


Peace Policies and Practices in Yugoslavia and Beyond



PEACE, UNCONDITIONAL!

Edited by
Sanja Petrović Todosijević and Martin Pogačar

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Belgrade, Ljubljana
2025

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Srđan Mičić*

Yugoslavia's Pacifist Foreign Policy and Actions in the League of Nations, 1920–1933**


Abstract This chapter addresses the compatibility between Yugoslavia's foreign policy and the work of the League of Nations. It examines the period from the inception of the international organisation in Geneva to the last reorganisation of the Little Entente during the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. The first contact of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes with the ideals and plans for establishing a new organisation to preserve peace was during the Paris Peace Conference. The chapter addresses differences in the views of Yugoslav statesmen, diplomats and politicians regarding the work of the League of Nations, the first steps of Yugoslavia's diplomacy at the Geneva forum and the harmonisation of Yugoslavia's and its allies' policies with those of the League of Nations.

Keywords Yugoslavia, League of Nations, Great Powers, Little Entente, Balkans, Central Europe, peace politics, international order, mutual assistance, disarmament

The Kingdom of Serbia – as the leading actor in the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS) – faced many challenges during the First World War. One of the most important tests was the Italian imperialist designs towards the Balkans. A major step in this direction was the Treaty of London (1915), when the British Empire and France granted some of Italy's wishes. After the February Revolution in Russia in 1917, the Kingdom of Serbia lost its most important source of support among the Great Powers. Eventually, in mid-1918, the Kingdom of Serbia found a new supporter in the United States of America (USA). The

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Stane Jagodič, *Sadist's Tin*, assemblage, 1972

Serbian elite preserved its position in the Kingdom of SCS,¹ and the foreign policy of the new state was a continuation of the previous Serbian foreign policy. Therefore, staying in the good graces of American President Woodrow Wilson became one of the most important tasks for Serbian and Yugoslav diplomacy until Wilson's policies lost support in the American public in 1919.² For most of the interwar period, the main issue for Belgrade was the country's relations with Rome. The Italian aspirations towards the eastern coastline of the Adriatic Sea were not only a question of the Kingdom of SCS's territorial integrity but also of Italy's possible bridgehead into the Balkans over Albania's territory, which the Kingdom of SCS sought to prevent. Its secondary concerns were relations with Vienna, Budapest and Sofia. When the Kingdom of SCS forged an alliance with Prague and Romania – the Little Entente – the Central European issues seemed to be under control.³

The international recognition of the Kingdom of SCS did not come right away. The USA, Great Britain and France had recognised the new state by mid-1919, and Italy followed suit in the Treaty of Rapallo in late 1920.⁴ Therefore, the delegation at the Paris Peace Conference was officially recognised as representing the Kingdom of Serbia, an associated power of the Allied Powers in the Great War. The delegation was led by Serbia's long-serving Prime Minister, Nikola Pašić. Its members were Yugoslavia's Foreign Minister Ante Trumbić, the Serbian and the first Yugoslav plenipotentiary minister in Paris Milenko Vesnić, and the Slovenian politician Ivan Žolger. The deputy delegates were Mateja Bošković, Josip Smodlaka and Otokar Rybař. The Yugoslav delegation and government continued the previous Serbian foreign policy, counting on Wilson's support. The US delegation was bound by public declarations to prevent the application of secret treaties, including the 1915 Treaty of London.⁵ The goal of the Yugoslav foreign policy was to avoid the implementation of this treaty at all costs.⁶

1 For further reading: Branko Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1988*, Knjiga I, Kraljevina Jugoslavija 1914–1941 (Beograd: Nolit, 1989); Ljubodrag Dimić, *Istorija srpske državnosti*, Knjiga III, Srbija u Jugoslaviji (Novi Sad: SANU, Ogranak u Novom Sadu; Beseda, Društvo istoričara Južnobačkog i Sremskog okruga, 2001); Mira Radojević, *Srpski narod i jugoslovenska kraljevina*, vol. I, Od jugoslovenske ideje do jugoslovenske države (Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga, 2019).

2 For further reading: Dragoslav Janković, *Srbija i jugoslovensko pitanje 1914–1915. godine* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, NIP Eksportpres, 1973); Nikola Popović, *Odnosi Srbije i Rusije u Prvom svetskom ratu 1914–1918* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1977); Dragoljub Živojinović, *Amerika, Italija i postanak Jugoslavije 1917–1919* (Beograd: Naučna knjiga, 1970); Đorđe Đ. Stanković, *Nikola Pašić, saveznici i stvaranje Jugoslavije* (Beograd: Nolit, 1984); Andrej Mitrović, *Srbija u Prvom svetskom ratu* (Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga, 1984); Ubavka Ostojić-Fejić, *Sjedinjene Američke Države i Srbija 1914–1918* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1994); Đorđe Stanković, *Srbija 1914–1918. Ratni ciljevi* (Novi Sad: IK "Prometej," Beograd: Radio-televizija Srbije, 2014); Mira Radojević and Ljubodrag Dimić, *Srbija u Velikom Rat 1914–1918: Kratka istorija* (Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga, 2014).

3 For further reading: Bogdan Krizman, *Vanjska politika jugoslavenske države 1918–1941: diplomatsko-historijski pregled* (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1975).

4 Bogdan Krizman, "Pitanje međunarodnog priznanja jugoslovenske države 1919. godine," in: *Istorija XX veka, zbornik radova*, vol. III, urednik Dragoslav Janković (Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka, 1962), 345–386; Id., "Italija u politici kralja Aleksandra i kneza Pavla (1918–1941), *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, no. 1 (1975): 33–35.

5 For further reading: Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World*, third edition (New York: Random House Inc., 2003).

6 For further reading: Ivo Lederer, *Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study in Frontiersmaking*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963); Andrej Mitrović, *Jugoslavija na Konferenciji mira 1919–1920* (Beograd: Narodna knjiga, 1969).

Yugoslavia's position on the creation of the League of Nations

For Wilson, the principal task of the Paris Peace Conference was the creation of the League of Nations (LoN).⁷ Wilson chaired the Commission tasked with drafting the Covenant of the LoN.⁸ In his message to Yugoslavs, Wilson offered support against Italian claims and asked for assistance in creating the LoN. The government in Belgrade and the delegation accepted these terms.⁹ Milenko Vesnić was the representative of the Kingdom of SCS in the Commission. As the head of the Serbian military mission in Washington, he had established cordial relations with Wilson and his adviser, Colonel Edward House.¹⁰ Vesnić's wife, Blanche, was a close friend of Wilson's spouse, Edith.¹¹ In its first iteration, the Commission had ten delegates of the Great Powers¹² and five delegates of the Lesser Powers. Vesnić, alongside other Lesser Power delegates, insisted that another four representatives of smaller states should join the Commission, and they achieved this goal despite American and British opposition.¹³ The Kingdom of SCS became one of the LoN's founding members.¹⁴

Ante Trumbić was the first Yugoslav statesman willing to entrust national security to the LoN. In February 1919, he suggested the full military and naval neutralisation of the Adriatic Sea under Geneva's protection.¹⁵ The Croatian delegate Josip Smodlaka seconded the proposal, but the Serbian delegates Vesnić and Pašić and the Slovenian delegate Otokar Rybař opposed it.¹⁶ The cabinet of Stojan Protić rejected this,¹⁷ arguing that the Kingdom of SCS would be downgraded to a secondary power.¹⁸ In May 1919, the Yugoslav and Italian delegations accepted the principle of independent Rijeka under the LoN's protection.¹⁹

7 Wilson's idea for the preservation of peace was the so-called (American) New Diplomacy, which excluded secret diplomacy and promoted public diplomacy. The LoN was to have the leading role in this concept as an international body that would supervise all international agreements, serving as the corrective factor of international diplomacy, much like national public opinion for government policies.

8 C. Howard-Ellis, *The Origin, Structure and Working of the League of Nations* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1928), 69–73; F. P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), 25, 31, 33; MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, 84, 86, 91.

9 Mitrović, *Jugoslavija na Konferenciji mira 1919–1920*, 115, 116.

10 Lederer, *Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference*, 90; Mitrović, *Jugoslavija na Konferenciji mira 1919–1920*, 113.

11 Lederer, *Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference*, 90; MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, 121.

12 The American, British, French, Italian and Japanese delegates.

13 The original plan was that the delegates of Serbia, Belgium, Portugal, China and Brazil would be the representatives of the Lesser Allies. In the end, the Commission was expanded to include the delegates of Greece, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania (Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 33).

14 Ibid., 65.

15 Lederer, *Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference*, 132.

16 Ibid., 133.

17 Ibid., 152.

18 State Archive of Serbia, Belgrade, Collection Varie, box no. V, item no. 65, Milan Antić, *Jadransko pitanje*, Beograd, 15 March 1922, 11 (henceforth: SAS, Varie).

