


Peace Policies and Practices in Yugoslavia and Beyond



PEACE, UNCONDITIONAL!

Edited by
Sanja Petrović Todosijević and Martin Pogačar

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Belgrade, Ljubljana
2025

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Nemanja Stanimirović*

Yugoslav Dissidents as Agents of Peace in the Era of Détente

Abstract This paper explores the intellectual history of the transformation of the peace concept during the Cold War. More specifically, it delves into the metamorphosis that occurred between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s and how this new conception of peace transferred to the Yugoslav intellectual scene. To trace this process, the paper reconstructs the direct context and activities of two Yugoslav dissidents, Ivan Supek and Mihailo Marković, within international peace-seeking organisations, primarily the Pugwash movement and the nascent peace research institutes. The paper highlights the crucial role played by these two intellectuals in translating a new conception of peace to the Yugoslav setting, which, in turn, influenced the emerging dissident scene. The enquiry is based mostly on the journal *Encyclopedia Moderna*, hitherto largely neglected by researchers, and archival material from Sir Joseph Rotblat's papers at the Churchill Archive Centre and Mihailo Marković's fonds at the Historical Archive of Belgrade.

Keywords Peace, détente, Ivan Supek, Mihailo Marković, Pugwash, Yugoslavia

Peace must be one of the most mysterious and contradictory terms. Namely, it is a concept adhered to by practically everyone in modern history and, at the same time, one that has spawned infinite variants of interpretation. Etymologically, in its proto-Germanic origins, peace (*friþuz*; *friðr* in Old English) even carried the meaning of “a state of love and protection”, whilst the Latin (*pax*, *paces*) origin indicated “a state of mere non-violence”. Yet, as the famous *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* indicated, since modern times and “the victory of reason”, peace is not understood simply as a temporal suspension of war between states, but has picked up a life of its own to become one of our civilisation's primary



Stane Jagodič, *Perspective*, photomontage, 1985

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mission.¹ Thus, it is fairly unsurprising that, today, in these belligerent and uncertain times, all societies simultaneously desire peace yet have a different understanding of it. One of the contributions that social scientists can make to resolving these issues is helping us realise how we have come to this present conception of peace. As will be demonstrated in the paper, this question was tightly linked with another – namely, how to attain it. To grapple with the multilayered nature of this currently most sought-after concept, one is obliged to look at the previous utilisations of the term, and perhaps even trace a particular interpretation's lineage to the present day. Ideas and perceptions neither exist nor travel by themselves, but are carried by concrete individuals and are usually engraved into the chronicles of particular institutions. This journey thus entails contouring the contexts of different utterances of the word “peace”, a slippery endeavour that requires relinquishing the fixed meaning of the term – as various people understand peace disparately, so does the same person at a different point in time or space.

This paper aims to connect several dots within this wide web by narrating the story of two Yugoslav intellectuals who dedicated significant mental effort to peace in the late 1960s and early 1970s. More concretely, it will demonstrate how Ivan Supek and Mihailo Marković introduced some of the ideas and concepts from the international scene into the Yugoslav context, added a couple of local spices to the recipe, and played an important role in establishing institutions upholding the tradition of peace.

The goal of the paper is not to present their stances on all the crucial world conflicts of the time. Rather, the focus will primarily be on the historical context, that is, their activity, the debates they were engaged in and the explanatory answers that they derived from tackling the issues of war and peace. It will be argued that they were mostly emblematic of the *Zeitgeist* – insistently seeking an international framework for a peaceful conflict resolution, and of the humanist orientation – pioneering the centrality of an individual instead of a state in all questions, including that of peace-seeking, by linking it with democratisation.

Despite being relatively paradigmatic of their global social group, that is, not sticking out too much with their arguments, the two thinkers are relevant precisely because of their national context. Namely, as will be further explored in the concluding remarks, the relationship between a critic and her state is terribly significant for our present-day drawing of the lessons of peace. The necessity of finding ever finer nuances within the anti-war argument whilst, at the same time, criticising the regime which is likewise at least nominally fighting for peace, as the Non-Alignment orientation represented the cornerstone of the Yugoslav regime, illustriously highlights this issue.

1 See: Wilhelm Janssen, “Friede,” in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland. Band 2 E-G*, ed. Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1975), 586–587.

A cold Peace?

As hinted above, antagonistic visions of peace have constantly reproduced an atmosphere of mistrust. Never before was this as strongly pronounced as in the 20th century, and the Cold War is perhaps the most paradigmatic example of this paradox. Namely, the appearance of the first instances of *world wars* (and even more so, the prospect of a nuclear war) gave peace the utopian and progressive value of a condition necessary for the survival of the entire human race. “The war of states thus inevitably becomes a crusade for the future kingdom of peace”.² For example, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the two opposing military alliances during the postwar period, have unequivocal commitment to peace inscribed in the very first sentences of their founding acts’ preambles.

Indeed, the latter has stressed relatively more the intrinsic peacefulness of its theoretical underpinning and has attempted to capitalise on this fortunate inheritance by launching transnational front organisations dedicated to peace – most notably the World Peace Council (WPC).³ Analogously, the Soviets have looked more favourably on the majority of the instances of peace-oriented initiatives that sprang on the continuum somewhere between them and Washington (apart perhaps from the UN), seeing them as useful platforms to demonstrate the natural compatibility of socialism and peace, especially in the early postwar period.⁴ Namely, in the traditional Marxist view, as a system based on class antagonism and exploitation, capitalism is inherently violent, and humanity will not be able to attain peace without overthrowing the capitalist mode of production. Consequentially, once the USSR prevails and brings forth a socialist society, eternal peace will ensue.

While the USA can likewise be said to have pursued comparable “peace-loving” projects, i.e. Food for Peace and Atoms for Peace (or rather, the International Atomic Energy Agency),⁵ it was agonisingly more suspicious of such enterprises, fearing the Soviet manipulation of the concept.⁶ What the West did manage to utilise from the peace arsenal within the Cold War arena was the science of it. Namely, below the sphere of actual or

2 Janssen, “Friede,” 588–591.

3 See: Günter Wernicke, “The Communist-Led World Peace Council and the Western Peace Movements: The Fetters of Bipolarity and Some Attempts to Break Them in the Fifties and Early Sixties,” *Peace & Change* 23 (2002), 265–311.

4 See: Philip Deery, “The Dove Flies East: Whitehall, Warsaw and the 1950 World Peace Congress,” *Australian Journal of Politics and History* vol. 48, no. 4 (2002), 449–468, and Gerhard Wettig, “The Last Soviet Offensive in the Cold War: Emergence and Development of the Campaign against NATO Euromissiles, 1979–1983,” *Cold War History* 9, no. 1 (2009), 79–110. For the Soviet attitude to PCSWA, see: Fabian Lüscher, “Party, Peers, Publicity: Overlapping Loyalties in Early Soviet Pugwash, 1955–1960,” in *Science, (Anti-)Communism and Diplomacy. History of Modern Science*: Vol. 3, ed. Alison Kraft and Carola Sachse (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 121–155.

5 For the former, see: Mikko Laaksonen, “Food for leverage – United States food aid as a political weapon of the Cold War,” (MA diss., Tampere University, 2023), 30–52. For the latter, see: John Krige, “Atoms for Peace, Scientific Internationalism, and Scientific Intelligence,” *Osiris* 21, no. 1 (2006), 161–181, and Martin J. Medhurst, “Atoms for Peace and Nuclear Hegemony: The Rhetorical Structure of a Cold War Campaign,” *Armed Forces & Society* 23, no. 4 (1997), 571–593.

