


Peace Policies and Practices in Yugoslavia and Beyond



PEACE, UNCONDITIONAL!

Edited by
Sanja Petrović Todosijević and Martin Pogačar

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UNCONDITIONAL!



Institute for Recent History of Serbia
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in Yugoslavia and Beyond

Edited by
Sanja Petrović Todosijević and Martin Pogačar

Belgrade, Ljubljana
2025

PEACE, UNCONDITIONAL!

Introduction → 11

11 → Martin Pogačar, Sanja Petrović Todosijević

Peace. Unconditional.

The Vestiges of Peace and the Socio-Political Frameworks of War

The Idea of Peace → 27

29 → Tomaž Mastnak

Unconditional Peace?

The Idea of Peace in Political Context

45 → Peter Klepec

On the Cruelty of War

63 → Petra Svoljšak

The War to End All Wars: A Broken Promise of Peace

81 → Nemanja Stanimirović

Yugoslav Dissidents as Agents of Peace in the Era of Détente

107 → Gal Kirn

Balkan Route to and from War: Reflections on Peace in Šejla Kamerić's *Cease* (2023) and Nika Autor's *Sunny Railways* (2023)

Political Practices of Peace → 127

129 → Srđan Mičić

Yugoslavia's Pacifist Foreign Policy and Actions in the League of Nations, 1920–1933

165 → Rastko Lompar

War and Peace within Interwar Yugoslav Radical Right Circles

191 → Zoran Janjetović

Indemnification for Nazi Victims, the Federal Republic of Germany and Yugoslavia

215 → Luka Savčić

“Struggle for Peace” as a Form of Yugoslav Internationalism:
A Case Study of Anti-colonialism

233 → Natalija Dimić Lompar

Entering the Cold War “Struggle for Peace”:
Yugoslavia and the International Forum for Peace, 1951–1954

265 → Jovan Čavoški

Yugoslavia, Formation of the Asian-African Group and Issues of Peace in the United
Nations, 1950–1953

289 → Luka Filipović

From Czechoslovakia to Chile, in the Shadow of Vietnam:
Anti-War Movements and the European Communists, 1968–1974

311 → Petar Dragišić

Yugoslavia and the Helsinki Summit in 1975

Images of Peace → 323

325 → Zdenka Badovinac

Peace as a Space for the Third

339 → Katja Kobolt

Pictures of War, Pictures for Peace: Memory of the People’s Liberation Struggle
in Yugoslav Children’s Literature

357 → Stanislava Barać

“Lest We Forget”: Desanka Maksimović’s Remembrance Politics and Anti-War Engagement

389 → Ovidiu Țichindeleanu

On Seeing the Socialist Culture of Peace

Peacemakers → 413

415 → Nika Grabar

Building Non-Peace

439 → Tina Filipović, Ana Kladnik

Non-State Actors as Active Agents of Peace in Cold War Europe

461 → Svetlana Stefanović

International Women’s Year (1975) and the United Nations Decade for Women:
Equality, Development and Peace, 1976–1985 – The Yugoslav Answer

481 → Sanja Petrović Todosijević

International Children’s Friendship Meeting, 1976–1988
Social Organisation of Children in Socialist Yugoslavia and Education for Peace

513 → Vladimir Petrović

Anatomy of a Lost Chance:
Vance-Owen Peace Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina in Geneva, January 1993

547 → Nataša Kostić

Teaching History and Learning about the Dissolution and Wars of the 1990s
in Reconciliation Processes

569 → Martin Pogačar

Anti-Militarism in the Art of Stane Jagodič

Postscript → 575

575 → Martin Pogačar

Pax Ante Futurum

580 → Notes on Contributors

Petar Dragišić*

Yugoslavia and the Helsinki Summit in 1975

Abstract The paper focuses on Yugoslav views on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) summit, held in 1975 in Helsinki, Finland. Considering the Yugoslav policy of non-alignment, Belgrade strongly supported overcoming the bloc division in Europe and easing Cold War tensions in the 1970s. The research was based on Yugoslav archival documents (files of the President of the Republic's Office) and secondary sources.