19 Lederer, *Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference*, 212, 213.

In December, the Minister of Transportation, Milorad Drašković, suggested the LoN's mandate for the northern part of Albania in response to the Italian claim for a mandate over that country.²⁰ The main argument disputing Italy's juridical right was that the LoN Covenant allowed this form of governance for former colonies or territories without prior independence.²¹

One of the innovations introduced by the Paris Peace Conference was an international system for the protection of minority rights, which was intended for the successor states of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian Empires and did not apply to the Great Powers. The former were dissatisfied with the impositions made by the latter.²² The Great Powers excluded the implementation of the Permanent Court of International Justice in The Hague,²³ provided for in the Covenant, from the minority rights system, instead assigning the leading role in this matter to the LoN Council.²⁴ For the Kingdom of SCS, the main problem was the implementation of post-war international law in the territory of pre-war Serbia. In that regard, Article 51 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en Laye was one of the most challenging obligations.²⁵ The new head of the American delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, Frank Polk, urged Pašić and Vesnić to trust the future work of the LoN.²⁶ Prime Minister Ljubomir Davidović emphasised that Belgrade did not reject the protection of minority rights but opposed the violation of national sovereignty.²⁷

At the government meetings chaired by the Yugoslav Prince Regent Alexander Karadorđević in September 1919, Trumbić argued that the LoN would be a sufficient guarantee for the implementation of the minority rights system, and neither the Great Powers nor Geneva could impose any further obligations without Yugoslav consent. His premise was that a refusal to sign the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en Laye and the supplementary Convention would place the Kingdom of SCS in an uncertain position vis-à-vis the Peace Conference and the LoN. His estimation was that the LoN's competencies

would include control mechanisms for the Great Powers' actions.²⁸ Trumbić's argument was that Geneva would be an important factor for preserving territorial integrity, and a refusal to sign the Treaty and Convention would leave the Kingdom of SCS without this protection in the future. Rybař supported this view. Trumbić dismissed the possibility of the LoN's dissolution in the near future. The head of the Legal Section of the Yugoslav Delegation, Slobodan Jovanović, supported the view that the LoN would be unable to impose new obligations without Belgrade's consent. He believed that Geneva would have only moral authority in international relations and that the Kingdom of SCS should not be discouraged by the LoN's judicial role, as it was sufficiently defined. Jovanović emphasised that the investigative function was perplexing as it was not defined clearly enough. He rejected the interpretation that refusing to sign the Treaty and Convention would cost the country the LoN's future protection.²⁹ Belgrade notified the Peace Conference of its view that the LoN Council would have only juridical power in minority issues.³⁰ The French Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon and Secretary General of the Quai d'Orsay, Philippe Berthelot, informed Trumbić that this interpretation would be acceptable.³¹ The Council of the Big Four at the Peace Conference approved it in early November 1919.³²

During the negotiations with Italy in 1920, the Kingdom of SCS continued to reject the Italian mandate over Albania and was willing to accept the LoN's role in some disputed areas of the Adriatic Coast.³³ Trumbić and Rybař had changed their positions. Trumbić reckoned the LoN would hand over Rijeka to Italy, a permanent member of the LoN Council.³⁴ Rybař concluded that Geneva would work primarily to protect the Great Powers' interests and influence.³⁵ In February 1920, the Slovenian delegate Ivan Žogler seconded their view that the Government should reject Lloyd George's proposal for the Adriatic question and its specifics to be resolved in the LoN.³⁶

20 Ibid., 209.

21 Ibid., 264, footnote 48.

22 Ibid., 239.

23 The Permanent Court of International Justice was one of assisting institutions to the LoN, with supreme jurisdiction in legal matters. It provided advisory opinions to the LoN Council and resolved cases submitted by governments (Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 170, 171).

24 Richard Veatch, "Minorities and the League of Nations," in: *The League of Nations in retrospect: proceedings of the symposium* (Berlin–New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1983), 396; Giuseppe Motta, *Less than Nations: Central-European Minorities after WWI*, Volume I (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), 47, 48.

25 Lederer, *Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference*, 239, 240; Mitrović, *Jugoslavija na konferenciji mira 1919–1920*, 200–205; Zoran Janjetović, "Pitanje zaštite nacionalnih manjina u Kraljevini SHS na konferenciji mira u Parizu 1919–1920," *Istorija 20. veka*, no. 2 (2000): 33–40.

26 Lederer, *Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference*, 241.

27 Ibid., 244.

28 Bogumil Hrabak, "Zapisnici sednica Davidovićeve dve vlade od avgusta 1919. do februara 1920.," *Arhivski vijesnik* XIII, no. 13 (1970): 29, 30, 32.

29 Ibid., 34–36.

30 Ibid., 47.

31 *Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije Kraljevine SHS na Mirovnoj konferenciji u Parizu 1919–1920*, eds. Bogdan Krizman, Bogumil Hrabak (Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka, 1960), 186, 187.

32 Ibid., 190.

33 SAS, Varie, b. V, item no. 65, Antić, *Jadransko pitanje*, ff. 89; Ferdo Šišić, *Jadransko pitanje* (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 1920), ff. 72; Lederer, *Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference*, ff. 278.

34 SAS, Varie, b. V, item no. 65, Antić, *Jadransko pitanje*, 103.

35 These concerns stemmed from the European Powers' reaction to D'Annunzio's occupation of Rijeka (Ibid., 91).

36 SAS, Varie, b. V, item no. 75, Report of Milan Antić, Belgrade, 25 November 1923, 48.

The first steps in the new international organisation

One of the first tasks of the LoN was to increase membership. The Albanian government submitted a petition for admission to the LoN to the Secretary-General, Sir Eric Drummond, in October 1920.³⁷ The British Foreign Secretary, Lord George Curzon, was initially against this, as he had reservations about the membership of small states.³⁸ A Commission for Admission was formed at the first Assembly of the LoN, with Lord Robert Cecil,³⁹ Drummond's closest associate, as its chair.⁴⁰ The commission considered thirteen applications, discarding one.⁴¹ The decision was positive in four cases,⁴² and seven⁴³ requests were rejected. The Bulgarian and Albanian applications gave rise to extensive debates.⁴⁴ The LoN Secretariat was certain the Greek opposition was eliminated but was unsure about the Kingdom of SCS's concerns.⁴⁵ The Yugoslav delegate Miroslav Spalajković supported the admission of Austria and Armenia and opposed the Bulgarian and Albanian applications.⁴⁶ Cecil's determined advocacy for the latter ensured their admission.⁴⁷ The Allied Powers reserved the right to make the final decision on Albanian borders. They forwarded the issue to the Conference of Ambassadors, an inter-allied body that allowed the Great Powers control over the enforcement of the Peace Treaties.⁴⁸ The Yugoslav Legation in London warned that the changed stance of the Foreign Office (FO) on Tirana's application could have a grave impact on the Kingdom of SCS.⁴⁹

One of the tactics used by the Kingdom of SCS to prevent Italy's domination over Albania was support for the Miridit tribe in the northern part of Albania. The Yugoslav government deployed the army to take control of some strategically important positions in

this region.⁵⁰ The Albanian government appealed to the LoN Council to resolve the issues of the frontiers and the presence of foreign troops.⁵¹ In June 1921, the PM and Foreign Minister Nikola Pašić rejected the idea that the LoN Council should decide upon the Yugoslav military presence in northern Albania and asked for the decision to be made at the Conference of Ambassadors.⁵² He was supported by Athens.⁵³ The FO assured him that Geneva would not be responsible for the decision on the frontiers.⁵⁴ Lord Curzon was sympathetic to Belgrade's and Athens' claims as he was convinced that Rome's plan was to pounce on Albanian territory as soon as the collapse of the state started.⁵⁵ Spalajković argued before the LoN Council that the core of the problem was the internal instability of the Albanian state.⁵⁶ The Yugoslav plenipotentiary minister in Bern, Milutin Jovanović, called on the Council to let the Conference of Ambassadors resolve the border issue.⁵⁷ Pašić insisted on sending one delegate to the Conference, as Belgrade could not accept any decision made without its consent.⁵⁸ He appointed Mateja Bošković and Milutin Jovanović as delegates.⁵⁹ Belgrade played right into the hands of the Allied Powers, which had no intention of ceding any responsibilities to the LoN.⁶⁰ The LoN Council left this matter to the Conference of Ambassadors.⁶¹ The Second LoN Assembly could not do anything to stop this,⁶² but it supported Albania in the dispute with the Kingdom of SCS, which resorted to armed conflict.⁶³ Belgrade asked the Council and the Assembly to send a commission of inquiry to Albania before making the final decision. The Council accepted this but changed the sequence of steps, and the commission was sent after the decision was reached.⁶⁴

37 Deona Cali Kalaja, "The admission of Albania in the League of Nations," *Journal of Liberty and International Affairs*, Volume 3, Issue 1 (2016): 58.

38 Dominik Ławski, "Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec kwestii albańskiej w 1921 roku," *Acta Universitatis Lodzensis. Folia Historica*, 115 (2024): 86.

39 Kalaja, "The admission of Albania in the League of Nations," 61.

40 David Macfadyen, Michael D. V. Davis, Marilyn Norah Carr, and John Burley, *Eric Drummond and his Legacies: The League of Nations and the Beginnings of Global Governance* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 36.

41 The Committee discarded the application from the Montenegrin government in exile, as the Allied Powers accepted the unification of Montenegro with the Kingdom of SCS.

42 Finland, Austria, Costa Rica and Luxembourg.

43 Lichtenstein, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Georgia and Armenia.

44 Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 122–124.

45 Kalaja, "The admission of Albania in the League of Nations," 62.

46 Zoran Bajin, *Spalajković. Diplomata i kontrarevolucionar* (Novi Sad: Prometej, 2021), 207.

47 Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 123, 159; Kalaja, "The admission of Albania in the League of Nations," 62–66.

48 Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 159.

49 Archive of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, Records of the Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in England – London (341), box 19, folder 44, the Legation in London to the Étrangères Belgrade, Conf. No. 303, 29 December 1920 (henceforth: AJ).

50 Desanka Todorović, *Jugoslavija i balkanske države 1918–1923*. (Beograd: Narodna knjiga–Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1979), 129, 134, 135; Bogumil Hrabak, "Miriditi između Italijana, arbanaških nacionalista i Srba (1918–1921)," *Istorija 20. veka*, no. 1–2 (1993): 49; Dragan Bakić, "The Italo-Yugoslav Conflict over Albania: A View from Belgrade," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 25, no. 4 (2014): 595, 596; Dušan Fundić, "Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca i Miriditska republika (1921)," *Tokovi istorije*, no. 2 (2024): 50–57.

51 Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 159; Todorović, *Jugoslavija i balkanske države 1918–1923*, 127.

52 AJ, r. 341, b. 19, f. 44, Pašić to the Legation in London, Conf. No. 5723 from 14 June 1921.

53 Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 159.

54 AJ, r. 341, b. 19, f. 44, the Legation in London to the Étrangères, Conf. No. 144 from 22 June 1921.

55 Peter J. Yearwood, *Guarantee of Peace: The League of Nations in British Policy 1914–1925* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 201.