6 CIA’s report on WPC is quite telling in that regard. See: CIA, *The World Peace Council. A Soviet-Sponsored International Communist Front* (1971), unpublished.

aspiring “peace practitioners” lies the inferno of “peace sophists”, where the studies of peace, built on a dense network of research institutes,⁷ have occupied numerous scholarly fields. Although not necessarily “first-(nor even second-)order cold warriors”,⁸ peace researchers have helped disseminate the contours of the US worldview and thus effectively prepared the ground for its ideological offensive around issues such as “human rights” from the mid-1970s.⁹ In other words, the study of peace has become one of the instruments of war. Briefly, both peace-attaining and peace-studying can lead, and have led, to conflictual situations, or have at least failed to deliver peace.

What is more, peace quite quickly came to be seen as a mechanism for penetrating another country’s jurisdiction, which draws on an important long-standing legal dilemma. Namely, two legal principles competing in the international law sphere, one upholding the territorial integrity of a state as its cornerstone and another allowing intervention on a humanitarian basis, likewise saw their struggle’s culmination during the Cold War. Whilst the latter was already gaining prominence at the dawn of the 20th century,¹⁰ it was not until the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the UN, with its charters based on the protection of an individual, that it prevailed over the former.¹¹ Although both superpowers would probably object to that connotation, this emergence of global institutions corresponded to the “imperialist stage” of each of their respective development – when they had outgrown their own national boundaries and sought to expand and exert influence abroad.¹² However, the fact that both the USA and USSR reached this level of maturity at more or less the same time informed caution with discarding the principle of territorial integrity for the simple fact that the competitor might equally exploit the space previously unclaimed by the other.¹³

This deadlock was ultimately broken with the fall of the Soviet Union and, in turn, the end of the Cold War, tailed by a rapid escalation of the “humanitarian intervention” principle.¹⁴ However, some of the largest cracks were visible already in the early 1970s. The

literature has often stressed the relevance of the 1975 Helsinki Accords, especially the third basket, which contained provisions on upholding human rights, as a huge blow to the Eastern Bloc (despite it originally being perceived as a victory for the USSR).¹⁵ Whilst it might be an overstatement to claim that the human rights issue, or one international agreement, caused the end of the Cold War,¹⁶ the Soviet Union’s incapability of either sheltering from or matching the ensuing American ideological offensive is reflective of the relative strength both superpowers wielded at the time.

The importance of this swing does not lie merely in its militarily-political consequences: as is argued in this paper, it also produced a novel understanding of the peace concept. The Marxist strand had previously destabilised our comprehension of peace as a form of contract preventing conflict between states and instead moved the arena to the internal state sphere by stressing the inherent class struggle.¹⁷ The apparent persistence of capitalism, however, supported the efforts to forsake the class perspective. Thus, with the admission that the key impetus for war’s constant respawning indeed lies in the domestic field, a new axis of opposing poles was brought forward – that of a state and an individual. By reframing in a novel setting Kant’s old argument that no state accountable to its citizens would wage war, the neoliberal paradigm merged democracy as a form of government with the prospect of peace. This sparked numerous accounts stressing the danger civil society (a sum of individual relationships) faced from the state, whether in its left-wing form of Habermas protecting the “lifeworld” or outright, as in Arendt’s theory of totalitarian states occupying the society. In short, only undemocratic governments go to war, and once those are defeated, an “end of history” would presumably ensue. Effectively, as Adam Smith’s claim that economic cooperation necessarily produces new value was never questioned, the irrational war-mongering behaviour of a state neglecting its citizens’ interests could only be explained by references to intentional disregard for human rights by individual usurpers of state power. The novel understanding of peace is thus highly interlinked with increasing stress on the individual and effective governance.

This huge shift did not occur in a vacuum but followed a certain course of events. Perhaps the crucial turning point in the superpowers’ negotiations came when the US leadership started conditioning further economic benefits to the USSR upon the enactment and fulfilment of some human rights-related policies. Namely, in the aftermath of the renewed tensions between the Arab countries and Israel in 1967, where

7 Frances Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War. The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: The New Press, 2013).

8 Gilman Nils, “The Cold War as Intellectual Force Fields,” *Modern Intellectual History* 13, no. 2 (2016), 507–23.

9 This shift was well captured by Barbara J. Keys in her book *Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014).

10 The gradual progress of the principle of humanitarian intervention can be traced in the contributions to the brilliant volume Fabian Klose, eds. *The Emergence of Humanitarian Intervention. Ideas and Practice from the Nineteenth Century to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

11 Thomas Franck demonstrated this quite elegantly with the corresponding notions of right of self-determination and *uti possidetis*. See: Thomas M. Franck, “Postmodern tribalism and the right to secession,” in *Peoples and Minorities in International Law*, ed. Catherine Brölmann et. al. (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 3–27.

12 For the most coherent treatment of Marxist utilisations of imperialisms see: Alex Callinicos, *Imperialism and Global Political Economy* (London: Polity, 2009).

13 Chris Harman, “Analysing Imperialism,” *International Socialism* 99, no. 2 (2003), accessed 25 September 25, 2024, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/harman/2003/xx/imperialism.htm>.

14 See: China Miéville, *Between equal rights. A Marxist Theory of International Law* (London: Brill, 2005).

15 See, for example, Douglas Selvage, “The Limits of Repression: Soviet Bloc Security Services vs. Transnational Helsinki Networks, 1976–1986,” in *The CSCE and the end of the Cold War. Diplomacy, Societies and Human Rights, 1972–1990*, ed. Nicolas Badalassi and Sarah B. Snyder (New York: Berghahn, 2019), 207–229.

16 A critique of such a view can be found in Barbara J. Falk, “Resistance and Dissent in Central and Eastern Europe: An Emerging Historiography,” *East European Politics and Societies* 25, no. 2 (2011), 318–360.

17 See: Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Famous is Karl Liebknecht’s cry: “The enemy is at home!”

the Soviets sided with the former, the rapidly increasing emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union caused the government to implement “a diploma tax”, intending to deter the brain drain. Lobbying by the American-based Jewish organisations on their compatriots’ behalf was picked up in 1972 by two senior US officials who insisted on the Soviet relaxation of emigration policies as a prerequisite for ratifying an American-Soviet trade deal.¹⁸ The Brezhnev administration angrily refused this stipulation, highlighting that this was meddling with their internal jurisdiction. What altered the formula and ultimately convinced the US government to exploit the benefits of this venture was its amalgamation with the struggle of the Soviet dissidents. Most notably, Andrei Sakharov (the creator of the Soviet nuclear bomb) followed up his long-term dissident criticism of the Soviet regime with a letter to the US Congress encouraging them to link the international peace negotiations with the domestic issue of human rights in the USSR.¹⁹ Practically gaining a foothold inside enemy territory by teaming up with the dissidents, the US, especially from the Carter administration onwards, took a much firmer stance on the issue of human rights when dealing with the Soviet representatives. Numerous institutes and scholars “concerned” about peace immediately sprang up in the West, supporting the new narrative, albeit now consistently in collusion with some dissatisfied Soviet citizens.²⁰ Conversely, this international recognition of their domestic struggles gave a deeper meaning to the dissident activity.²¹ Another famous Soviet dissident, Roy Medvedev, represented perhaps the last line of the argumentation protecting the USSR regime – admitting the necessity of reforms in the sphere of human rights but decoupling that issue from international cooperation.²²

Paradoxically, in the preceding years, it was the US that had been globally vilified, primarily for the atrocities their army committed in Vietnam. Namely, just months after the 1967 WPC-sponsored conference on Vietnam in Stockholm, where a call for an international boycott of the US was proclaimed,²³ the International War Crimes Tribunal

(better known as the Russell Tribunal) was held in the same city, finding the US guilty of numerous violations of international law in Vietnam.²⁴ The latter was not sponsored or controlled by the Soviet Union. On the contrary, it consisted of some of the most eminent left-wing thinkers who unequivocally distanced themselves from Moscow, including Lord Bertrand Russell, Jean-Paul Sartre, James Baldwin, Simone de Beauvoir, Isaac Deutscher, young Tariq Ali, and also Vladimir Dedijer, a prominent Yugoslav historian and [at the time still loyal]²⁵ Party member, who served as the vice-chair for the event. It was a first-grade international event,²⁶ undoubtedly hurting the US,²⁷ preceding the Tet Offensive by merely a month.²⁸ To paraphrase Jürgen Habermas – it was a legitimisation crisis of late capitalism.²⁹

Still, these undoubtedly lowest points in the global reputation of the USA were not capitalised on by the USSR. As Jan-Werner Müller put it – “The range of challenges [...] the supposed weakening of Western democracies appeared as an entirely domestic phenomenon; [...] it seemed to have nothing to do with threats from the Soviet Union and its allies. Consequently, proposed solutions to the ‘crisis of democracy’ were also fashioned in domestic terms”.³⁰ Indeed, the USSR was not without its share of criticism – most notably in relation to the 1968 aggression against Czechoslovakia.