Keywords Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Tito, Helsinki, 1975, *détente*

The road to the CSCE

In late 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis heightened the tensions between the USA and the Soviet Union, pushing the world to the brink of a major conflict. The crisis did not last long and was resolved diplomatically, but it showed the danger of an uncontrolled Cold War clash. In the following years, the de-escalation of the Cold War began, and in the late 1960s, the world entered a period of *détente*. Although the West fiercely criticized the intervention of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, this public manifestation of the Brezhnev Doctrine did not seriously hinder the rapprochement between the West and the East. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between Moscow and Washington began in the late 1960s and ended in 1972 with the conclusion of the *Anti-Ballistic Missile*

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Stane Jagodič, *Cataclysm*, photomontage, 2018

*Treaty and the Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.*¹

These agreements confirmed the beginning of a cautious rapprochement between the two Cold War blocs. In addition, the attempts to ease the Cold War tensions by organizing a conference dedicated to the security and stability of Europe went on simultaneously. Already in the early stages of the Cold War, in the mid-1950s, the Soviet head of diplomacy, Vyacheslav Molotov, proposed convening a conference of European states for the purpose of confirming the borders of European states established after the Second World War. In this way, Moscow wanted to encourage the Western European countries to recognize the division of Europe, which guaranteed Soviet unchallenged supremacy east of the Iron Curtain. Nevertheless, in the mid-1950s, the West was not yet ready to make any substantial concessions to its Eastern rival.²

In 1966, the Warsaw Pact adopted in Bucharest the *Declaration on the Strengthening of Peace and Security in Europe*, which underlined the need to adopt measures that would reduce tensions and strengthen security in Europe.³ In this document, the Warsaw Pact proposed to the NATO countries the convening of a conference in Europe dedicated to European security issues, i.e. to “ensuring security in Europe and to establishment of a general European cooperation [...] in the interest of maintaining and strengthening European security”.⁴

Two years later, the Warsaw Pact again proposed convening a conference on European security. At the meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee in Budapest, on 17 March 1969, it was emphasized that holding such a conference would represent “an opportunity for finding together the ways and means to eradicate the division of Europe into armed groupings and to implement peaceful cooperation among European states and peoples”.⁵

Already in April 1969, this Soviet initiative was discussed at a meeting of the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, with Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson. Dobrynin emphasized that “Warsaw Pact countries attach great importance to a conference on European security”, underlining that “the [Budapest] Appeal represents a serious attempt to facilitate security in Europe and cooperation among European States in the economic, technological and scientific fields”. The Soviet ambassador also said that Moscow would not oppose the participation of the US in such a security conference.

Although Richardson did not give a precise answer to the Soviet proposal, he signalled that the Budapest Appeal would be discussed at the NATO Ministerial meeting in April of the same year.⁶

The West soon responded affirmatively to this proposal of the Warsaw Pact, and a few months after the conference in Budapest, Finnish President Urho Kekkonen proposed that Finland host the conference. Invitations were sent to all European countries, as well as to the United States of America and Canada. In November 1972, the multilateral preparatory talks began at the Dipoli conference centre, paving the way for the organization of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).⁷

The Conference on Security and Cooperation officially opened in July 1973 in Helsinki. It was the most significant Cold War diplomatic forum, which brought together representatives of almost all European countries (Albania refused to take part), the USA and Canada.⁸ The Conference culminated in the summit of the highest representatives of the participating states in the Finlandia Hall in Helsinki from 30 July to 1 August 1975, which ended with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. This document was the result of an uneasy compromise between the two blocs. In Helsinki, the West accepted the state of affairs in Europe established after the Second World War, which was the basic demand of Moscow and the Warsaw Pact. The signatories of the Helsinki declaration pledged to respect territorial integrity, sovereignty, and the inviolability of borders, as well as the right of states to choose their own political and ideological model:

The participating States will respect each other's sovereign equality and individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence. They will also respect each other's right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations [...] The participating States regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers. Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State.⁹

1 Bernd Stöver, *Der Kalte Krieg 1947–1991. Geschichte eines radikalen Zeitalters* (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2007), 398–400.

2 John Lewis Gaddis, *Der Kalte Krieg. Eine neue Geschichte* (München: Siedler Verlag, 2007), 232.

3 Stöver, *Der Kalte Krieg*, 397.

4 *Declaration on the Strengthening of Peace and Security in Europe*, Bucharest, 5 July 1966.

5 A. Ross Johnson, *The Warsaw Pact's Campaign for 'European Security', A report prepared for United States Air Force Project Rand*, 1970, 22.

