak after the effects of the Oil Crisis in 1973 became visible,

46 Filipović, *Evrokomunizam i Jugoslavija 1968–1980*, 307–322.

47 Jose M. Faraldo, "Entangled Eurocommunism: Santiago Carrillo, the Spanish Communist Party and the Eastern Bloc during the Spanish transition to democracy 1968–1982," *Contemporary European History* 26, no. 4 (2017): 647–668; Joseph Antony Nicastro, "Eurocommunism, Spain and the Views of Santiago Carrillo" (Master Thesis, University of Massachusetts, Department of Political Science, 1979), 105–110.

48 Shirley Robin Letwin, *The Anatomy of Thatcherism* (London: Routledge, 1992), 49–96.

49 AJ, 507/IX, 48/I-568-572, Informacije o razgovorima sa predstavnicima KP Italije, 1978.

50 AJ, 507/IX, 48/I-572-633, Beleške o saradnji sa Komunističkom partijom Italije, 1980–1982.

51 Stephanie Mudge, *Leftism Reinvented: Western Parties from Socialism to Neoliberalism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018), 43–68.

52 "Moral panic" was the term proposed by French sociologist Laurent Mucchielli to describe how media close to New Right politicians in the late 1970s and early 1980s reported about rising crime rates, drug abuse and the overall "moral decay" of Western societies to present the welfare state as a failed economic and social experiment which should be replaced by a return of the liberal capitalist system that had been prevalent in most Western European countries before the Second World War.

53 Laurent Mucchielli, "Délinquance et immigration en France: un regard sociologique," *Criminologie* 36, no. 2 (2003): 27–55.

was only a crisis from the perspective of the British conservatives, French Gaullists or Italian Christian democrats. For the left-wing parties, this period marked the greatest expansion of their popularity and influence since the end of the Second World War. This period, which numerous authors have referred to as "the long year of European socialism" (1974–1976), saw a series of strikes in Great Britain, which ended favourably for the labour unions, the unprecedented electoral successes of the Italian communists, the growing influence of communist and socialist parties in France, the reestablishment of left-wing parties in Spain during the transitional period after the death of Francisco Franco in 1975, as well as the reconciliation of the Eastern and Western communists during the two-year-long preparations for the conference of European communist parties in Berlin.[54]

Global Allendism: How US support for Pinochet's coup contributed towards uniting the forces of the European far left

Renewed cooperation between the Eurocommunists and the Eastern Bloc parties came at the end of a long string of reconciliations between Western European communist and socialist parties, which occurred after the communist parties of the Mediterranean started following the model that the Italian Communist Party had established when defining a new political practice comprising many party policies aimed at developing cooperation with socialists, Christian democrats and leftist elements in the church, which would later become collectively known as policies of "historical compromise".[55] Analysts from Yugoslavia estimated that one of the key milestones in the process of expanding cooperation between the leftist forces in the Mediterranean was reached when communists, socialists and social democrats, as well as some New Left movements in Italy and France, decided to put their differences aside and participate in organizing mass demonstrations of solidarity with the people of Chile. The protests started after a military coup brought Augusto Pinochet's regime to power in September of 1973 and lasted until the first months of 1974.[56] The French communist press wrote that the demonstrations against the military coup in Chile had "broken the façade of the détente" by spreading the idea that calming the Cold War tensions in Europe was a calculated move that benefited both the USA and the USSR, which were able to gradually subdue the remnants of the revolts that shook both the Western and Eastern Bloc in the late 1960s. The French communists also assessed that the US and USSR governments needed political stability in Europe to direct their resources towards many proxy wars, mainly in East Asia and South America, which had broken out far from the "deceptive calmness" of international relations in Europe during the time of détente.[57] Results of later historical research speak in favour of those assessments made by the authors of articles in PCF press, which stated that the supposed "calmness" of the political situation in European countries and in their relations was little more than a surface under which growing social tensions simmered, manifesting themselves through terrorism, street violence and culture wars, which reached their historical peak during the time of détente.[58]