Instead, and consequentially, the Western European social-democratic parties reaped the most benefits from this exchange of blows, attaining sufficient political capital to resolve the region’s security concerns. Namely, with Europe as the perpetual stage of escalating frictions between two superpowers, meanwhile halved by the “Iron Curtain” and the “two Germanys” even more palpably divided by the Berlin Wall, the nuclear and conventional arms proliferation seemed to be most pressing issue precisely for the

18 For the effects of the Jackson-Vanik amendment (named after the two Congressmen who sponsored it) see: Geoffrey P. Levin, “Before Soviet Jewry’s Happy Ending: The Cold War and America’s Long Debate over Jackson-Vanik, 1976–1989,” *Shofar* 33, no. 3 (2015), 63–85.

19 Barbara Martin, “The Sakharov-Medvedev Debate on Détente and Human Rights. From the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Helsinki Accords,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 23, no. 3 (2021), 138–174.

20 For an example of such a group, see: Elisabetta Vezzosi, “The Committee of Concerned Scientists and the Helsinki Final Act. ‘Refusenik’ Scientists, Détente and Human Rights,” in *The CSCE and the end of the Cold War. Diplomacy, Societies and Human Rights, 1972–1990*, ed. Nicolas Badalassi and Sarah B. Snyder (New York: Berghahn, 2019), 119–150.

21 Kacper Szulecki, *Dissidents in Communist Central Europe. Human Rights and the Emergence of New Transnational Actors* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

22 See: Roy Medvedev, “Democracy and détente,” in *Political Essays* (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1976), 13–29. This is not to say that Medvedev intentionally defended the regime, although there have been some controversies about his dissident status. See: Martin, “The Sakharov-Medvedev Debate on Détente and Human Rights,” 172.

23 A report on the conference was published in the Yugoslav *Pugwash* journal. See: Ljubomir Josifović, “Svetska konferencija o Vijetnamu,” *Encyclopedia Moderna* 2, no. 5–6 (1967), 279–291.

24 See: Mehta Harish, “North Vietnam’s Informal Diplomacy with Bertrand Russell: Peace Activism and the International War Crimes Tribunal,” *Peace & Change* 37, no. 1 (2012), 64–94, and Marcos Zunino, “Subversive Justice: The Russell Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal and Transitional Justice,” *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 10, no. 2 (2016), 1–19.

25 Following Tito’s death, Dedijer published three controversial volumes that cast a shadow on the late leader’s life.

26 Tariq Ali’s memoir testifies to this. Tariq Ali, *Street Fighting Years. An Autobiography of the Sixties* (London: Verso, 2005), 193–196. See also the short amateur documentary filmed at the time of the Tribunal – *The Russell Tribunal*, directed by Staffan Lamm (Hjalmar Palmgren, 2003), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YEN01rPJ9-I>.

27 See how the US responded to the Tribunal in Luke J. Stewart, “Too loud to rise above the silence: the United States vs. the International War Crimes Tribunal, 1966–1967,” *The Sixties* 11, no. 1 (2018), 17–45.

28 The Tet or Spring Offensive by the National Liberation Front of North Vietnam launched on 30 January. It was repelled by the US and South Vietnam in military terms, but the very fact that Viet Cong had launched an offensive at all had a huge ideological and psychological effect, which Ali conveys brilliantly: “If a predominantly agricultural country could resist the world’s most powerful nation, then surely a determined working class in France or Italy could dislodge its own bourgeoisie”, Below on the same page, Ali reports how the Vietnamese saw the global solidarity campaign: “Your struggle is very important for us, it is our second front.” Ali, *Street Fighting Years*, 178.

29 Jürgen Habermas, “What Does A Crisis Mean Today? Legitimation Problems In Late Capitalism,” *Social Research* 40, no. 4 (1973), 643–67.

30 Jan-Werner Müller, “The Cold War and the intellectual history of the late twentieth century,” in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Volume 3: Endings*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 3–4.

Europeans, pushing their leaders to launch détente policies even before the superpowers.³¹ The Europeans' feeling of powerlessness as "junior partners" hastened their efforts to integrate the continent, gradually defusing the global tensions.³² Brandt's approach to diplomacy – stressing the increasing openness, gradual improvements, exchanges and personal connections – famously paved the way for the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975, a forum that increased united Europe's combined weight on the global power scales. With Brandt winning the Nobel Peace Prize and the Scandinavian countries, with their long-standing social-democratic traditions, serving as an important site for meetings of peace initiatives (as will be shown below), the period 1965–1975 seemed to be the decade of social democracy.³³

Furthermore, it was the European social democrats' strive for equidistance from both communism and liberalism that particularly hit the chord for many people in that period. Having the best of both worlds – the equality of a socialist economy and the freedom of liberal democracy – seemed to complement the climate of détente. Analogously, gravitating towards the space between the two blocs, they did not simply copy and follow the Western narrative on human rights.³⁴ Instead, they insisted on going beyond mere individual political rights and including collective social and economic rights, attainable solely by restructuring international economic relations, for which, in turn, détente was necessary.³⁵ These notions found very fertile ground in Yugoslavia. On the one side, the Yugoslav self-management economic model,³⁶ inaugurated following the country's fallout with the Eastern bloc in 1948,³⁷ elicited much continuous interest among the Western social democrats, who were likewise disappointed in Stalinism but refused to abandon

the socialist cause.³⁸ On the other, and more relevantly for this paper, the pivotal Yugoslav role in establishing the Non-Alignment Movement, which managed to gather most of the newly established countries around the globe unwilling to commit to the superpowers' bootsoles,³⁹ inspired the shared journey of Western European social democrats.

In sum, it is the distance between Sakharov and Medvedev that reflects the borders within which one should consider the arguments and peace-related initiatives of Supek and Marković. Whilst they were familiar with the Soviet dissidents, it is not claimed here that the two Yugoslavs were necessarily aware of their arguments' connection to the wider Cold War dynamics. Nevertheless, as two philosophers of humanist orientation, they made themselves a part of a global anti-etatist trend. What is more, it was precisely their similarities with the Western European social democratic parties, however unconscious, that meant they occupied the same ideational space. In short, for the Yugoslav dissidents, this meant supporting initiatives like the Russell Tribunal and the issue of human rights (albeit in their wider form – including social and economic rights), calling for economic, scientific, cultural and interpersonal exchanges between the blocs in Brandt's style, but also stressing the primacy of détente for a deeper reconfiguration of global inequality. Where they slightly differed is the even more highlighted antipolitical sentiment of the humanist thought, typical for the Eastern European equivalent of post-war social democracy. What was crucial, nevertheless, was a consistent focus on the individual as the necessary link between democratisation and peace.