6 Memorandum of Conversation, 4. April 1969, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIX, European Security, Document 1.

7 Jussi M. Hanhimäki, “Détente in Europe, 1962–1975,” in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, vol. II, eds. Melvyn P. Lefler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 213.

8 Tony Judt, *Geschichte Europas von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart* (München-Wien: Carl Hanser Verlag, 2006), 568–569.

9 *The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, Aug. 1, 1975

Nevertheless, the Soviets had to pay a high price for these Western concessions, accepting that the Helsinki Declaration should include guarantees that the signatory states would respect human rights and freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief:

The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. They will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development. Within this framework, the participating States will recognize and respect the freedom of the individual to profess and practice, alone or in community with others, religion or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.¹⁰

Immediately after the signing of the Helsinki Declaration, the Americans considered the concessions that had been made to the Soviets in Helsinki too generous. On the other hand, Moscow did not attach much importance to the part of the Helsinki Final Act that dealt with the issue of human rights.¹¹ However, in the following years, it turned out that this segment of the Helsinki Final Act had greatly encouraged the anti-regime structures east of the Iron Curtain and thereby significantly contributed to the destabilization and collapse of the Eastern Bloc.¹²

Yugoslavia and negotiations on the Helsinki Final Act

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Yugoslavia continued to develop the concept of an equidistant policy between the two blocs. Although the intervention of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 had frightened the regime in Belgrade, which feared a similar scenario in Yugoslavia, it did not lead to a significant change in Yugoslav foreign policy. Yugoslavia criticized the intervention in Czechoslovakia, but this criticism did not lead to a more notable deterioration in Yugoslav-Soviet relations. In September 1969, the talks between Josip Broz Tito and the head of Soviet diplomacy, Andrei Gromyko, signalled the normalization of relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR. In early 1970, in a conversation with the US Secretary of State William Rogers, the Yugoslav president

underlined that Yugoslavia's relations with the Soviet Union were significantly better than in previous years.¹³

The visit of American President Richard Nixon to Yugoslavia in the fall of 1970 once again confirmed Yugoslavia's non-aligned position. In a conversation with Nixon, Tito criticized the presence of both the Soviet and American fleets in the Mediterranean.¹⁴ At the same time, Yugoslavia increasingly focused on Europe, trying to improve bilateral relations with Western European countries.¹⁵ This was confirmed by the international activity of the Yugoslav president in the early 1970s. In 1970 and 1971, Josip Broz Tito visited several European countries (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain and Italy).¹⁶ At that time, the central focus of the Yugoslav European policy was the issue of European security. For this reason, Belgrade not only carefully monitored the Conference on Security and Cooperation, but also actively participated in the negotiations on the Helsinki Final Act, promoting its non-aligned strategy together with other non-bloc countries in Europe.

In its efforts to influence the content of the Helsinki Final Act, Yugoslavia did not act alone, but closely cooperated with neutral (Austria, Switzerland, Finland, Sweden) and non-aligned (Malta, Cyprus) participants in the Helsinki process. This group advocated improving the level of security in Europe by overcoming Cold War divisions. Hence, Yugoslavia, together with other neutral and non-aligned countries, contributed significantly to settling the disagreements between the members of the Eastern and Western blocs and to finding compromise solutions.

The role of Yugoslavia and other neutral states was particularly significant in the negotiations on the territorial issues in Europe, given the strikingly different positions of Eastern and Western participants in the CSCE on this topic. While the member states of the Warsaw Pact advocated for the inviolability of borders in Europe, the Western participants in the Conference were against such guarantees, which would have made German unification impossible. Western opposition to the recognition of existing borders in Europe also ran against Yugoslav interests, as the regime in Belgrade feared possible Italian attempts to change the Yugoslav-Italian border, established by the Memorandum of Understanding in 1954. For this reason, Belgrade backed the Soviet proposal, with an amendment, however, allowing the possibility of changing borders consensually. The Yugoslav proposal, supported by other neutral participants of the Conference, including Romania, was eventually included in the Helsinki Final Act: "They [signatories] consider

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Jussi M. Hanhimäki, "Détente in Europe, 1962–1975," 214.