Though they supported the demonstrations against Pinochet and the subsequent protests against US influence in Western Europe, the Italian and Yugoslav communists were, to a certain extent, shocked by the mass outpour of support for the demonstrations against the coup in Chile from labour unions, various non-political organizations and clubs, as well as from famous artists and media personalities in Italy, France and Great Britain. Recorded conversations between representatives of the two parties show that the Italian and Yugoslav communists were even more astounded by the fact that numerous left-wing parties and movements, previously in a state of constant verbal and occasionally even physical altercations, now completely disregarded their mutual animosities to work together on organizing even more acts of protest to spread awareness about the events in Chile.[59] The authors of the reports that arrived from the LCY party office for international relations tried to answer the question of why the protests against US involvement in Vietnam had articulated some of the suppressed resentments between leftist parties and movements in Europe, while on the other hand, the demonstrations against US involvement in Chile proved to be a decisive factor in overcoming many long-lasting divisions on the European left.[60] It is interesting to note that both Yugoslav and Italian analysts emphasized the importance of the general understanding that Salvador Allende was a democratically elected president overthrown by a military coup with the support of the US government. During their meetings, representatives of LCY and PCI estimated that US support for a coup against a democratically elected president had become much more unpalatable for Western societies after the revolts and anti-war protests of the late 1960s and early 1970s than it had been when the Greek military junta rose to power following a similar pattern in 1967, although Greece was much closer to the financial centre of the world than Chile.[61]

The same sources indicate that Italian and Yugoslav contemporaries understood the potential significance of the ideology of those who had become the victims of the militant coup in Chile in the process of uniting deeply divided European left-wing parties and movements in support of the Allendists. Allendism was one of the most moderate

54 Filipović, *Evrokomunizam i Jugoslavija 1968–1980*, 323–366.

55 AJ, 507/IX, 48/I-449-492, Razgovori predstavnika SKJ i KPI o stanju u Italiji, 1971–1972.

56 AJ, 507/IX, 48/I-517, Pripremni materijal za sastanak sa članovima KP Italije, 1976.

57 AJ, 507/IX, 30/I-250-251, Informacije o pisanju partijske štampe KP Francuske, 1975.

58 Julian E. Zelizer, "Détente and Domestic Politics," *Diplomatic History* 33, no. 4, (2009): 653–670; Aurélie Dianara Andry, *Social Europe, The Road Not Taken: The Left and the European Integration in the Long 1970s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 204–252.

59 AJ, 507/IX, 48/I-501-513, Razgovori predstavnika SKJ i KPI o kretanjima u Evropi 1974–1976.

60 AJ, 507/IX, 48/I-517, Pripremni materijal za sastanak sa članovima KP Italije, 1976.

61 AJ, 142, A-074-078, Međunarodna saradnja, informacije o održavanju Mediteranskih konferencija.

ideologies on the spectrum of democratic socialism, more radical than the party ideologies of contemporary European social democrats and many socialists, but less radical than the French or even Italian model of Eurocommunism.[62] Consequently, the support for the democratically elected Chilean government did not raise the question of the attitudes towards authoritarian tendencies and stances on the dictatorship of the proletariat, and thus it was possible for the European left-wing parties to engage in demonstrations against a foreign-supported military junta without getting dragged into endless debates about the ethics of participating in such actions, as had happened when leftist parties tried to take a leading role in movements against the wars in Indochina.[63] Additionally, a large number of Chilean communists and socialists had abandoned the idea of appropriating the principles of the Bolshevik or Maoist socialist model in South America long before Allende came to power, so there was no cause for a debate that would allow the reformist and anti-reformist factions of the European Marxists to express their mutual animosities. Lastly, in the new social reality of many local communities within Western Europe, heavily influenced by the long-term consequences of the rebellions triggered by the anti-war movements, left-wing parties and labour unions had much less practical cause for animosities and competition since they were now on a path of expanding their influence so broadly that they would briefly become the dominant forces in European politics.

The forgotten pacifistic side of Marxist movements in Europe and the world

In retrospect, the way anti-war movements have been presented in historical narratives and popular culture since neoliberal movements came to power in the US and most Western European countries seems to suggest that the communist role in anti-war movements has been neglected, at least to an extent. This year will mark the 40th anniversary of the miners' strike (1984–1985) in the United Kingdom, regarded by many historians as a symbolic turning point in the long struggle between European labour unions and neoliberal governments for the fate of welfare state social policies and labour legislation. In continental Western Europe, numerous labour unions followed the trend of taking up many aspects of the social role previously held by the influential Marxist parties, which, in the mid-1980s, entered a period of a slow political decline and gradual collapse of their inner structures. For more than three decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, neoliberalism remained unchallenged as the dominant global ideology, while the political spectrums of Western Europe and the United States have been reduced to right and left centrist parties, and the Fukuyamist idea that history ended with the Western victory in the "battle for the souls" has seeped into numerous aspects of cultural memory, as well as EU legislation. This allowed neoliberal ideas and value systems to slowly penetrate numerous spheres of social life and culture around the world, while simultaneously changing the frameworks in which we think about history and perceive our contemporary social reality.