The Yugoslav dissident peace initiative(s)

Both Ivan Supek (1915–2007) and Mihailo Marković (1923–2010) were prominent scholars within the Yugoslav context, also known in somewhat broader circles. Marković's senior by eight years, Supek managed to attain higher education in Western Europe prior to the Second World War, studying physics in Leipzig under Werner Heisenberg (principal scientist of the Nazi nuclear bomb project).⁴⁰ He was a member of the Yugoslav Communist Party (KPJ) until 1940 when he was excluded during the so-called "conflict on the literary left".⁴¹ After being imprisoned as an antifascist and subsequently released

31 Jussi M. Hanhimäki, "Détente in Europe 1962–1975," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Volume 2: Crises and Détente*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 198–218. This stress on the inter-West alliance rifts and focus on the European role is relatively new in historiography, fostered by a "global turn", of which the most influential work remains Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

32 Hanhimäki, "Détente in Europe 1962–1975," 199–201.

33 On the other hand, the atmosphere was especially conducive to such policies of increased European unity following the signing of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which, among other things, entailed West Germany's renewed repudiation of pursuing reunification with East Germany. Nevertheless, this allowed the social democrats to exert more proactive and expansive influence in the ensuing period. See: Rasmus Mariager, "New Security Concepts and Transnational Party Networks, 1976–1983. The Socialist International, Scandilux, and the Overcoming of the Crisis of Détente," in *The long détente: changing concepts of security and cooperation in Europe, 1950s–1980s*, ed. Oliver Bange and Poul Villaume (Budapest: CEU Press, 2017), 127–154.

34 As Michele Di Domato put it: "Socialist representatives contrasted the progress that could be obtained with the 'small steps' of diplomacy with what they saw as the self-righteousness of the 'big words' of human rights rhetoric." See: Michele Di Donato, "The Socialist International and human rights," in *Leftist Internationalisms. A Transnational Political History*, ed. Michele Di Donato and Mathieu Fulla (London: Bloomsbury, 2023), 168.

35 See: Ibid.

36 For more insight into the outlook and functioning of Yugoslav self-management see, still relevant, Sharon Zukin, *Beyond Marx and Tito. Theory and Practice in Yugoslav Socialism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

37 There is an extensive list of literature on the topic, and a useful overview can be found in Jeronim Perović, "The Tito-Stalin split: a reassessment in light of new evidence," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 9, no. 2 (2007), 32–63.

38 See: Vladimir Unkovski-Korica, "The Yugoslav Communists' Special Relationship with the British Labour Party 1950–1956," *Cold War History* 14, no. 1 (2014), 23–46, Frank Georgi, *L'Autogestion en chantier: les gauches françaises et le 'modèle' yougoslave (1948–1981)* (Nancy: Arbres bleus éditions, 2018), and Zoran Janjetović, "Poluslužbeno partnerstvo – Jugoslavija i Savezna Republika Nemačka šezdesetih godina XX veka," in *1968 – Četrdeset godina posle*, ed. Radmila Radić (Belgrade: INIS, 2008), 259–274.

39 See: Jovan Čavoški and Srđan Mičić ed. *On the Fault Lines of European and World Politics: Yugoslavia between Alliances and Neutrality/Non-Alignment* (Belgrade: INIS, 2022). See also: Jovan Čavoški, "'Yugoslavia's Help Was Extraordinary': Political and Material Assistance from Belgrade to the MPLA in Its Rise to Power, 1961–1975," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 21, no. 1 (2019), 125–150.

40 For Supek's short biography, see his obituary in Bojan Marotti, "Ivan Supek (1915–2007)," *Prologomena* 7, no. 1 (2008), 89–100.

41 See: Stanko Lasić, *Sukob na književnoj ljevici 1928–1952* (Zagreb: Liber, 1970).

from Gestapo prison after Heisenberg's intervention, Supek returned to Zagreb and joined the communist-led Partisan movement three years later. It is often mentioned that he warned about the dangers of the atomic bomb already in 1944.⁴² For his part, Marković became a member of the Yugoslav communist youth (SKOJ) in the years immediately preceding the war and, following continuous service in the Partisan movement, reached the captain rank in the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA).⁴³ Following the war, which saw the establishment of a nominally socialist state under the auspices of the KPJ (from 1952 SKJ), both Supek and Marković continued their academic careers. The former, an erudite scholar striving for interdisciplinarity, increasingly wrote philosophical and literary works. He was the Head of the newly founded "Ruđer Bošković" Institute in Zagreb until 1958, when allegedly his disagreement with the supposedly secret Yugoslav atomic bomb project led to his dismissal. A member of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Art (HAZU, then still called the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Art or JAZU) since 1948, Supek pushed for the creation of the Institute for Philosophy of Science and Peace (Institut za filozofiju znanosti i mir - IFZM) within JAZU in 1965. He became the rector of the University of Zagreb in 1970 and was the president of JAZU/HAZU in the 1990s, following the country's dissolution. Marković obtained his philosophy degree in Belgrade only after the war but was awarded PhDs from both the University of Belgrade and UCL in 1955/1956. Whilst a Lecturer at Belgrade's Faculty of Philosophy, Marković soon became one of the most prominent members of the group of dissident Marxist humanists revolving around the influential journal *Praxis*. His dissident activity earned him and seven of his Belgrade colleagues a suspension in 1975. He was a regular Visiting Lecturer in the US until 1990, when he entered politics and wrote a manifesto for the party of Slobodan Milošević, a reformed SKJ.

Their relatively high social status made it easier for the two scholars to travel abroad after the war and attend academic conferences, allowing them to get familiar with new literature and different arguments and meet their peers. Having already publicly distanced themselves from Tito's regime, suffered some forms of repression and been recognised domestically as dissidents, international links and attention sealed their dissident identity.⁴⁴ Eventually, these novel social surroundings pushed them to entertain more practical initiatives regarding peace.

⁴² Marotti, "Ivan Supek", 92–93.

⁴³ For a short biography of Marković in English see: Milanko Govedarica, "The 100th Birth Anniversary of the Great Man: Mihailo Marković (1923–2023) MARKOVIĆ AND THE ROLE OF THE ENGAGED INTELLECTUAL," *Sociološki pregled* 57, no. 1 (2023), 5–22.

⁴⁴ I am using here the "dissident triangle" criteria from Szulecki, *Dissidents in Communist Central Europe*, 208.

The Pugwash Conference

The Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs or PCSWA was a transnational NGO formed in 1957 on the initiative of Lord Bertrand Russell and supported by ten eminent scientists from around the globe (nine of the 11 signatories were Nobel Prize laureates at the time, and Joseph Rotblat, who was to become PCSWA's heart and soul in the ensuing years, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995 precisely for his contributions within PCSWA), perhaps most prominently Albert Einstein (who died merely two days after he signed the letter taken as the PCSWA's founding act, henceforth called the Einstein-Russell Manifesto).⁴⁵ PCSWA's aim was to gather the most notable scientists from all over the world, most importantly from the USA and the Soviet Union, and allow them to discuss the most urgent global issues, primarily the threat of nuclear armament.⁴⁶ Amidst growing fears of a nuclear war, PCSWA stressed the all-pervasive threat experienced by people on both sides of the world and the belief that objective science can lead to some form of universal language.⁴⁷ Consequently, in addition to their technical expertise on the "bombs", which allowed scientists to better perceive the deeper and far-reaching consequences of a potential conflict, it was hoped that these intellectual elites would renounce their national or ideological allegiances at least when attending PCSWA events and thus contribute to finding common ground through impartial and objective exchanges.

However, a deeper motivation of PCSWA was that these scientists would, upon returning to their home countries from a Pugwash Conference, with their prudent advice, influence the policymakers and thus contribute to more peaceful international relations. Track II-diplomacy,⁴⁸ in fact, proved to be one of the greater contributions of PCSWA to the onset of superpower détente, especially following its successful 1960 Moscow Conference. Namely, as demonstrated by Alison Kraft, at crucial points of the Cuban Missile Crisis, PCSWA scientists were the only remaining direct link between Washington and Moscow.⁴⁹ Also, in the mid-1960s, following another intensification in the American bombing of Vietnam (which in turn risked unmaking all of the progress achieved in the area of disarmament negotiations), whilst "providing an international forum in which the Soviets could vent their anger over Vietnam",⁵⁰ the PCSWA leadership engaged in a form

⁴⁵ Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein, "The Russell-Einstein Manifesto," *Science and War* 26, no. 1/2 (1976), 15–16.