¹² John Lewis Gaddis, *Der Kalte Krieg*, 236–237; Tony Judt, *Geschichte Europas*, 750–751; Henry Kissinger, *Weltordnung* (München: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 2014), 351.

¹³ Ljubodrag Dimić, "Povratak u Evropu. Jugoslavija i pitanje evropske bezbednosti krajem 60-ih i početkom 70-ih godina," *Glas*, no. 428 (2018): 75–82.

¹⁴ Ibid., 89.

¹⁵ Ibid., 70.

¹⁶ Ibid., 91–94.

that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement".¹⁷

In addition, Yugoslavia, alongside other neutral countries participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, played a prominent role in the discussions on notifications of military manoeuvres in Europe. While the Western countries insisted on giving notification of all military manoeuvres involving more than 12,000 soldiers, the Eastern Bloc proposed limiting the notification clause to those involving more than 40,000 soldiers. Yugoslavia and other non-aligned and neutral participating states proposed the obligation to give notification of only major military manoeuvres, as well as to invite foreign observers to military manoeuvres.¹⁸ These proposals paved the way for a compromise solution, which was eventually codified in the Helsinki Final Act:

Notification will be given of major military manoeuvres exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with any possible air or naval components [...] Notification will be given of major military manoeuvres which take place on the territory, in Europe, of any participating State as well as, if applicable, in the adjoining sea area and air space [...]¹⁹

Yugoslavia supported the Western concept of the so-called *third basket*, which, among other things, dealt with "cultural and educational exchanges, broader dissemination of information [and] contacts between people". The Yugoslav delegation at the CSCE argued that "freer circulation of people and ideas" would contribute to the strengthening of security in Europe. Nevertheless, the Yugoslavs warned against misusing this type of direct and open communication as a pretext for interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. Such an attitude of the Yugoslav regime indicated Belgrade's anxiety about the political and ideological consequences of the implementation of the *third basket* of the Helsinki Final Act.²⁰ The Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs was resolute about the general intention of the Western participants in the CSCE to encourage the free flow of people and ideas:

The NATO countries officially expressed the view that the free flow of people and ideas would lead to better mutual understanding, that it, therefore, represents a fundamental prerequisite for strengthening European security and that, hence, the issues of cooperation in the field of human contacts, information, culture and education should be given full attention. The background of the attitude of the NATO countries was certainly broader. Their rapid economic and technological development, i.e. their way of life based on such development, provides them with certain advantages in this segment compared to the Warsaw Pact countries. The NATO countries try to use these advantages to the greatest extent possible to strengthen their ideological penetration into the Warsaw Pact, as well as to loosen the ideological structures of the WP countries.²¹

During the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Yugoslavia, alongside other neutral participating states, as well as Romania, advocated for the continuity of the Conference, that is, for turning the Conference into a continuous process. In this regard, Yugoslavia proposed occasional meetings of a coordinating body, which would be held after the end of the Conference in Helsinki. Both the Eastern and Western blocs expressed serious reservations about this initiative of Yugoslavia, Romania and neutral countries. According to Yugoslav sources, the reservations of Moscow and the Warsaw Pact countries about the continuity of the CSCE were caused by their fear that stricter control of the implementation of the *third basket* of the Helsinki Final Act would undermine the political and ideological stability of the Eastern Bloc.²² On the other hand, within the Western bloc, the staunchest opponent of the continuity of CSCE was France. According to an analysis of the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the French believed that the continuity of the CSCE would have a negative impact on the development of the European Community and the role of France in the relations between the East and West. In addition, Paris believed that the continuity of the CSCE would strengthen the American presence in Europe, which did not correspond to the French vision of Europe.²³

The issue of the continuity of CSCE was discussed at the Helsinki summit in late July and early August 1975. According to Yugoslav sources, FR Germany was also against the idea, while the continuity of CSCE was partially acceptable for Great Britain.²⁴ The reports of the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the Helsinki summit stated that Sweden and Romania supported the idea of the continuity of CSCE. According to

17 Dragan Bogetić, "Jugoslovenski nastup na Konferenciji o evropskoj bezbednosti i saradnji u Helsinkiju 1973-1975.," *Istorija 20. Veka*, no. 2 (2016): 152-153; Leo Mates, *Međunarodni odnosi socijalističke Jugoslavije* (Beograd: Bigz 1976), 178; *The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, 1 August 1975.