56 Bajin, *Spalajković*, 211.

57 Todorović, *Jugoslavija i balkanske države 1918–1923*, 130.

58 AJ, r. 341, b. 19, f. 44, Pašić to the Legation in London, Č. Conf. No. 5806 from 28 June 1921; Todorović, *Jugoslavija i balkanske države 1918–1923*, 128.

59 Archive of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts, Belgrade, Ivan Subotić papers (14.576), folder V, item no. 4, Report "History of our [Yugoslavia's] policy in Albania in 1921 based on documents from the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (14 reports numbered from 1 to 14)," Excerpt from the dossier "Albanian borders," Dossier Ar.-1 (later: ASASA).

60 Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 136.

61 Ibid., 159; Yearwood, *Guarantee of Peace*, 202.

62 Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 159, 160; Todorović, *Jugoslavija i balkanske države 1918–1923*, 134, 136.

63 Todorović, *Jugoslavija i balkanske države 1918–1923*, 133, 134, 136; Bajin, *Spalajković*, 211.

64 AJ, r. 341, b. 19, f. 44, Pašić to the Legation in London, Conf. No. 6812 from 8 November 1921.

Pašić could not persuade the French PM Aristide Briand to allow Yugoslav participation at the Conference of Ambassadors, and he was granted a hearing before the final decision.⁶⁵ In London, Cecil shifted the discussion to the House of Commons and put pressure on the FO to compel Belgrade to accept the LoN's stand in November 1921. A high official at the Central European Department of the FO, Harold Nicolson,⁶⁶ who argued against revising the borders on behalf of Yugoslavia,⁶⁷ warned the Yugoslav plenipotentiary minister in London, Mihailo Gavrilović, of Belgrade's misapprehensions. According to Nicolson, the issue was not between the Kingdom of SCS and Albania, but between the Kingdom of SCS and the LoN. Tirana garnered little sympathy in London, but Geneva did, and Belgrade was bound to lose.⁶⁸ Lloyd George wanted to maintain his role as a champion of the LoN, and he relented in the Albanian issue.⁶⁹ A member of the Albanian border commission, Major Harold Temperley, who proposed rectifying the frontiers on Yugoslavia's behalf,⁷⁰ informed Gavrilović that the Conference would reach a satisfactory solution and urged Belgrade to accept it.⁷¹ Otherwise, the issue would be passed on to the LoN,⁷² and no one could anticipate its resolution.⁷³ After discussions requested by Cecil in the House of Commons, the British Government changed its stand. With Lloyd George's approval, Nicolson suggested activating Article 16 of the LoN Covenant against the Kingdom of SCS. Cecil demanded strict land and naval sanctions, but Lord Curzon rejected this.⁷⁴ Lloyd George urged Drummond to summon the LoN Council, suggesting economic sanctions.⁷⁵ Gavrilović was informed of the possible consequences.⁷⁶ The Conference of Ambassadors decided to restore Albanian frontiers from 1913 and grant Italy the right to

protect Albania's territorial and economic independence. The Conference of Ambassadors and LoN Council pressured the Kingdom of SCS to withdraw its troops. Belgrade accepted these solutions in December 1921.⁷⁷ Cecil later praised Yugoslavia's "far-sighted self-control" at the Third Assembly of the LoN.⁷⁸

Regarding the Bulgarian application for the LoN, Spalajković argued against its admittance because Sofia failed to meet the military obligations stipulated in the Treaty of Neuilly.⁷⁹ He claimed that Bulgaria was hiding its armament efforts, which represented a threat to peace. He called on Geneva to send an inquiry commission to verify these claims. Spalajković and the Greek delegate to the LoN, Nikolaos Politis, demanded that Sofia hand over 1500 war criminals, return stolen goods and money and suspend its support for the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) and its guerrilla actions in Macedonia. The Inter-Allied Commission did not confirm the Yugoslav and Greek claims, and the First Assembly of the LoN voted for Bulgaria's admission.⁸⁰ According to Frank P. Walters, one of Drummond's close associates, the Kingdom of SCS, Romania and Greece had made a "generous act" towards Bulgaria. He credited this generosity to the atmosphere of the First Assembly and Geneva's immense influence on the subsequent "remarkable change" in the relations among the Balkan states.⁸¹

In 1921, the Little Entente – a tripartite alliance between Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania⁸² – supported the view of Italy, France and Great Britain that the Hungarian request for admission to the LoN should be rejected.⁸³ The following year, the FO and Palazzo Chigi changed their position, and the Third Assembly of the LoN took the application into consideration. In August 1922, at the conferences between the Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister Edvard Beneš, Pašić and the new Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Momčilo Ninčić, and between the Little Entente and Poland, it was agreed to follow the Allied Powers' course⁸⁴ and

65 Todorović, *Jugoslavija i balkanske države 1918–1923.*, 137.

66 During the Paris Peace Conference, Nicolson was one of the members of the British delegation that drafted the proposals for supporting the creation of the Kingdom of SCS and Czechoslovakia. He considered the Adriatic problem to be the central issue of the Peace Conference. Nicolson believed that Italy had rightly obtained Trieste but did not have a right to Fiume (Rijeka) and the Istrian Peninsula. He held senior FO positions at Whitehall from February 1923 to December 1925 (Derek Drinkwater, *Sir Harold Nicolson and International Relations: The Practitioner as Theorist* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 20–22).

67 Yearwood, *Guarantee of Peace*, 203.

68 AJ, r. 341, b. 19, f. 44, Gavrilović to the Étrangères Belgrade, Conf. No. 263 from 3 November 1921.

69 Yearwood, *Guarantee of Peace*, 204, 205.

70 Ibid., 203.

71 AJ, r. 341, b. 19, f. 44, Gavrilović to Pašić, personally, 25 October 1921.

72 Lord Curzon wanted to avoid this, as it would have proven that the Great Powers were incapable of resolving important political issues and would provide a chance for the Kingdom of SCS and Greece to state their case and *raison d'état* (Ławski, "Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec kwestii albańskiej w 1921 roku," 98).

73 ASASA, Collection no. 14.576, f. V, item no. 4, Report "History of Our [Yugoslavia's] policy in Albania in 1921 based on documents from the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (14 reports numbered from 1 to 14)," excerpt from dossier "Albanian borders," Dossier Ar.-1.

74 Yearwood, *Guarantee of Peace*, 205, 206; Ławski, "Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec kwestii albańskiej w 1921 roku," 109.

75 Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 160.

76 AJ, r. 341, b. 19, b. 44, Gavrilović to the Étrangères Belgrade, 8 November 1921.

77 Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 160, 161; Todorović, *Jugoslavija i balkanske države 1918–1923*, 139; Yearwood, *Guarantee of Peace*, 207; Ławski, "Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec kwestii albańskiej w 1921 roku," 109.

78 *Verbatim Record of the Third Assembly of the League of Nations*, 5th Plenary Meeting, September 6th, 1922, at 4. P.M. (Genève: Imprimerie Albert Renaud et Cie, 1922), 5 (henceforth: VRTALN).

79 The most important provision was the limitation of armed forces and restrictions on rearmament.

80 Todorović, *Jugoslavija i balkanske države 1918–1923.*, 99.

81 Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 123.

82 For further reading on the Little Entente: Eliza Campus, *Mica Înțelegere* (București: Editura Științifică, 1968); Milan Vanku, *Mala antanta 1920–1938* (Titovo Užice: IP "Dimitrije Tucović," 1969); Eliza Campus, *The Little Entente and the Balkan Alliance* (București: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1978); Magda Ádám, *Richtung selbstvernichtung. Die Kleine Entente 1920–1938* (Budapest: Corvina; Wien: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1988); Idem, *The Little Entente and Europe (1920–1929)* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1993); Zdeněk Sládek, *Malá dohoda 1919–1938: Její hospodářské, politické a vojenské komponenty* (Praha: Karolinum, 2000) [Serbian edition: Зденек Сладек, *Мала антанта 1920–1938. Њене привредне, политичке и војне компоненте* (Београд: Службени гласник, 2018)].

83 Ádám, *The Little Entente and Europe (1920–1929)*, 255, 256.

84 "Odluke konferencije u Pragu," *Vreme*, 28 August 1922, 1.

support Hungary's admission.⁸⁵ It was emphasised this would be an additional guarantee of Budapest's loyal implementation of the Treaty of Trianon.⁸⁶ The Little Entente supported the admission but emphasised that Budapest had not met all of its international obligations,⁸⁷ submitting a joint note on the Hungarian commitment to preventing a Habsburg restoration.⁸⁸

The Kingdom of SCS and the preservation of peace

After taking charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in early 1922, Ninčić worked diligently to formulate a new foreign policy and reform the diplomatic service. He was Yugoslavia's first Foreign Minister to address properly the country's relations with the LoN. During his tenure, from January 1922 to December 1926, Ninčić sought to implement the most effective organisation that could meet all obligations in a significantly changed international situation.⁸⁹ One of his first decisions was to transfer the Department for the Implementation of International Treaties from the Presidency of the Ministerial Council to the MFA and expand its work on the LoN.⁹⁰ He twice undertook preparatory work for the opening of the Permanent Delegation in Geneva, in 1924 and 1926, yet both times, the opening fell to his successors, Vojislav Marinković and Ninko Perić, in 1924 and 1927.⁹¹

Ninčić introduced the new practice of the Foreign Minister heading Yugoslavia's delegations at the Assembly of the LoN.⁹² This lasted until Milan Stojadinović took charge of the MFA in mid-1935.⁹³ After the political settlement between the Radicals and the Croatian Peasant Party (Hrvatska seljačka stranka, HSS) and during their coalition

governments (July 1925–February 1927),⁹⁴ further changes were made to the Yugoslav delegations. With King Alexander's approval,⁹⁵ Ninčić proposed and the Cabinet accepted the appointment of Stjepan Radić, the leader of the HSS and (later) the Minister of Education, as a deputy delegate at the Sixth Assembly of the LoN, with Radić enjoying the same decision-making powers as the official delegates.⁹⁶ Milorad Stražnicki, a professor at the University in Zagreb, and State Under-Secretary at the Ministry for Social Issues Juraj Krnjević were appointed assistant delegates.⁹⁷ The idea was to prove that the Kingdom of SCS had managed to overcome the so-called Croatian question, which had been internationalised since the Genoa Economic and Financial Conference in 1922 – and to let Radić undo his previous anti-Yugoslav actions abroad.⁹⁸ He accepted the mission,⁹⁹ lavishing praise on Ninčić's prudence, forethought and ability to smoothly organise work.¹⁰⁰ At the Seventh Session of the Assembly in September 1926, Radić was a delegate and Krnjević was an assistant delegate.¹⁰¹ After Ninčić was elected President of the LoN Assembly, Radić became the first delegate. According to Radić, Lazar Marković unsuccessfully tried to prevent this.¹⁰² The latter was one of three delegates of the Kingdom of SCS at the LoN Assembly (besides Ninčić and Radić)¹⁰³ and a close associate of Pašić, whose last term in office as Prime Minister ended in April 1926.