⁴⁶ A great overview of PCSWA is provided in Alison Kraft, Holger Nehring and Carola Sachse, "Introduction: The Pugwash Conferences and the Global Cold War: Scientists, Transnational Networks, and the Complexity of Nuclear Histories," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 20, no. 1 (2018), 4–30.

⁴⁷ See: "The Russell-Einstein Manifesto."

⁴⁸ See: Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

⁴⁹ Alison Kraft, *From Dissent to Diplomacy: The Pugwash Project During the 1960s Cold War* (Cham: Springer, 2022), 71–74.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 79.

of “shuttle-diplomacy” between Ho Chi Min’s and Johnson’s governments, attempting to defuse the tensions.⁵¹ In other words, the organisation both took a life of its own by taking direct participation during the critical moments of the peace negotiations and made efforts to influence the governments indirectly by engaging the participating scientists.

At the same time, these high points demonstrated the limits of PCSWA. Namely, a deep-rooted contradiction became apparent in its work in relation to the Vietnam War. On the one hand, PCSWA agonisingly strived to remain neutral in order to retain the unscathed reputation required for the role of negotiation facilitators. On the other, the terrible atrocities committed by the US Government put this “non-partisanship” under severe pressure. Before the aforementioned Russell Tribunal, organised by the founder of PCSWA and gathering significant support, Russell also published a remarkably devastating and influential “Appeal”,⁵² with the pro-Soviet intellectuals and organisations likewise casting severe criticism of PCSWA. Ultimately, it demonstrated the limits of PCSWA’s influence as their efforts to calm the situation fell on deaf ears and were overridden by American bombs, hurting the organisation’s reputation along the way.⁵³

The most profound challenge that PCSWA encountered came from within itself and stemmed precisely from the détente context. Namely, the more political nature of the German question at the same time put an additional focus on political issues and, in turn, led to an ever-increasing number of social scientists participating at PCSWA events, both of which trends ran counter to PCSWA’s bedrocks. Before this heightened European focus was eventually curtailed by the PCSWA leadership in 1968, the Europeans within PCSWA founded their regional sub-group and ensured one of the Pugwash Conferences discussed the issue of European security.⁵⁴ It was within this context of the European Pugwash group that the Yugoslavs, in particular Ivan Supek, entered the debates.

In sum, following the ratification of several nuclear arms treaties that made nuclear war more unlikely, PCSWA embarked on an internal quest to retain its relevance within the global quest for peace. Thus, with its agonising efforts to maintain a neutral position forcing it to avoid sensitive political topics, such as the Vietnam War and the German question, the novel prevailing sentiment was that worldwide peace would be impossible without a more substantial equality of nations.⁵⁵ Hence, PCSWA’s solution

was to encourage international cooperation, which would aid the development of underdeveloped countries.⁵⁶ It was in this period that the Pugwash scientists argued for gradual cooperation and step-by-step exchanges, which would be beneficial for everyone. Furthermore, they increasingly considered “non-material” topics, such as climate change and the role of knowledge production in *post-industrial* societies. These different and, sometimes, arguably even conflicting visions of peace were not chronologically separated but often overlapped in the thoughts of PCSWA scientists.

Pugwash, Ivan Supek and Yugoslavia

The Yugoslav participation within the PCSWA had very official overtones from the onset. Namely, as Srđan Milošević has shown, both Russell and Cyrus Eaton (PCSWA’s main financial sponsor) sent Tito a letter in 1958, inviting Yugoslavia to dispatch a representative to the PCSWA Conference, to which the Yugoslav leadership enthusiastically responded by delegating Pavle Savić (at the time still the principal scientist of the Yugoslav nuclear energy project), who was instructed to extend an invitation to the organisation to host one of the future events in Yugoslavia.⁵⁷ With regular correspondence between PCSWA and Tito’s cabinet in the meantime, Ivan Supek was the next Yugoslav to appear at a PCSWA event, in 1961.

Apart from Mihailo Marković, who joined him for the 1965 Conference in Venice, up until 1967 (when a meeting was held in Zagreb and Supek was elected to the PCSWA leadership), Supek was the only representative from Yugoslavia at PCSWA Conferences abroad, regularly attending.⁵⁸ Already echoing the words from the Russell-Einstein Manifesto in his 1962 book *Science and Peace*, Supek was undoubtedly instrumental in ensuring that the PCSWA connection went beyond meaningless administrative collaboration, which would have merely added a bonus point to the Yugoslav regime’s peace-loving image. Moreover, by gradually establishing personal trust with key people at PCSWA, Supek provided the Yugoslav scientific community with a stable connection to their global counterparts. Formalised in March 1963, the Yugoslav Pugwash group prepared a September PCSWA Conference in Dubrovnik.

51 Ibid., 87–94.

52 Bertrand Russell, “Appeal to the American Conscience,” in *Unruly Dog 121* eds. Tonny Simpson (London: The Spokesman, 2013), 53–60. It was also translated into Serbo-Croatian and published in *Encyclopedia Moderna*.

53 See: Kraft, *From Dissent to Diplomacy*, 79–84.

54 See: Ibid., 99–129.

55 New types of weapons was practically the only topic of the Conferences until 1960, followed by wider and more political discussions of wars in the early 1960s. However, from the 1965 Conference held in Ethiopia until 1980, the issue of global inequality informed almost 50% of PCSWA’s Conference’s topics. See: Jeffrey Boutwell eds, *Participants in the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs meetings, 1957–2007* (Virginia: Cardinal Press, 2007).

56 “Economic aid to developing countries should not depend on the Cold War!” Jasmina Lelas, “15 Pugwash konferencija,” *Encyclopedia Moderna* 1, no. 1 (1966), 77–79.

57 Srđan Milošević, “Počeci pagvaškog (Pugwash) pokreta u Srbiji 1957–1967,” in *Tradicija i transformacija: transnacionalna iskustva jugoslovenske istorije – zbornik radova. Knj. 2*, ed. Olga Manojlović Pintar and Vera Gudac Dodić (Belgrade: INIS, 2019), 179–182. Milošević’s article is crucial for this paper as it reconstructs the early years of the Pugwash movement in Yugoslavia by basing his research on the archival material collected by the official Yugoslav institutions.

58 Data derived from the List of Participants in Boutwell, *Participants in the Pugwash Conferences*.

From 1966, Supek ensured that the group had its bulletin – *Encyclopedia Moderna* (henceforth EM), formally published by IFZM. EM not only provided the group with a vessel for intervening in the Yugoslav intellectual sphere by publishing highly scientific expert articles and novel literary pieces, but also expanded its linkage to the global PCSWA with reports from the events and key insights circulating and finding their path to the Yugoslav public through the bulletin.⁵⁹ Topics represented in the journal undoubtedly reflect the multilayered perception of peace within PCSWA.

During its informal period, the Yugoslav Pugwash group was indirectly controlled by the regime through administrative bodies, ensuring that it toed the official line.⁶⁰ This dependence on bureaucratic decision-making, incompatible with scientific endeavours, was criticised by the Yugoslav Pugwashites as early as 1964.⁶¹ With the aforementioned establishment of IFZM in 1965, however, Yugoslav Pugwash moved under the auspices of JAZU, acquiring relatively more leeway.⁶² This was further accentuated when it was renamed the Yugoslav Pugwash Conference (YPC) in 1967.⁶³

Indeed, YPC regularly echoed and overlapped with the official Yugoslav foreign policy, especially in relation to Vietnam,⁶⁴ both at PCSWA events and on the pages of EM, and it is very unlikely that they would have retained such strong state support and funding had it not been so. In fact, the disagreement between the YPC and the regime was a much subtler distinction between the former's repetition of abstract calls for nuclear disarmament for the sake of humanity and the latter's more structural analysis, which stressed the strategic threats which signing the NPT carried for "smaller powers".⁶⁵ Similarly, in relation to the 1967 Russell Tribunal, countering the claims from a pro-regime scientist that the struggle for peace is a socialist cause and should be carried through the mass organisations and not elitist circles, YPC argued that "humanism" demonstrates that there are no bloc divisions within the peace camp and that there are numerous progressive antiwar initiatives in the West as much as there are regressive in the East: "Struggle for

peace is a human right and nobody has a monopoly on it".⁶⁶ In other words, YPC introduced a way of fighting for peace in Yugoslavia other than the official non-alignment course.