18 Bogetić, "Jugoslovenski nastup," 155-156.

19 *he Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, 1 August 1975.

20 Arhiv Jugoslavije (Archives of Yugoslavia - AJ), Fond 837, Kabinet predsednika Republike (President of the Republic's Office - KPR), I-2/63, Savezni sekretarijat za inostrane poslove, Izveštaj o Konferenciji o bezbednosti i saradnji u Evropi, 13 October 1975.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.; Bogetić, "Jugoslovenski nastup," 156-157.

23 AJ, KPR, I-2/63, Savezni sekretarijat za inostrane poslove, Izveštaj o Konferenciji o bezbednosti i saradnji u Evropi, 13 October 1975.

24 AJ, KPR, I-2/63, Služba za spoljnopolićka pitanja, Savezna republika Nemačka (kratka informacija), 24. jul 1975; AJ, KPR, I-2/63, Služba za spoljnopolićka pitanja, Velika Britanija, 24 July 1975.

these documents, Romanians were confident that “extending the process of multilateral negotiations in Europe would facilitate more independent actions by states, thus weakening the Cold War constraints and creating conditions for overcoming bloc divisions”. Besides, it was underlined that the positions of Yugoslavia and Romania regarding the issue of the continuity of CSCE were almost identical.²⁵

Despite major disagreements regarding the continuity of the CSCE, the participating states decided to continue this multilateral process. The signatories agreed to postpone the decision on the continuity of CSCE until the meeting of the representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1977 in Belgrade.²⁶

In an analysis of the results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs underlined the expectation that the Conference would have a positive impact on relations between the European countries. However, the Yugoslav analysts stressed the necessity of fully implementing the conclusions adopted in Helsinki. In this regard, they did not rule out possible obstructions from both the West and the East. However, this scepticism did not affect the general attitude of the Yugoslav regime towards the Conference on Security and Cooperation. Shortly after the end of the Helsinki summit, in the summer of 1975, the Yugoslav government instructed the federal ministries and several other institutions to start the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act.²⁷

Yugoslavia and the outcome of the summit in Helsinki

In his speech at the summit in Helsinki, the Yugoslav president did not hide his satisfaction with the results of the Conference. Tito described the Helsinki conference as “a great moment in the history of Europe” and an indication that Europe had left its past behind, starting to look towards the future. In this regard, Broz underlined the darkest moments of European history: colonialism, fascism and tensions at the beginning of the Cold War. The Yugoslav president warned against restricting the spirit of Helsinki to the European continent, suggesting that the process launched at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe should encompass the whole world and all important international problems. Josip Broz Tito underlined that détente should not be applied only to the relations between the two major ideological and geopolitical blocs, given that the easing of tensions between the superpowers had not eliminated all crisis hotspots in the Third World. Although he praised the results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in

25 AJ, KPR, I-2/63, Služba za spoljopolitička pitanja, SR Rumunija (kratka informacija), 24 July 1975; AJ, KPR, I-2/63, Služba za spoljopolitička pitanja, Kraljevina Švedska (kratka informacija), 24 July 1975.

26 Bogetić, “Jugoslovenski nastup,” 158–159.

27 AJ, KPR, I-2/63, Izveštaj o Konferenciji o bezbednosti i saradnji u Evropi, 13 October 1975.

Europe, Tito emphasized that the Helsinki Accords would not solve all security problems in Europe and worldwide. Consequently, the Yugoslav president remarked that the CSCE “is not the end, but only the beginning of a process”.²⁸

As an unofficial leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, in his Helsinki speech, Josip Broz Tito emphasized the need for the elimination of the bloc division, which he perceived as a major obstacle to the normalization of global relations: “When we, as a non-aligned country, advocate for overcoming blocs, we do so intending to remove everything that divides countries and peoples and impedes their cooperation, and because we are deeply convinced that this is an essential condition for lasting security and peace in Europe and the world”.²⁹

In a conversation with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson on the sidelines of the summit in Helsinki on 31 July 1975, the Yugoslav leader expressed his expectation that the evolution of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe would eventually lead to the liquidation of the bloc division in Europe. In addition, Broz underlined that full implementation of the Helsinki Accords would inevitably result in the disappearance of the Cold War blocs.³⁰

Nevertheless, Josip Broz Tito made slightly different predictions about the outcome of the Helsinki process in a conversation with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in November 1973 in Kiev. On that occasion, Broz expressed his belief that the evolution of the Conference on Security and Cooperation would eventually weaken NATO.³¹ It is striking that, unlike at the meeting with British Prime Minister Wilson, the Yugoslav president accidentally or intentionally omitted to speculate about the potential consequences of the Helsinki process for the Soviet bloc.