Beneš was perceived as the spokesman of the Little Entente in Geneva¹⁰⁴ and an expert on the LoN.¹⁰⁵ At the conference of the Little Entente and Poland in August 1922, Ninčić was put forth as the first nominee for the joint candidate for the non-permanent

85 Vuk Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918–1933* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1971), 211, 212; Andrzej Essen, *Polska a Mała ententa 1920–1934* (Warszawa–Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1992), 105; Ádám, *The Little Entente and Europe (1920–1929)*, 256.

86 "Odluke konferencije u Pragu," *Vreme*, 28 August 1922, 1. In fact, this was solely the viewpoint of the Polish delegation at the Conference Erazm Piltz, which was not supported by Ninčić, Beneš and the Romanian Foreign Minister, Ion G. Duca (Essen, *Polska a Mała ententa 1920–1934*, 105).

87 On behalf of the Little Entente, the Czechoslovakian delegate Štefan Osuský elaborated that Hungary had not abolished compulsory military service and avoided disarmament, while the "Numerus Clausus" from 1920 was not compatible with national minority rights. (VRTALN, 10th Plenary Meeting, 18 September 1922, at 11 A.M., 4–6).

88 AJ, Records of the Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in France – Paris, Vichy (388), box 11, folder 28, folio 406.

89 Srđan Mičić, *Od birokratije do diplomatije. Istorija jugoslovenske diplomatske službe 1918–1939*. (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2018), 89–102.

90 Ibid., 90–93, 97, 98, 101, 102.

91 Ibid., 235, 236.

92 "Dr. Ninčić u Ženevi," *Politika*, September 4, 1922, 3.

93 Srđan Mičić, "Shifting in the Yugoslav Foreign Policy from Regional Alliances to Neutrality," in: *On the Fault Lines of European and World Politics: Yugoslavia between Alliances and Neutrality/Non-Alignment*, editors: Srđan Mičić, Jovan Čavoški (Belgrade: Institute for Recent History of Serbia, 2022), 63.

94 The agreement sought to overcome the points of contention in the relations between the Serbs and Croats, commonly known as the so-called Croatian question, and lay down the foundations for their joint work on state affairs (Branislav Gligoričević, *Parlament i političke stranke u Jugoslaviji 1919–1929* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju – Narodna knjiga, 1979), ff. 196).

95 "Radić u Ligi Naroda," *Pravda*, 13 August 1925, 1.

96 *League of Nations Official Journal*, Special Supplement No. 33, Records of the Sixth Assembly (Geneva, 1925), 19 (henceforth: LNOJ); "Politički dnevnik," *Vreme*, 12 August 1925, 1; "Odluke vlade," *Pravda*, 12 August 1925, 1.

97 LNOJ, No. 33, 18; "Politički dnevnik," *Vreme*, 12 August 1925, 1.

98 "Radić u Ligi Naroda," *Pravda*, 13 August 1925, 1.

99 Đ. Banjac, "G. Stjepan Radić o svojoj misiji u Društvu Naroda," *Vreme*, 16 August 1925, 4; Z., "Kod St. Radića," *Politika*, 17 August 1925, 1–2; "Izjave Radića i proslava Hrvatskih Sokola," *Pravda*, 17 August 1925, 1.

100 "Pripreme za Ligu Naroda," *Vreme*, 21 August 1925, 1; "Sastanak za Ženevu," *Politika*, 21 August 1925, 2; "Delegacija za Ligu Naroda je spremna," *Pravda*, 21 August 1925, 1.

101 LNOJ, Special Supplement No. 44, Records of the Seventh Ordinary Session of the Assembly, Text of the Debates (Geneva, 1926), 18.

102 *Korespondencija Stjepana Radića, 1919–1928*, vol. 2, ed. Bogdan Krizman (Zagreb: Institut za hrvatsku povijest Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 1973), 615, 616.

103 *Kraljevina Jugoslavija u Društvu naroda: katalog izložbe*, autori izložbe i kataloga Dušan Dončić i Jelena Đurišić (Beograd: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2014), 21.

104 Kosta St. Pavlović, *Vojislav Marinković i njegovo doba (1876–1935)*, Knjiga druga (London, 1956), 76, 78, 81; Id., *Vojislav Marinković i njegovo doba (1876–1935)*, Knjiga treća (London, 1957), 93.

105 Věra Olivová, "Československo-německé vztahy ve dvacátých letech," in: *T. G. Masaryk a vztahy Čechů a Němců (1882–1937)*, sborník příspěvků přednesených od listopadu 1993 do června 1995 v rámci Masarykovy společnosti na FF UK v Praze, editor Gajan Koloman (Praha: Masarykova společnost, 1997), 220.

seat in the LoN Council. This was an insincere proposal, as in reality, Beneš's intention was to prevent his candidacy.¹⁰⁶ Ninčić was elected as one of the vice-presidents of the Third Assembly of the LoN.¹⁰⁷ In his first address to the Assembly, he highly praised the contribution of the Council to "the restoration of goodwill among men" and "the re-establishment of international confidence".¹⁰⁸ He justified the prior opposition to the Council's actions in the Albanian question as a misunderstanding on the part of Belgrade.¹⁰⁹ Ninčić won 15 votes as the candidate for the non-permanent member of the Council but was not elected.¹¹⁰ At the Seventh Assembly of the LoN, Ninčić was elected President of the Assembly. In his opening speech, he emphasised the Kingdom of SCS's determination to support the LoN in its efforts to safeguard peace and human civilisation.¹¹¹ The Locarno Pact of 1925 restored Germany's position as a Great Power, consequently leading to the reorganisation of the LoN Council in 1926. In this reshuffling, the Little Entente was guaranteed one seat.¹¹² The tripartite alliance nominated Romania, and the Assembly voted to approve this choice.¹¹³ Czechoslovakia ran for a seat separately and failed – without winning the Yugoslav vote.¹¹⁴ The lesson was learned, and Prague would not repeat the mistake.¹¹⁵ Marinković was the first Yugoslav Foreign Minister who made a name for himself as a statesman in Geneva during his tenure from April 1927 until July 1932.¹¹⁶ Before the Ninth Assembly of the LoN in 1928, he was offered the position of vice president or committee chairmanship.¹¹⁷ He was elected president of the Sixth (Political) Committee,¹¹⁸ the most important body

of the Assembly.¹¹⁹ His work was facilitated when he became a semi-permanent member of the Council as the representative of the Little Entente (1929–1932).¹²⁰

The Yugoslav officials were willing to leverage Geneva's influence to improve bilateral relations and avoid conflicts with Italy. Yet, there were some differences in the approaches of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministers. After the Third Assembly of the LoN, Ninčić invited Drummond to visit the Kingdom of SCS in late October 1922, intending to convince him that Belgrade was pursuing a peaceful solution and not blocking its negotiations with Rome.¹²¹ Milutin Jovanović supported this move, as he believed that the Under-Secretary of the LoN, Bernardo Attolico, could infer the same during this visit.¹²² Since the visit coincided with the fascist March on Rome,¹²³ Ninčić criticised the Yugoslav press for its biased reporting of the events in Italy. He emphasised his country's determination not to interfere in internal squabbles and continue to pursue a pacifist foreign policy.¹²⁴ The Kingdom of SCS sought LoN support against the Italian aggressive policy in the Adriatic Sea. Due to the *coup d'état* in Bulgaria,¹²⁵ the Italian short-lived occupation of Corfu¹²⁶ and growing frictions in bilateral relations, Pašić and Ninčić decided to involve Geneva. They ratified the treaties of Rapallo and Santa Margherita¹²⁷ before the LoN in an attempt to annul the Italian annexation of Rijeka in September 1923. Benito Mussolini unsuccessfully engaged the FO and the Quai d'Orsay to prevent this. Lord Curzon called the MFA to rely on LoN support. While the diplomatic efforts in Geneva did not alter Rome's plans,¹²⁸ the FO was convinced the Council could protect Belgrade.¹²⁹ Mussolini became rather cooperative during Drummond's visit in October 1923, deciding to counter the Anglo-French monopoly

106 Essen, *Polska a Mała ententa 1920–1934*, 105–109.

107 *VRTALN*, 5th Plenary Meeting, 6 September 1922, at 4. P.M., 2.

108 *VRTALN*, 8th Plenary Meeting, 9 September 1922, at 10. A.M., 10, 11.

109 *Ibid.*, 11.

110 *VRTALN*, 24th Plenary Meeting, 30 September 1922, at 10. A.M., 7.

111 *Journal of the Seventh Assembly of the League of Nations*, No. 2, 7 September 1926 (Geneva, 1926), 15 (henceforth: *JSALN*).

112 Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 335.

113 *JSALN*, No. 11, 17 September 1926, 129–131; *LNOJ*, No. 44, 82, 83.

114 *Korespondencija Stjepana Radića*, vol. 2, 624, 625.