However, an area where Supek pushed through his disagreement with the regime is the issue of the alleged Yugoslav nuclear bomb. Namely, having served as the head of the Institute "Ruđer Bošković", the second-largest nuclear institute in the country, Supek was also a member of the scientific board of the Federal Committee for Nuclear Energy (SKNE). It was within that context that Supek raised the alarm at one of the SKNE meetings in 1962 when he became suspicious that the Yugoslav regime, in contrast to its proclaimed peace-loving orientation, was secretly developing a nuclear bomb.⁶⁷ Historical research disproved all of Supek's claims, instead establishing that there were mere desires within the military circles for plans to be made for a nuclear bomb but never an actual one.⁶⁸ Yet this myth caused a bit of controversy in the early 1970s,⁶⁹ persisting within public opinion, especially since the country's dissolution.⁷⁰ Supek's persistence with his accusations throughout the years has certainly contributed to this process, and his argumentation unequivocally echoes the disarmament calls of PCSWA. Indeed, it was this opposition to the regime which made Supek a true dissident.

Mihailo Marković and international peace studies

Mihailo Marković was likewise an important member of YPC, who attended three Pugwash events (Conferences in 1965 and 1967 and a Symposium in 1971), contributing extensively to *Encyclopedia Moderna* as a member both of the journal's Council and Editorial Board.⁷¹ While he obviously saw some value in the Pugwash movement, he left those offices somewhat abruptly at some point in 1970/1971,⁷² instead opening up another channel through which peace research entered the Yugoslav space.

59 This was most explicitly stated in one of the calls on the back cover of *Encyclopedia Moderna* (vol. 3, no. 7 1968/1969). Namely: "[Apart from other stated aims] the most important goal of the group is its influence on public opinion in the sense of its closer alignment with the general aims of PCSWA."

60 Milošević, "Počeci pagvaškog pokreta."

61 Jugoslovenska pagvaška grupa, "O stanju, organizaciji i financiranju naučnih istraživanja u Jugoslaviji. Dokument sa sastanka članova pagvaških grupa Jugoslavije u Zagrebu 1964. godine," *Encyclopedia moderna* vol. 1, no. 1 (1966), 89–90.

62 See: Jure Juras, "Novi institut Jugoslavenske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti," *Encyclopedia Moderna* vol. 1, no. 1 (1966), 91–92.

63 GBR/0014/RTBT 5/5/2/143, Ivan Supek's letter to the Secretary General of the Pugwash Continuing Committee, 18 November 1971.

64 See: Jugoslovenska pagvaška konferencija, "Izjava Jugoslavenske pagvaške konferencije o sadašnjoj situaciji u svijetu," *Encyclopedia Moderna* vol. 2, no. 5–6 (1967), 277–278. They even wrote a very favourable review of the aforementioned WPC Conference in Ljubomir Josifović, "Svetska konferencija o Vijetnamu," *Encyclopedia Moderna* 2, no. 5–6 (1967), 279–281.

65 See: Leo Mates, "Za međunarodni sporazum o sprečavanju širenja nuklearnog oružja," *Encyclopedia Moderna* 2, no. 3–4 (1967), 129–133.

66 Jure Juras, "Mir kao utopija pojedinaca ili kao realno opredeljenje svih ljudi," *Encyclopedia moderna* vol. 2, no. 2 (1967), 136–139.

67 Dragomir Bondžić, *Između ambicija i iluzija. Nuklearna politika Jugoslavije 1945–1990* (Belgrade: ISI, 2016), 296–299.

68 Ibid.

69 Namely, in a slightly more relaxed atmosphere after 1966, one journalist dug out this issue and interviewed numerous stakeholders to get to the bottom of it. See: Ibid., 306–311.

70 See: Ibid., 312–319.

71 As evidenced by the extensive correspondence Marković exchanged with Jure Juras, the journal secretary, on some administrative issues, Marković's concerns and comments on particular articles, and some private "conspiring" – namely, Juras nudging Marković to "procure" new members from Belgrade for the journal's Editorial Board, such as Vojin Bakić, but also to assuage the conflict between Supek and Dobrica Ćosić. The correspondence is in Istorijski arhiv Beograda (IAB), 2828, 49.

72 Marković's name was inscribed on the inside of the cover page, among others, until the 17th issue, published in 1971. For his much later explanations of this decision, see: Mihailo Marković, *Juriš na nebo. Sećanja. Knjiga prva* (Belgrade: Prosveta, 2008), 64, 118–121.

This brings us to the story of the short-lived “International Peace Academy” (IPA), an initiative launched in 1967 by “several concerned US citizens” with the unofficial support of some high-ranking UN personnel, seeking to provide training in peace-making for relevant professionals.⁷³ At roughly the same time, there was an inaugural congress of the International Future Research in Oslo, chaired by Johan Galtung from the International Peace Research Institute (IPRI), a key person in the history of peace studies globally.⁷⁴ The Oslo congress was held mere days after the PCSWA Conference in the nearby Ronneby, attended by Galtung, Supek and Marković. Thus, a year later, when there was a joinder of IPA and IPRI forces in discussing the outlook and plans for the “Training in Conflict Resolution”, to which Galtung provided key concepts and ideas,⁷⁵ Marković was listed as present at the meeting and as a “commentator” of the proposal.⁷⁶ With numerous documents relating to these meetings stored within Marković’s archive and such a short period of time between the two events in 1967, it is reasonable to assume that it was Galtung who invited Marković to join this venture or that at least the PCSWA served as a platform for this connection.

Be that as it may, Marković soon put his weight behind this novel project. During his temporary stay in the US in early 1970, he even offered to write to George Kennan, former US Ambassador to Yugoslavia (and USSR), and Tito, inviting them to join/support IPA’s efforts.⁷⁷ Now listed among the Directors and Visiting Consultants of the IPA Committee, Marković became a pivotal figure, preparing and carrying out the training course in Vienna in 1970 alongside Galtung and Chadwick Alger. Namely, the three produced the syllabus and a couple of papers, with each holding multiple lectures during the eight-week course.⁷⁸ As Galtung put it eloquently in 1968, their goal was not to tutor new researchers, “but to train people who carry with them many diverse perspectives ... These people would then be used in international commissions, organisations, perhaps also in national diplomacy and mass media. They would constitute a new ferment in human relations, a voice of insight combined with general compassion with mankind.”⁷⁹ What is more, this course confronted people with opposing ideological views, managing to foster cooperation so they could focus on finding a solution.⁸⁰ The practical application must have amused a philosopher like Marković.

73 A sort of advertisement pamphlet was published for the first two pilot projects in 1970 explaining some core ideas of the Academy. It was written by Indar Jit Rikye, IPA Committee’s first chairman and former Military Adviser to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. See: Indar Jit Rikye, *A transnational training project* (Brattleboro: IPAC, 1970), 12.

74 See: Johan Galtung and Dietrich Fischer, *Johan Galtung. Pioneer of Peace Research* (Berlin: Springer Verlag 2013), 3–22.

75 IAB, 2828 – Legacy of academician Mihailo Marković, 49, Johan Galtung, Training of Peace Specialists: A proposal. *International Peace Research Newsletter* no. 2 1968.

76 IAB, 2828, 49, The Peacemakers Academy Proposal, 14–17 November 1968, IAB, 2828, 49, List of those planning to attend the meeting of the Peacemakers Academy Committee and the IPRI of OSLO, 14–17 November 1968.