Consequently, it is sufficient to examine the unspoken but commonly accepted limitations of almost any given contemporary political debate in the countries of the former Western Bloc to see the argumentative patterns through which both parties involved in the debate showcase the mutual understanding that the Marxist parties and movements of the past upheld and reproduced dangerous extremist beliefs and violent tendencies. This idea, often taken for granted by experts, politicians and the media during a long enough period to inform even the formation of the dominant frames directing critical thought of researchers in social sciences and humanities, is challenged when the history of anti-war movements in Europe is taken into account. The analyzed sources, as well as the results of previous historical research, indicate that, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the support of communist and socialist parties was of as much importance for the successful mobilization of the masses in anti-war movements in Western Europe as the popularity of the social and cultural agenda that anti-war movements articulated for the reforms of party policies and ideologies of Western communist parties, which led to the greatest expansion of the influence of far-left parties in European politics during the latter half of 20th century.

All four major Eurocommunist parties, the Italian, French, Spanish and Greek, officially defined spreading pacifist ideas as one of the main goals of their new political practices. The Italian and French socialists took part in numerous meetings, conferences, seminars and other international events organized by Italian and Yugoslav communists with the sole formally proclaimed purpose of discussing the ways in which Marxist parties and left-wing organizations in general could contribute towards the preservation of peace in Europe and supporting pacifist movements around the world. For example, the growing international influence of both parties provided the Italian and Yugoslav communists with the opportunity to organize a series of conferences for the leftist movements of the Mediterranean in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which were devoted to analyzing the current situation in the Middle East and finding possible ways for European left-wing parties to influence events so as to give even the smallest contribution towards finding peaceful solutions for the conflicts raging in the immediate proximity of Southern Europe. Before opening talks about a possible reconciliation with the communist parties of Eastern Europe during the preparations for the 1976 Berlin conference, the communist parties of the Mediterranean insisted on the need to discuss the development of different socialist models, justifying this request by proclaiming that the parties which followed the ideas of democratic socialism would not risk a scenario in which future generations would identify them as followers of the same authoritarian ideology whose principles had served as the

62 Eugenia Palieraki, "Allende in Athens: The Political and Cultural Impact of the Chilean 1970s in Greece during Colonels Dictatorships and *Metapolites* 1970–1981," *Journal of the Society for Latin American Studies* 42, no. 4 (2023): 526–538.

63 AJ, 507/IX, 122/1-52-81; AJ, 507/IX, 48/I-392-426; AJ, 507.IX, 33/I-210-255; AJ, 507/IX, 33/I-712-779, Informacije o razvoju saradnje sa komunističkim partijama Italije, Francuske, Španije i Grčke, 1968.

pretext for the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. However, four decades of neoliberal reforms have changed both the social reality and the frames of thought through which the past is commonly perceived, thus achieving the same erasing of the boundary between popular perceptions of the pacifist Marxists and the followers of militant Stalinism that Eurocommunists, socialists and Yugoslav communists of the late 1960s and early 1970s had tried to avoid.

Summary

Anti-war movements played a crucial role in providing the agenda that helped ordinary people to express many animosities arising from a growing awareness of the existing frames of the contemporary social and political situation in Western Europe and the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Student rebellions and union strikes, caused by the movements against the war in Vietnam, contributed towards the rising decisiveness of Mediterranean communist parties to expand their preexisting plans to change party ideologies and move away from the influence of the Soviet party. Demonstrations against the invasion of Czechoslovakia created pressure that could have led many indecisive European Marxists to accept the reforms advocated by the leftist factions that had accepted ideologies from the spectrum of democratic socialism. However, divisions among the leftist parties of Europe over the attitudes about the ideologies of the participants in the conflicts in Indochina still provided a cause through which tensions between the conservative and reformist factions on the left could be expressed. Divisions on the European far left were, to a certain extent, mitigated through joint participation in demonstrations against the American support for the Chilean coup, after they were gradually trivialized by the need to address practical problems stemming from the new social and political circumstances. Lastly, as the four decades of neoliberal reforms changed not just the social reality but also the frames of thought through which we perceive the past, the pacifist side of the European far left and the contributions of Eurocommunist and socialist parties towards anti-war movements in Europe and the world have been pushed under the commonly accepted narrative about the exclusively militant European Marxists who had supported Soviet aggression in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan.

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