However, after the summit in Helsinki, Josip Broz Tito was less optimistic than in the talks with Wilson and Brezhnev. In a press statement at the Belgrade airport, upon his return from Helsinki, the Yugoslav president described the Conference on Security and Cooperation as a “historic event”, adding that it would open a new phase in the relations between the European states “if the principles we all accepted are respected and fully implemented”. Tito, however, added that the Conference could not solve the major problems of European security and that overcoming all obstacles to improve security in Europe would require “much more effort and time”.³²

28 “Govor predsednika Tita na Konferenciji o evropskoj bezbednosti i saradnji. Prekretnica ka koegzistenciji i miru,” *Borba*, 1 August 1975.

29 Ibid.

30 AJ, KPR, I-2/63, Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita sa britanskim premijerom E. Vilsonom, 31 July 1975. godine u Helsinkiju.

31 “Запись Бесед Л.И. Брежнев с И. Броз Тито о развитии двусторонних советско-югославских отношений, о внешнеполитических проблемах и о международном положении во время визита в Советский Союз 12–15 ноября 1973 г.,” in *Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Jugoslavije, Jugoslavija – SSSR. Susreti i razgovori na najvišem nivou rukovodilaca Jugoslavije i SSSR 1965–1980*, vol. 2, eds. Miladin Milošević, Vladimir P. Tarasov, Natalija G. Tomilina (Beograd: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2016), 635.

32 “Predsednik Republike se vratio iz Helsinkija u Beograd. Jača atmosfera dobre volje i sporazumevanja,” *Borba*, 3 August 1975.

Nevertheless, the Conference brought a short-term but concrete benefit to Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was assigned to host the first follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which took place from 9 October 1977 to 9 March 1978.³³ According to historian Jovan Čavoški, Tito's intensive diplomatic activity at the summit in Helsinki was, among other things, motivated by the desire of the regime in Belgrade to be entrusted with this task.³⁴ Another palpable consequence of CSCE was the final settlement of the Yugoslav-Italian territorial dispute. Only a few months after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act (November 1975), the Yugoslav and Italian governments solved the border dispute that had been souring the relations of the two countries for decades by signing the so-called Treaty of Osimo. This agreement was considered the first tangible result of the Helsinki process.³⁵

Besides, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe offered the Yugoslav regime an ample opportunity to promote its view of international politics, based on the principles of neutrality and non-alignment, and, at least for a short time, to contribute to the shaping of détente in Europe in the mid-1970s.

Summary

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which began in July 1973, ended with the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act, signed on 1 August 1975 by the highest representatives of European countries (except Albania), the United States of America and Canada at the summit in Helsinki. The Helsinki Final Act was the result of a sensible compromise between the East and West. Given its strategy of neutrality and non-alignment, Yugoslavia supported easing Cold War tensions and overcoming the bloc division in Europe. Hence, the outcome of the Helsinki summit was largely in line with Yugoslav interests.

At the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Yugoslavia cooperated closely with other neutral and non-aligned participating states (Austria, Cyprus, Malta, Sweden, Finland, and Switzerland), significantly influencing the outcome of the CSCE. The numerous conversations of Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito with the most important European leaders during the CSCE summit in Helsinki in late July and early August 1975 indicated Yugoslavia's prominent role in attempts to maintain détente in Europe in the mid-1970s.

33 Jovan Čavoški, "Čekajući Evropu u Beogradu: Jugoslavija i Beogradski sastanak KEBS-a 1977–1978," *Tokovi istorije*, no. 2 (2019): 187.

34 Jovan Čavoški, "Čuvajući duh Helsinkija: Jugoslavija i kontinuitet KEBS-a 1975–1976," *Tokovi istorije*, no. 1 (2019): 148–149.

35 Saša Mišić, *Pomirenje na Jadranu. Jugoslavija i Italija na putu ka Osimskim sporazumima iz 1975* (Beograd: Fakultet političkih nauka, 2018), 360–377.

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