77 IAB, 2828, 49, International Peace Academy Committee of the International Research Fund, Inc. (23 April 1970, Vermont).

78 IAB, 2828, 49, Letter from Johan Galtung, 20 May 1970. Being in charge of the “Social Change” module, Marković prepared pieces titled “Steps toward future society” and “Strategy for Non-violent Social Change”.

79 IAB, 2828, 49, Johan Galtung, Training of Peace Specialists: A proposal. For *International Peace Research Newsletter* no. 2 1968, 2.

80 Johan Galtung, “An IPRA Summer School?”, *Instant Research on Peace and Violence* Vol. 1, No. 3 (1971), 83.

Nevertheless, despite a relatively high turnout in the first two years (another course was held in Helsinki the following year), IPA experienced difficulties, and there is no evidence of it going on beyond 1972. There were some organisational reasons for this cessation of activities, but the crucial issue remained the inability to overcome the “etatist” understanding of peace.⁸¹ Marković was under attack from the regime precisely in this period, so he rarely travelled abroad between 1972 and 1975.⁸² However, the relationship with Galtung seems to have been sufficiently strong, as the latter soon became the first Director General of the recently established Inter-University Centre (IUC) in Dubrovnik.⁸³ This institution, thus, on the one hand, represented the embodiment of the YPC’s efforts to foster international scientific cooperation and, on the other, symbolised its contribution to creating platforms for other initiatives. Apart from the fact that by that time, Dubrovnik had already hosted a PCSWA Conference in 1963, IUC’s first official event was precisely hosting a Pugwash Symposium in April 1972, chaired by Supek.⁸⁴ What is more, in late 1974, Galtung, Supek and Marković organised a postgraduate course at IUC on “Theories of development conflict and peace”, thus officially commencing cooperation with the Oslo IPRI.⁸⁵ Finally, to round it off, another PCSWA Symposium, “Science and Ethics”, was held in Dubrovnik in 1975.⁸⁶

What about peace?

In the end, how did all of these different events and trends manifest in Supek’s and Marković’s writings and explicit stances on peace? Already in the first issue of *EM*, to which he contributed four pieces, Supek echoed the troubled relationship between the Yugoslav regime and YPC by supporting Yugoslavia’s non-aligned orientation while also insisting on its undeviating implementation.⁸⁷ More broadly, Supek consistently emphasised the interlinkage between democracy and peace. This, in turn, was based on

81 Asbjørn Eide, “International Peace Academy And The Helsinki Project: The Idea And Its Execution.” *Instant Research on Peace and Violence*, vol. 1, no. 3 (1971), 81–82. Allegedly, each Consultant, including Marković, received around \$100 for each Lecture they gave. As criticised by Oslo researchers: “Is it really true that the experts on the problems of peace with justice can be moved only with money?” “An Editorial,” *Instant Research on Peace and Violence* Vol. 1, No. 2 (1971), 34.

82 Mihailo Marković, *Juriš na nebo. Sećanja. Knjiga druga* (Belgrade: Prosveta, 2009), 34–41.

83 “In memoriam: Johan Galtung. First Director General of the IUC,” *Inter-University Centre in Dubrovnik*, accessed 25 September 2024, <https://iuc.hr/news/in-memoriam-johan-galtung-first-director-general-of-the-iuc>. See also: Johan Galtung, *The Dialectics of Education. The Inter-University Centre in Dubrovnik*, unpublished.

84 See: Editorial, “Zbivanja,” *Encyclopedia Moderna* 7, no. 19 (1972), 88.

85 GBR/0014/RTBT 5/5/2/142, Johan Galtung letter to Joseph Rotblat, 12 October 1973. See also: IAB, 2828, 49, Theories of development conflict and peace.

86 See Supek’s contribution for that Symposium in Ivan Supek, “Science and Ethics,” *Encyclopedia Moderna* 9, no. 27 (1974), 72–78.

87 Ivan Supek, “Uvodnik,” *Encyclopedia Moderna* 1, no. 1 (1966), 1–3.

his humanist understanding of individuals being capable of exerting influence on their surroundings. Thus, when he said that “only when the citizens supremely manage their working organisations or institutions ... will the general human tendency for cooperation and peace be fully expressed,”⁸⁸ what he actually said was that the previous lack of democracy in the economic and political sphere has prevented people from attaining their true interests. The notion of this shared human destiny across the bloc divide markedly echoed PCSWA’s universalist claims,⁸⁹ but Supek also made a more concrete application of the idea, arguing that it was not in the small nations’ interest to pursue armament since they would never be able to defend themselves from a nuclear attack, and should instead pursue collective security.⁹⁰

Moreover, it was especially the political monopoly that Supek saw as the main culprit for the perpetuation of war. For example, he explained the impotence of the UN by the fact that “there sit many governments which are kept afloat due to the threat of violence and whose genuineness behind declarations is hardly believable.”⁹¹ Whilst presuming that the answer was in the area of international cooperation, Supek stressed that it was the logic of the state which, by feeding the need for military, “puts the brakes on peace, democracy, principles of coexistence, equality and disarmament.”⁹² He demonstrated this view more explicitly when distancing himself from “Russell and Einstein’s utopian vision of a global state” – it was precisely etatism which hindered internationalisation,⁹³ to which he counterposed “the act of self-managing the entirety of human activity, its liberation from the state’s tutelage and monopolistic aspirations.”⁹⁴ The target of these critiques was not an abstract state but, most specifically, the Yugoslav one. Namely, in arguing for further market and cultural reforms, Supek claimed that it was not the people who hindered them but the political leadership. It is they who maintain the political monopoly and, in this betrayal of self-management principles, empower the etatist tendencies and autarchy.⁹⁵ In promoting such stances, Supek indirectly addressed one of the key détente’s dilemmas – whether domestic issues should be intertwined with the international.

88 Ivan Supek, “Za evropsku sigurnost i suradnju. Glas pred XVI pagvašku konferenciju u Sopotu u Poljskoj 11. septembra 1966,” *Encyclopedia Moderna* 1, no. 1 (1966), 51–54.

89 “No matter how different our origins and perspectives may be, a total threat unites us all.” Ivan Supek, “Za svjetsko društvo,” *Encyclopedia Moderna* 1, no. 1 (1966), 6.

90 Editorial, “Splitski razgovori,” *Encyclopedia Moderna* 3, no. 7 (1968/1969), 8.

91 Ibid.

92 Ivan Supek, “Pismo urednika,” *Encyclopedia moderna* 3, no. 7 (1968/9), 4.

93 This stance was first explicitly mentioned during the Split conversations. See: Editorial, “Splitski razgovori,” *Encyclopedia Moderna* 3, no. 7 (1968/1969), 7–8.

94 Ivan Supek, “Pismo urednika,” *Encyclopedia moderna* 4, no. 10 (1969), 5. In the same article, Supek reiterated a very strong humanist orientation: “The healing [of international relations – NS] is possible only with the deepest rootedness in human creativity and national traditions. Conflicts which emerge on the global scene have their seeds in the most narrowly defined upbringing and can only be resolved within this total relation between a human and the world.” Ibid.