115 AJ, Records of the Permanent Delegation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia by the League of Nations – Geneva (159), box 1, folder II, Fotić to Marinković, Conf. No. 261, 4 July 1927.

116 Kosta St. Pavlović, *Dnevnik 1930–1932*, eds. Srđan Mičić, Nataša Miličević (Beograd: Istorijski Arhiv Beograda – Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2020), 117–119, 122, 123, 182–194, 196, 225, 242; *Id.*, *Vojislav Marinković i njegovo doba (1876–1935)*, knjiga četvrta (London, 1957), 127, 128; *Id.*, *Vojislav Marinković i njegovo doba (1876–1935)*, knjiga peta (London, 1960), 91–93.

117 AJ, r. 159, b. 3, f. VII, Fotić to Šumenković, Conf. No. 457, 31 July; Fotić to Marinković, personally, Str. Conf. No. 483, 17 August; Fotić to the MFA, Conf. No. 492, 22 August; Fotić to the MFA, Conf. No. 497, 23 August; Fotić to Marinković, personally, Conf. No. 512, 27 August; Šumenković's cable, Conf. No. 10259, 28 August 1928.

118 *Verbatim Record of the Ninth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations*, Second Plenary Meeting, 3 September 1928, at 4 P.M. (Geneva, 1928), 4; *Journal of the Ninth Ordinary Session of the Assembly*, No. 2, 4 September 1928 (Geneva: Albert Kunding, 1928), 18.

119 Anique H. M. van Ginneken, *Historical Dictionary of the League of Nations*, Historical Dictionaries of International Organizations No. 23 (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2006), 38, 39.

120 Mičić, "Shifting in the Yugoslav Foreign Policy from Regional Alliances to Neutrality," 64.

121 AJ, Records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (334), box 98, folder 325, folio 209.

122 *Ibid.*, folio 210.

123 Benito Mussolini and the fascists seized power in Italy in mass demonstrations in October 1922.

124 "G. Ninčić o stanju u Italiji," *Vreme*, 2 November 1922, 2.

125 On 9 June 1923, the pro-Yugoslav government of Aleksandar Stamboliyski was overthrown in a bloody *coup d'état*. Stamboliyski was brutally murdered, and many of his followers were either executed or imprisoned.

126 During the Corfu crisis, the plenipotentiary minister in Paris, Miroslav Spalajković, supported Raymond Poincaré's view that the Conference of Ambassadors should resolve this issue instead of the LoN, as it would be more efficient (James Barros, *The Corfu Incident: Mussolini and the League of Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 115, 116, n. 94).

127 These were the first in a series of treaties and conventions from 1920 and 1922 which sought to resolve or relax the bilateral relations between the Kingdom of SCS and Italy.

128 Enes Milak, "Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca i Rimski sporazum (1922–1924)," u: *Istorija XX veka*, zbornik radova, vol. XIV–XV, odgovorni urednik Živko Avramovski (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju – Narodna knjiga, 1982), 150–154; Yearwood, *Guarantee of Peace*, 272.

129 AJ, r. 341, b. 1, f. 1, the chargé d'affaires and the secretary of the Legation in London Konstantin Fotić to the Étrangers, Conf. No. 420, 22 September 1923.

over the LoN.¹³⁰ After Ninčić's resignation in late 1926 due to the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Co-operation signed by Italy and Albania, the new Foreign Minister, Ninko Perić, was eager to involve Geneva to fend off the Italian threat but could not obtain Austin Chamberlain's support.¹³¹ When Marinković started his second tenure as Foreign Minister in 1927, he changed the approach. He wanted to keep the LoN as a last resort in case of an Italian military attack, trying to avoid asking for Geneva's help in diplomatic affairs regarding the Italian-Albanian Pact.¹³² Drummond took part in the pacification of the Yugoslav-Italian relations during his visits to Rome and Belgrade in 1930. King Alexander promised that in case of an Italian occupation of any island in the Adriatic Sea, he would turn to the LoN Council instead of resorting to war.¹³³

One of the LoN's practices was to apply economic solutions to political problems.¹³⁴ The Kingdom of SCS participated in these processes. Yet, for Belgrade, bilateral political relations heavily informed stands on particular economic problems. The first case in Europe was Austria. Vienna accepted all peace terms without much opposition, and the international community sought ways to relax the economic crisis caused by the implementation of the Treaty of Saint-Germain.¹³⁵ The Little Entente and Poland decided to support Austria in this issue in August 1922.¹³⁶ Gavrilović informed the MFA that Italy was preparing to invest in Austria and had plans for a customs union, and the FO was not willing to provide financial support before the Assembly's decision.¹³⁷ Ninčić was certain that Belgrade, Prague and Rome had particular interests in resolving the issue under the jurisdiction of the LoN and working cordially with Vienna.¹³⁸ In Geneva, his first meeting was with the Austrian Foreign Minister Alfred Grünberger. Ninčić promised to support any suggestion for Austria's economic renewal.¹³⁹ In the first address to the Assembly, he asked the LoN to make a concerted effort to find "an immediate solution".¹⁴⁰ The Third Assembly reached a positive decision.¹⁴¹ Milan Đ. Milojević, the plenipotentiary minister

in Vienna from January 1924, later remarked that Austria's economic recovery was one of the most important tasks completed by the LoN.¹⁴²

Hungary and Bulgaria, which refused to accept the outcome of the Great War, fared considerably worse. After the Hungarian Prime Minister István Bethlen requested a loan from the LoN and a moratorium of 20 years on reparation payments,¹⁴³ the Yugoslav Foreign Minister Ninčić took a firm stand against acquiescing to this in May 1923. His main argument was that economic concessions would only encourage Budapest to continue avoiding its obligations under the Treaty of Trianon. Ninčić rejected the British, French and Italian position on the loan, informed Prague and Bucharest of his views¹⁴⁴ and asked for their support.¹⁴⁵ However, he altered his stand after a few days and consented to the Hungarian request under rigorous control of loan use and with guarantees for reparation payments and disarmament.¹⁴⁶ Acting on the received instructions, Spalajković concurred with Czechoslovak and Romanian diplomats on their joint action with the Quai d'Orsay against Bethlen's plan – which was supported by the FO and Palazzo Chigi – until Hungary fulfilled its Trianon military obligations.¹⁴⁷ The joint action of the Little Entente's diplomats¹⁴⁸ swayed the Reparation Commission's decision that a part of the loan had to be used for reparation payments.¹⁴⁹ Ninčić was still searching for a solution acceptable to Belgrade. He asked the Quai d'Orsay to support the proposal that the Reparation Commission take control of the loan instead of the LoN, as the FO was suggesting.¹⁵⁰ Due to Beneš's lenient stand and British pressure, the Little Entente came to terms with granting the Hungarian request in July. The main condition was the payment of reparations.¹⁵¹ During the negotiations in Geneva, in September, Ninčić did not change his stand.¹⁵² He told Bethlen that an economically weak Hungary represented a much lesser threat to peace. The Romanian plenipotentiary minister in London and delegate at the LoN, Nicolae

130 Elisabetta Tollardo, *Fascist Italy and the League of Nations 1922–1935* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 23, 24.

131 Saša Mišić, *Albanija – prijatelj i protivnik: Jugoslovenska politika prema Albaniji 1924–1927* (Beograd. Službeni glasnik, 2009), 127–135, 139–141.

132 Ibid., 142, 143.

133 Vuk Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Francuska između dva rata (Da li je Jugoslavija bila francuski "satelit")* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1985), 168, 169.

134 Patricia Calvin, *Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations 1920–1946* (Oxford: MPG Books Group, 2013), ff. 17.

135 Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 205–208; Calvin, *Securing the World Economy*, 26, 27.

136 Vanku, *Mala antanta 1920–1938*, 23; Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918–1933*, 211, 212; Essen, *Polska a Mala ententa 1920–1934*, 104, 105; Ádám, *The Little Entente and Europe (1920–1929)*, 255.

137 AJ, r. 341, b. 21, f. 49, Gavrilović to the Étrangeres Belgrade, Conf. No. 322, 26 August and Conf. No. 328, 29 August 1922.

138 A.[ndra] Milosavljević, "U Marijenbadu," *Politika*, 1 September 1922, 2.

139 "Dr. Ninčić u Ženevi," *Politika*, 4 September 1922, 3.

140 VRTALN, 8th Plenary Meeting, 9 September 1922, at 10. A.M., 12.

141 Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 209, 210.

142 Milan Đ. Milojević, *Iz oblasti naše spoljne politike*, I (Beograd: "Život i rad," 1932), 103.

143 Ádám, *The Little Entente and Europe (1920–1929)*, 589, 589; Árpád Hornyák, "The League of Nations loan to Hungary in 1924 with special regard to Yugoslav aspects," *Analele Științifice ale Universității "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" din Iași (serie nouă) Istorie*, to LXVII (2021): 423–425.

144 AJ, r. 388, b. 11, f. 28, folios 479, 480.

145 Hornyák, "The League of Nations loan to Hungary in 1924 with special regard to Yugoslav aspects," 428, 429.

146 Ibid., 429.

147 AJ, r. 388, b. 11, f. 28, folios 481, 482.

148 Ibid., folios 487–490.

149 Hornyák, "The League of Nations loan to Hungary in 1924 with special regard to Yugoslav aspects," 425, 426.

150 AJ, r. 388, b. 11, f. 28, folio 571.

151 Vanku, *Mala antanta 1920–1938*, 25; Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918–1933*, 246, 248, 249; Ádám, *The Little Entente and Europe (1920–1929)*, 259–262, 269, 270; Sládek, *Malá dohoda 1919–1938*, 30; Dragan Bakić, *Britain and Interwar Danubian Europe: Foreign Policy and Security Challenges, 1919–1936* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), 54–59; Hornyák, "The League of Nations loan to Hungary in 1924 with special regard to Yugoslav aspects," 430–432.

152 AJ, r. 388, b. 11, f. 28, folio 584.

Titulescu, had an amicable relationship with Beneš.¹⁵³ Ninčić's position was further compounded by Pašić's view that the Reparation Commission should not be in charge of the loan, as this would undermine its most important role.¹⁵⁴ Bethlen managed to reach a compromise solution with the Little Entente.¹⁵⁵ The LoN decided that the three member-states could participate in the Supervisory Committee only if they also participated in the loan.¹⁵⁶

The negotiations between the Little Entente and Hungary continued.¹⁵⁷ Ninčić pursued guarantees acceptable to Belgrade through the Reparation Commission. He instructed the Yugoslav delegation to vote for the LoN's plan under the condition that only the first part of the loan could be exempted from reparation payments and could not exceed the sum of 50,000,000 gold crowns.¹⁵⁸ He agreed with Beneš to reject the Hungarian request to receive the loan in one payment.¹⁵⁹ Further negotiations were required because Britain, France and Italy held differing views on the loan and reparation payments. In the end, Budapest reached an agreement with Belgrade more easily than with Bucharest.¹⁶⁰ In January 1924, the Little Entente consented to the loan on three conditions: Hungary had to acknowledge the existing frontiers, prevent a Habsburg restoration, and not misuse the loan for military purposes.¹⁶¹ Ninčić instructed the Yugoslav delegation at the Reparation Commission to sign the protocols only if France, Czechoslovakia and Romania did so.¹⁶² The Reparation Commission included the Little Entente's conditions in one of the protocols signed in March 1924.¹⁶³ The three member-states were entitled to control Hungarian efforts to prevent a potential Habsburg restoration, which had hitherto been a right reserved for the Great Powers.¹⁶⁴

In the second half of the 1920s, the Bulgarian Cabinet of Andrey Lyapčev requested two international loans through the LoN. The first was for the relief of Bulgarian refugees in 1926, and the second was for the stabilisation of the financial situation in 1928.¹⁶⁵

153 Hornyák, "The League of Nations loan to Hungary in 1924 with special regard to Yugoslav aspects," 433.

154 AJ, r. 388, b. 11, f. 28, folio 584.

155 Ádám, *The Little Entente and Europe (1920–1929)*, 262; Hornyák, "The League of Nations loan to Hungary in 1924 with special regard to Yugoslav aspects," 437, 438.

156 Hornyák, "The League of Nations loan to Hungary in 1924 with special regard to Yugoslav aspects," 438.

157 Ádám, *The Little Entente and Europe (1920–1929)*, 262, 263, 267, 271–273.

158 AJ, r. 388, b. 11, f. 28, folio 616.

159 Ibid., folios 618, 625, 626.

160 Hornyák, "The League of Nations loan to Hungary in 1924 with special regard to Yugoslav aspects," 439–441.

161 Ádám, *The Little Entente and Europe (1920–1929)*, 263; Sládek, *Malá dohoda 1919–1938*, 30.

162 AJ, r. 388, b. 11, f. 28, folio 668.

163 Ádám, *The Little Entente and Europe (1920–1929)*, 264, 273.

164 ASASA, Milan Antić papers (14.387), item no. 10.040.

165 For further reading: Dimitar Kosev, *Vanšnata politika na Balgariya pri Upravenieto na Andrey Lyapčev 1926–1931* (Sofiya: Al "Prof. Marin Drinov," 1995), ff. 16; Voyin Božinov, *Zemnoto kalbo ne prestava da se varti, ako i nie da spim: Razkaz za života na Andrey Lyapčev* (Sofiya: IK "LIK," 2005), ff. 157; Valentin Aleksandrov, *Atanas Burov: Banker, politik, diplomat* (Sofiya: IK "Uniskorp," 2011), ff. 34.

The Kingdom of SCS responded differently to these two requests. Ninčić sought to improve bilateral relations with Bulgaria in early 1926. Mirroring LoN practices, he intended to use the economy to surmount political obstacles. Only after Lyapčev refused to sign the bilateral treaty on arbitration with the Kingdom of SCS, one of Geneva's key methods for preventing war,¹⁶⁶ did Ninčić change his tune. He started campaigning against the loan, arguing that the Bulgarian government was refusing to respect the international order and protect peace. Ninčić, together with Bucharest and Athens, failed to achieve the main goal, yet they managed to acquire the right to appraise the implementation of the loan and obtained LoN's guarantees that it would not be misused for building strategic railways leading to the borders.¹⁶⁷ Regarding the stabilisation loan, Marinković and the plenipotentiary minister in Sofia, Ljubomir Nešić, were keen to leverage this request to force the Bulgarian government to resolve the problem with the IMRO's actions, which had a grave impact on the bilateral relations. After this organisation assassinated General Mihailo Kovačević in 1927, the border was closed for the following two years.¹⁶⁸

The Kingdom of SCS / Yugoslavia and disarmament

One of the issues for the preservation of peace was disarmament. Article 8 of the LoN Covenant introduced a provisional reduction in national armaments in accordance with the international plan. The first discussions revealed the differences between the Great Powers and the Smaller States and between Great Britain and France. While London sought total disarmament as a precondition for economic recovery and political appeasement, Paris wanted international guarantees for national security as a precondition for military reduction. This view was supported by the Little Entente and Poland.¹⁶⁹ Also, the question arose whether disarmament was mandatory or merely a moral obligation for the victorious powers. The French supported the former interpretation and the British the latter.¹⁷⁰

The LoN faced many impediments in implementing disarmament. Progress was slow and partial, causing uneasiness among interested parties.¹⁷¹ The work of the Third and Fourth Assembly of the LoN in 1922 and 1923 led to the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance.

166 Ginneken, *Historical Dictionary of the League of Nations*, 35, 36.

167 Kosev, *Vanšnata politika na Balgariya pri Upravenieto na Andrey Lyapčev 1926–1931*, 25–27, 29–35, 44, 45; Ivan Ristić, *Balkanski Kain i Avelj: Bugarska u jugoslovenskoj politici (1919–1929)* (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije – HeraEdu, 2024), 308–317.

168 Ristić, *Balkanski Kain i Avelj*, 342, 343, 346–348, 356, 357.

169 Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 217–222.

170 Carolyn J. Kitching, *Britain and the Geneva Disarmament Conference: A Study in International History* (Houndmills: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 13, 14.

171 Ibid., 14–16.

The idea was to meet the demands of both sides and interconnect disarmament with guaranteed assistance in case of an attack. Moscow, Washington, London and Berlin all rejected the proposal. The French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Édouard Herriot accepted, and Mussolini approved it, except for special agreements on defence. All European states that feared aggression from powerful neighbours were in favour. In 1924, the Fifth Assembly accepted the formula Arbitration, Security, Disarmament and translated it into the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. The Kingdom of SCS was among the first of nineteen states to sign it.¹⁷² Stanley Baldwin's Cabinet rejected the Protocol, followed by Italy and Japan, paving the way for the Locarno Pact. Instead of a general agreement on mutual assistance, the European Powers accepted a security formula for the western part of the continent.¹⁷³ The former Minister of Justice and delegate at the Fourth Assembly, Lazar Marković,¹⁷⁴ was satisfied with the LoN's progress in making international law an important instrument for improving international relations.¹⁷⁵ Before the Sixth Assembly in 1925, he alerted the LoN of the Hungarian and Bulgarian threat to peace.¹⁷⁶

The Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference¹⁷⁷ was formed by the LoN Council in December 1925. It included political and diplomatic representatives (members of the military were excluded) from 19 nations. Even states that were not members of the LoN participated in the Commission's work. It dealt only with methods and principles, leaving it to the Conference to address exact figures. The First Session was held from late May until early July 1926.¹⁷⁸ During six sessions in 1926–1930, the most important figures in the Yugoslav delegations were Lazar Marković, Milutin Jovanović (until 1927),¹⁷⁹ Konstantin Fotić (from 1927),¹⁸⁰ General Danilo Kalafatović and General

Mihailo Nenadović.¹⁸¹ Before the Third Session in March 1927, Foreign Minister Perić instructed Fotić to second the French in discussions with the Great Powers.¹⁸² This meant supporting them in the discussions with Great Britain, as both Paris and London had submitted draft conventions as the basis for the work of the Preparatory Commission and (later) the Disarmament Conference. The French and British technical proposals advocated the interests of land and naval powers, respectively. The French believed that the British government was looking for ways to relieve themselves of peace-keeping duties, while the British were convinced that the French government wanted to maintain military supremacy in continental Europe.¹⁸³ The General Political Director of the MFA, Božidar Purić, instructed the Delegation to support, if possible, the Polish request for stronger security guarantees.¹⁸⁴ For Belgrade, the Paris and London proposals for disarmament were both unfavourable because neither of the draft conventions envisioned disarmament but only a limitation of armament. The delegation supported the French proposal, with the caveat that the Kingdom of SCS did not have a war industry and could not limit its military budget because it could not predict market prices.¹⁸⁵ Regarding naval limitations, the Yugoslav delegation was dissatisfied with the French delegate Joseph Paul-Boncour's concessions to the British, as he changed the limitation of general tonnage to limitation by ton classes. The British project was favourable for lesser naval powers because it guaranteed a limitation based on the general tonnage principle, with the fixed maximum set at 100,000 tons. Milutin Jovanović had to negotiate with Paul-Boncour on revising the French proposal to be acceptable to Belgrade. Their redrafted proposal was based on the principle that each state should independently determine the general tonnage necessary for its national security.¹⁸⁶ Perić was satisfied with these alterations.¹⁸⁷ The critical objective was to avoid a limitation on military reserves and bind the disarmament only to active forces. France and its allies insisted on the maintenance of conscript armies, whereas Great Britain was against it.¹⁸⁸ According to Jovanović, the British were prepared to support this proposal if the French and Yugoslavs assisted them in naval issues.¹⁸⁹

172 Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 224–228, 263–265, 268–270; Kitching, *Britain and the Geneva Disarmament Conference*, 20–22.

173 Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 283–289.

174 *Kraljevina Jugoslavija u Društvu naroda*, 21.

175 "Evropska politika na ovogodišnjoj skupštini Lige Naroda," *Vreme*, 30 August 1925, 3.