95 Supek, “Pismo urednika,” *Encyclopedia moderna* 3, no. 7 (1968/9), 5.

Finally, these attitudes were paradigmatic of two moments of PCSWA’s identity crisis. Firstly, having actively participated in the European Pugwash group, Supek echoed the sentiments of Western Europeans in criticising US expansionism, which encapsulated the superpower struggle. Instead, as Supek argued at one of the PCSWA Conferences, “Europe could break the military blocs and step onto the world stage as a decisive factor contributing to peace and cooperation.”⁹⁶ To achieve that, a gradual economic, cultural and scientific exchange on the backs of individuals was required, and the European framework, according to Supek, was more conducive to such regional unity-forming. Building on that in the early 1970s, in his written address for the 1972 PCSWA Conference in Oxford, Supek embodied PCSWA’s shift to intellectual cooperation, eloquently arguing that it was the pluralistic universalism of universities, fostered over the centuries, and not state-imposed universalism (which often infringed on the aspirations of small nations), that should be the basis for a new internationalism.⁹⁷ In other words, it was the task of intellectuals to foster this cross-bloc exchange and thus gradually weed out “crucial evils such as armament or nature pollution.”⁹⁸

The penultimate point of interlinking the humanist argument of struggling against the logic of the state with the novel notions of peace was perhaps even more eloquently formulated by Marković. Namely, on the one hand, in the first *EM* issue, he argued that “the crucial condition for this fundamental human emancipation [becoming a historic subject] is abolishing every concentration of political economic power... Abolishing the bourgeoisie is just the first decisive step in that direction. Overcoming politics as a profession ... and abolishing the bureaucracy as a privileged social elite is the second step. Each of the two steps is a necessary precondition for radical humanisation, yet only jointly are they sufficient.”⁹⁹ On the other hand, Marković noted that the nuclear bomb had produced a new situation where “the power created by man is so big that it cannot be vested in the hands of any national community or social group”. Thus, connecting the two, “a struggle for disarmament and peace today attains its full meaning when linked with the demand for a new type of social organisation ... in which any form of usurpation of social power is overcome – it is open, democratic, universally humane.”¹⁰⁰ Marković counters the present activity of politics “monopolised by particular groups of professional rulers” and serving solely the particular interests of that group to the concept of *political praxis* – “self-government, conscious and rational coordination and direction of social

96 Ivan Supek, “Za evropsku sigurnost i suradnju. Glas pred XVI pagvašku konferenciju u Sopotu u Poljskoj 11. septembra 1966,” *Encyclopedia Moderna* 1, no. 1 (1966), 51.

97 Ivan Supek, “Naša moralna odgovornost,” *Encyclopedia Moderna* 7, br. 20 (1972), 3–4.

98 Ibid.

99 Mihailo Marković, “Mogućnosti radikalne humanizacije savremenog sveta,” *Encyclopedia moderna* 1, no. 1 (1966), 12–13.

100 Ibid., 14.

processes without any professional rulers".¹⁰¹ This somewhat utopistic vision of a future society allows him to explain the discrepancy between genuine human interest and current warmongering policies as *ideology*. It is inherent in the system, he admits, however "its way [italic - MM] of shaping humans" can be somewhat adjusted.¹⁰² What is more, with the raging ideological war between the superpowers, no conflict in other spheres can be resolved. Thus, what Marković proposes in practical terms is a scholarly confrontation of opposing ideologies within a safe space where one could critically negate the other's ideology aspects that counter the principle of peaceful coexistence – what remains is the common ground which should be worked upon. This is an area where intellectuals can contribute by producing proper knowledge (as opposed to partialised, which could be exploited for regressive purposes) as well as creating new international moral and ethical principles, thus challenging their own society's ideological assumptions.¹⁰³

Concluding remarks

This chapter has demonstrated that Ivan Supek and Mihailo Marković, two Yugoslav dissidents, were very active and committed to the question of peace during détente. Ivan Supek was instrumental in providing the Pugwash Movement with a foothold in Yugoslavia, while Marković was the first to establish firmer collaboration with nascent peace studies experts. Both provided eloquent justifications for attaining peace through the democratisation of the political sphere, which ran counter to the dominant regime's narrative stressing the non-alignment of states. In other words, Supek and Marković introduced a novel understanding of peace centred on domestic issues, however not on class but on the individual. The dissidents consciously picked up some of these views in their contacts with international peers, whilst some other aspects "sneaked in" unnoticed, namely the anti-Marxist notion of mutually benevolent cooperation. However, they were not mere neutral carriers of ideas. Instead, in translating them to the context of Yugoslav socialism, they supplied the concept with (at least) three important innovations: firstly, that intellectuals rather than professional politicians could provide an impetus for further internationalisation; secondly, that this internationalisation could be achieved within the present system but with a necessary redistribution, and finally, that the bureaucracy's monopoly on politics in socialist states could undo the progressive achievements of socialist revolution. This last point represented a particularly original combination of the novel understanding of peace with a humanist criticism of socialist states.

101 IAB, 2828, 44, Contradictions in States with Socialist Constitutions. This paper was sent for a Bertrand Russell Centenary Symposium (Spheres of Influence in the Age of Imperialism) held in Linz, 11–15 September 1972.

102 Mihailo Marković, "Ideološki ratovi i mirna koegzistencija," *Encyclopedia Moderna* 2, no. 3–4 (1967), 111–113.

103 Mihailo Marković, "Nauka i međunarodna politika," *Encyclopedia moderna* 4, no. 8 (1969), 11–13.

In the end, not much has remained of their efforts. Whilst the global PCSWA still exists, YPC did not survive the country's dissolution. EM's last issue appeared in 1976, and IFZM dropped "peace" from its name when it was eventually restructured into the Philosophy Department of the nascent HAZU in 1992. IUC still offers various courses, but none directly related to the issue of peace. The School for Peace, influenced by Galtung and Marković, was eventually established in Kruševac, Serbia, but its legacy is now reduced to the local Museum's auspices. One might conclude that, after the craze of peace research, the fields are now entirely unattended. Indeed, the failure of any of such initiatives to influence in any tangible way the terrible wars of the 1990s undoubtedly hurt their legitimacy. The eventual nationalistic reorientations of both Supek and Marković can only demotivate one further.

However, blaming them for not remaining relevant in the subsequent periods or even stopping the war is a mirror image of the mistake of ascribing to them a hugely destructive role in Yugoslavia's dissolution. Indeed, the human rights narrative did undermine some of the regime's ideological foundations by insisting on linking democracy to peace. However, it did not cause its demise but rather gave an early snippet of what would come to replace it as its antithesis. Thus, what endures is their scholastic relevance as avant-garde carriers of a new idea(s) of peace, reflecting the global shift and translating it to the Yugoslav context. It has profoundly challenged the regime's promotion of peace as a contract between states, albeit shifting the focus to the conflict between society and state, informing, in turn, the gist of the post-socialist perception of peace. It is this lesson of carefully rethinking one's basic concepts in opposing conflicts that still resonates loudly, as those concepts might/will provide the basis for a future society.

Summary

Our present understanding of peace has survived several alterations over time, and one of its most novel and important evolutions occurred in the 1970s in preparation for the post-Cold War unipolar context. In the deadlocked struggle between two superpowers' conceptions of peace, a third, middle way was brokered by an amorphous group of intellectuals, which may be vaguely politically linked with the ideas of social democracy. Those interpretations found particularly fertile ground among the Yugoslav dissidents, who, in turn, found themselves between opposition to the nominally peace-oriented regime and the international scientific community prophesying an inescapable link between a democratic regime and peace.

Ivan Supek and Mihailo Marković negotiated a new interpretation of peace within this middle space by participating in international peace-seeking organisations, always with the conditional support of the regime, and translating the product of the exchange of ideas that occurred there back to the country. Primarily, Supek was instrumental in connecting the Pugwash movement, a loosely tied group of scientists from around the world stressing the universality of science as a path to peace, to the Yugoslav context by establishing a Yugoslav Pugwash group and ensuring those ideas found a home within an official Yugoslav institution and its journal. The Pugwash circle served as a platform for Yugoslav intellectuals concerned with the peace issue to travel abroad, meet their peers and hear their ideas. One example of such a route was taken by Marković, who established connections with Johan Galtung and the International Peace Academy, attempting to implement those ideas in practice.

Apart from expressing their novel understanding of peace, which presupposed strong co-dependence between regime democratisation and its capacity for peace politics, which, in turn, later strengthened the hand of the Party's critics, this connection with international scientists was also reflected in the founding of several peace-oriented institutions in Yugoslavia, most notably the Inter-University Centre in Dubrovnik, whose first director was precisely Galtung.

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