176 "Evropska politika na ovogodišnjoj skupštini Lige Naroda," II, *Vreme*, 31 August 1925, 3.

177 The Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference succeeded the Temporary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of Armaments, which was formed by the First Assembly of the LoN. The Temporary Mixed Commission prepared plans for disarmament and security, which led to the Geneva Protocol of 1924 and the Locarno Pact of 1925 (Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 171).

178 The USA, the USSR, Germany and Turkey participated in the work of the Commission (Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 363, 365, 366; Andrew Webster, "An Argument without End: Britain, France and the Disarmament Process, 1925–34," in: *Anglo-French Defence Relations between the Wars*, Edited by Martin S. Alexander and William H. Philpott (Houndmills: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 50).

179 Jovanović was appointed the plenipotentiary minister in Warsaw in March 1927 and left the post in Bern in June (AJ, r. 334, b. 159, f. 482, folios 304–307).

180 Fotić was appointed the permanent delegate in Geneva in February 1927 and held this post until February 1929 when he was appointed the General Political Director of the MFA (Nataša Miličević, "Konstantin Fotić –diplomata od karijere," *Istorija 20. veka*, no. 1 (1998): 147, 148).

181 AJ, r. 159, b. 1, f. II, Fotić to Marinković, Conf. No. 434, 3 November 1927.

182 AJ, r. 159, b. 1, f. I, Perić to the Legation in Bern, Conf. No. 12, 22 March 1927.

183 Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 365; Webster, "An Argument without End," 50, 51.

184 AJ, r. 159, b. 1, f. I, Purić to the Royal Delegation at the Plenary Commission for the Disarmament Conference, Conf. No. 2825, 2 April 1927.

185 With a similar motivation, the Yugoslav delegation criticised the Dutch proposal for the annual publication of war materials in use and in stocks as favourable for industrial countries that did not need to make public purchases and suggested limiting the obligatory annual publication to countries with a war industry. (Ibid., General Report of the Delegation of the Kingdom of SCS at the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, Conf. No. 104, 26 April 1927).

186 Ibid., Jovanović to the MFA, Conf. No. 49, 6 April, Conf. No. 59, 60 and 61, 9 April; Jovanović to Perić, personally, Conf. No. 50, 6 April; Perić to Jovanović, confidential cable, 9 April 1927.

187 Ibid., Perić to Jovanović, cable, 10 April 1927.

188 David Carlton, "The Anglo-French Compromise on Arms Limitation, 1928," *The Journal of British Studies*, Volume 8, Issue 02 (May 1969): 143.

189 AJ, r. 159, b. 1, f. I, General Report of the Delegation of the Kingdom of SCS at the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, Conf. No. 104, 26 April 1927.

The Yugoslavs' main concern was the Italian consent to the international system for disarmament.¹⁹⁰ Due to the situation in Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria, the Yugoslav delegation was satisfied with the limitation on all military-style civilian formations.¹⁹¹ The Yugoslavs also supported the principle of general international supervision of the limitation implementation, advocated by France and rejected by Italy.¹⁹² The French draft of the disarmament convention included a limitation on civil aviation because the Kingdom of SCS was concerned about the Italian development in that transportation sector.

For the Yugoslav delegation, a significant impediment to the success of the Preparatory Commission was the British, German and American approach to disarmament from the technical and military side, ignoring the importance of national security. For the Kingdom of SCS, disarmament was primarily a political issue. The core problem was national security based on sufficient military strength and an efficient international system. The Yugoslav delegation expected the discussion to reverse to the Treaty for Mutual Assistance.¹⁹³ At the Third Session of the Preparatory Commission, Marković insisted that the LoN should recommend types of agreements for strengthening international security. He proposed to the LoN Committee for Arbitration and Security to analyse practical and effective measures for ensuring security. Marković suggested a mandatory arbitrage – based on the Locarno Pact – for securing peace.¹⁹⁴ These suggestions aroused Briand's and Paul-Boncour's suspicions.¹⁹⁵

Since neither the French nor British drafts of the Convention prohibited chemical warfare, the Yugoslav delegation prepared a suggestion for a general ban on chemical and bacterial warfare. The German delegation added a ban on the production of such materials.¹⁹⁶

Marković suggested to Foreign Minister Marinković for the MFA and the Ministry of the Army and Navy to coordinate their efforts on all military issues. He also advised reaching an agreement with Paris on a joint approach at the Fourth Session of the Preparatory Commission scheduled for March 1928.¹⁹⁷ At the delegates' conference in the

MFA in February 1928, several important decisions were made. For the Kingdom of SCS, a general mandatory arbitration was the only acceptable solution; individual treaties – based on the Locarno Pact model – were advisable. Security would be tenable only if enshrined in a general treaty concordant with the LoN Covenant. The delegates accepted the British stand that in the current international situation, only precisely defined regional pacts on security were appropriate, deeming them necessary for the Balkans and Central Europe. Belgrade was prepared to accept the intermediary role of the LoN Council in this matter.¹⁹⁸ Marinković accepted these conclusions. He instructed the delegation to harmonise its work with the French in all questions. He stressed the importance of obtaining real guarantees for national security before accepting disarmament. His main argument was that the LoN's merely moral guarantees would lead to the disarmament of agrarian countries, yet industrial states would still be able to arm themselves.¹⁹⁹

Marković fulfilled the first instruction during the meeting with Paul-Boncour.²⁰⁰ Beneš estimated that the Conference would not be summoned before 1930, providing ample time for the Little Entente to arm its forces and accept limitations on further armament. This stand aligned with the Great Powers' intentions to arm themselves before the Conference and then pursue the *status quo*.²⁰¹ Marković did not have instructions to discuss the issue.²⁰²

During the session of the LoN Committee for Arbitration and Security (20 February–7 March 1928), Marković harmonised his actions with the delegates of France, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Poland. Their main concern was to shift the discussion on security towards regional treaties based on the model of the Locarno Pact. They encountered German and Italian opposition,²⁰³ yet managed to obtain the adoption of a resolution that called upon the Council of the LoN to offer intermediary services for regional pacts in particular European regions.²⁰⁴ At the next session of the LoN Committee (27 June–4 July), Fotić worked on redrafting the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. The idea was to include Paragraph 3 of Article 4 of the Locarno Pact, which would allow mutual assistance in case of a flagrant violation of the territorial *status quo* and an unprovoked attack without the consent of the LoN Council.²⁰⁵ The Yugoslav-French-Polish action achieved a partial result. The LoN Committee agreed to include Article 4 in its entirety in the Introductory Note for

190 Ibid., Jovanović to the MFA, Conf. No. 81, 13 April 1927.

191 Italy was particularly interested in avoiding any limitations on the Fascist voluntary militia, the Blackshirts (Tollardo, *Fascist Italy and the League of Nations, 1922–1935*, 39).

192 AJ, r. 159, b. 1, f. I, General Report of the Delegation of the Kingdom of SCS at the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, Conf. No. 104, 26 April 1927; Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 366.

193 AJ, r. 159, b. 1, f. I, General Report of the Delegation of the Kingdom of SCS at the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, Conf. No. 104, 26 April 1927.

194 AJ, r. 159, b. 1, f. III, Marković to Marinković, Conf. No. 504, 6 December and Conf. No. 480, 7 December 1927.

195 Ibid., Marinković to Marković, Conf. No. 11985, 5 December 1927.

196 AJ, r. 159, b. 1, f. I, General Report of the Delegation of the Kingdom of SCS at the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, Conf. No. 104, 26 April 1927.

197 Ibid., Marković to Marinković, Conf. No. 504, 6 December 1927, Report on the Work of the Fourth session of the Commission for the Disarmament Conference.

198 AJ, r. 159, b. 2, f. IV, Marković to Marinković, Belgrade, 15 February 1928.

199 Ibid., Marinković to the Delegation of the Kingdom of SCS, 16 February 1928.

200 Ibid., Marković to Marinković, personally, Conf. No. 41, 20 February 1928.

201 Ibid., General Nenadović to the Minister of the Army and Navy, General Stevan Hadžić, Conf. No. officially dated 4 October 1928.

202 Ibid., Marković to the MFA, Conf. No. 44, 21 February 1928.

203 Ibid., Marković to the MFA, Conf. No. 64, 26 February and Conf. No. 108, 3 March 1928.

204 AJ, r. 159, b. 2, f. III, Marković's cable to the "Avala" Agency for Šumenković.

205 Ibid., Fotić to the MFA, Conf. No. 414, 29 June 1928.

Model D for the Treaty of Mutual Assistance.²⁰⁶ At the LoN Ninth Assembly in September 1928, Fotić and Nenadović tried to get Model D redrafted. The Polish and Romanian delegates Franciszek Sokal and Constantin Antoniadu seconded the request, Paul-Boncour and Beneš took a moderate stand, and the Greek, German and Hungarian delegates Nikolaos Politis, Dr Walter von Simons and General Gábor Tánčzos opposed it.²⁰⁷

The second reading of the convention draft at the Fifth Session of the Preparatory Commission, in April and May 1929, was the result of an Anglo-French compromise. They abandoned the contested proposals for military reserves, war materials and the principle of international supervision. Although this was but a weak limitation on arms and a far cry from a reduction,²⁰⁸ Marković was satisfied with the exemption of trained military reserves from the limitations. He judged the introduced flexible system to be favourable for the Kingdom of SCS, as it would allow the Army to increase and decrease its military force according to the circumstances.²⁰⁹ The Yugoslav delegation did everything to prevent the French proposal for indirect armament control. In the end, Marković seconded this due to the policy of coordinating the Kingdom's actions with France and due to the absence of Italian opposition.²¹⁰

During the Great Depression, Yugoslavia's stand regarding cooperation with France changed.²¹¹ In mid-May 1930, the acting General Political Director of the MFA, Pavle Karović, informed the Permanent Delegation in Geneva that the ratification of the Convention for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War signed in 1925 was not in Belgrade's interest because it favoured industrial over agrarian countries. Yugoslavia would not ratify the convention even if France did since their interests differed.²¹² An important factor for Belgrade was Rome's changed policy towards the LoN in mid-1930. Foreign Minister Count Dino Grandi pursued a new course, abandoning Mussolini's prior practices at international conferences. Grandi's intention was to take an active approach to all European affairs and oppose the initiatives of the Quai d'Orsay.²¹³

206 Ibid., Fotić to Marinković, Conf. No. 421, 6 July 1928, Report on the Third Session of the Committee for Arbitration and Security held in Geneva from 27 June to 4 July.

207 AJ, r. 159, b. 2, f. IV, General Nenadović to the Minister of the Army and Navy General Stevan Hadžić, Conf. No. officially dated 4 October 1928; *LNOJ*, Special Supplement No. 67, Records of the Ninth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, Meeting of the Committees, Minutes of the Third Committee (Reduction of Armaments) (Geneva, 1928), 72–75.

208 Webster, "An Argument without End," 51.

209 AJ, r. 159, b. 4, f. VIII, Marković to the MFA, Conf. No. 353, 3 May 1929.

210 Ibid., Marković to the MFA, Conf. No. 357, 4 May; Marković to Minister without Portfolio and acting Foreign Minister Kosta Kumanudi, Conf. No. 369, 10 May 1929.

211 For further reading: Vladimir Lj. Cvetković, *Ekonomski odnosi Jugoslavije i Francuske 1918–1941*. (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2006), ff. 85.

212 AJ, r. 159, b. 8, f. 21/I, Karović to the Permanent Delegation in Geneva, No. 9452, 16 May 1930.

213 AJ, r. 159, b. 44, f. 14, head of the First Political Section of the General Political Direction (GPD) of the MFA Pavle Karović to the Legations in Berlin, Paris, London and Washington and to the Permanent Delegation in Geneva, Conf. No. 10736 I-1-00, 5 June 1930.

Marinković's instruction for the Sixth Session of the Preparatory Commission in November 1930 was to support the French in naval issues, although Rome's project aligned more with Yugoslav interests – because of insufficient power for effective defence of the Adriatic Coast. Although aware of the risk that the failure of the Preparatory Commission could be blamed on the policies of Paris and its allies,²¹⁴ the Little Entente, Poland and Belgium continued to support the French delegation.²¹⁵ Marković opposed the French delegate René Masigli's proposal for indirect armament control,²¹⁶ but he was compelled to accept it in principle.²¹⁷ It was important to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia for the Convention to allow partial mobilisation in case of an Italian or Bulgarian military threat.²¹⁸ In the end, the Sixth Session of the Preparatory Commission managed to produce the final draft of the Disarmament Convention, which was to be the basis for the Disarmament Conference to negotiate an international disarmament agreement.²¹⁹ Marinković and the Minister of Army and Navy, General Stevan Hadžić, were satisfied with the achieved results.²²⁰

After the Sixth Session of the Preparatory Commission, General Nenadović advised General Hadžić to complete the armament program and the formation of the war industry before the Conference for Disarmament finished its work, which was planned for the autumn of 1933.²²¹ Marinković was apprehensive about the final outcome of armament limitation. His main concern was that Yugoslavia did not possess the minimum military power to preserve "national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations", as stipulated in Article 8 of the LoN Covenant. The main factors were the country's geostrategic position, the understaffed Officer Corps and NCO Corps and the procurement of war material, particularly for the navy.²²² At the Fifth Session of the Committee on Budgetary Questions in February 1931, the Yugoslav delegates suggested to the Preparatory Commission that the Conference should implement separate restrictions for the three military branches (army, navy and air force) and allow the possibility of credit disbursement within the limits of total approved expenditures.²²³

Although the final draft of the Disarmament Convention paved the way for convening the Conference for Disarmament, due to the political and economic crisis in

214 AJ, r. 159, b. 8, f. 21/I, GPD of the MFA to the Permanent Delegation in Geneva, Conf. No. 22667 Dn. 11-02, 12 November 1930.

215 AJ, r. 159, b. 8, f. 21/I, Report of Marković to Marinković, Geneva, 16 December 1930.

216 Ibid., Marković to the MFA, Conf. No. 1019, 12 November 1930.

217 Ibid., Report of General Nenadović to General Hadžić, Geneva, 19 December 1930.

218 Ibid., Report of Marković to Marinković, Geneva, 16 December 1930.

219 Webster, "An Argument without End," 55, 56; Kitching, *Britain and the Geneva Disarmament Conference*, 26.

220 AJ, Personal papers of Lazar Marković (85), box 1, folder 2, folios 56, 57.

221 AJ, r. 159, b. 8, f. 21/I, Report of General Nenadović to General Hadžić, Geneva, 19 December 1930.

222 AJ, r. 159, b. 9, f. 10, Marinković's note on the "Suspension of armaments" [1931].

223 AJ, Records of the Central Press Bureau of the Presidency of the Ministerial Council (38), box 58, f. 135, Correspondent of the Central Press Bureau and the Press Attaché at the Permanent Delegation in Geneva Branislav Denić to the Central Press Bureau of the Presidency of the Ministerial Council, Conf. O. Š. No 50, 28 February 1931.

Europe and the world, it took more than a year to get started with the work.²²⁴ During the second half of 1931, the members of the Little Entente established close cooperation in preparation for the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments.²²⁵ After Pierre Laval's Cabinet published a memorandum in mid-July 1931 that made it clear that France would not accept disarmament without further security guarantees,²²⁶ the military attaché in Paris, General Nenadović,²²⁷ was dissatisfied that Belgrade did not respond promptly to the call from Paris to gather in a single group. He informed his superiors of the necessity of being in absolute agreement with France on all political issues vital for Yugoslavia.²²⁸ The three Foreign Ministers of the Little Entente, Marinković, Beneš and Dimitrie I. Ghika, resumed close cooperation with the Quai d'Orsay in late 1931.²²⁹ The Little Entente held a meeting in Montreux and discussed a joint stand a day before the Conference opened.²³⁰

The Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments was the largest summit after the Paris Peace Conference, bringing together sixty-four recognised countries. The presence of prominent statesmen, large delegations and numerous journalists illustrated its significance for the world. The Conference began on 2 February 1932 and lasted until mid-1934, with some interruptions.²³¹ The head of the Yugoslav delegation was Foreign Minister Vojislav Marinković. The delegates were Senator and former Minister of Trade and Industry Želimir Mažuranić, MP and former permanent delegate in Geneva Ilija Šumenković, the permanent delegate in Geneva Konstantin Fotić,²³² the first Deputy Chief of the General Staff General Petar Kosić, and the Deputy Chief of the Navy Vice Admiral Nikola Stanković. The deputy delegates were the military attaché in Paris, General Mihailo Nenadović, and the chief of the Operative Department of the General Staff, General Dimitrije Živković. The experts were the head of the Section for the LoN of the MFA, Ivan Perne, and the acting commander of the 4th Air Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Branko Naumović.²³³

224 Webster, "An Argument without End," 57, 58.

225 AJ, Records of the Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Romania – Bucharest (395), box 23, folder 240, folios 482, 493.

226 Kitching, *Britain and the Geneva Disarmament Conference*, 38, 39.

227 He was appointed the military attaché in Paris, London and Madrid on 14 May 1931 and the Air Force and Navy attaché in Paris and London on 14 May 1932 (Mile Bjelajac, *Generali i admiral Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1918–1941: Studija o vojnoj eliti i biografski leksikon* (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2004), 227).

228 AJ, r. 85, b. 1, f. 2, folios 62, 63.

229 AJ, r. 395, b. 23, f. 240, folios 499, 500; AJ, r. 395, b. 26, folder 257, folio 413.

230 AJ, r. 395, b. 23, f. 240, folios 497, 498; AJ, r. 395, b. 26, folder 257, folio 413; K. Pavlović, *Dnevnik 1930–1932*, 333, 334.

231 Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 501; Webster, "An Argument without End," 58, 59; Kitching, *Britain and the Geneva Disarmament Conference*, 51.

232 Fotić was the acting Deputy Foreign Minister from late October 1930 to early 1932 when he was reappointed the permanent delegate in Geneva (Miličević, "Konstantin Fotić," 148).

233 AJ, r. 159, b. 17, f. 16, acting head of the Political Department (PD) of the MFA Pavle Karović to the Permanent Delegation in Geneva, Conf. No. 604 Dn.15, 13 January 1932.

The start of the Conference was not promising. The Great Powers were divided on fundamental questions. The Disarmament Convention produced by the Preparatory Commission was discarded in a matter of weeks. The French Memorandum introduced by the Minister of War and the head of the Delegation André Tardieu²³⁴ included the reassignment of army, navy and air force units under the jurisdiction of the LoN to act as international forces for implementing its main task – the preservation of peace, triggering new disputes among the Great Powers.²³⁵ General Nenadović was delighted with the plan.²³⁶ The personal secretary of Foreign Minister Kosta Pavlović appraised the impact of the Memorandum as very favourable.²³⁷ He welcomed the intention to improve LoN's effectiveness in international relations.²³⁸ Pavlović was not as impressed by the expositions of the British Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, and the acting chairman of the US delegation, Hugh S. Gibson,²³⁹ noting that the German Chancellor and Foreign Minister Heinrich Brüning seemed more flexible than expected.²⁴⁰ After the favourable reception of Grandi's indirect support of the German premise on total equality in armaments and criticisms of France for maintaining the largest army in Europe,²⁴¹ Fotić issued instructions to the MFA.²⁴² The main tasks were to instruct the Yugoslav press to give more publicity to the Conference, defend Yugoslavia's thesis about national security as a precondition for disarmament, express support for the French plan for creating international forces under the jurisdiction of the LoN, take a moderate stand towards Italian proposals for the abolition and prohibition of some types of armaments and to disprove the German and Italian claims of the total equality of armaments based on the Treaty of Versailles.²⁴³

In the exposition, Marinković emphasised support for the French plan and seconded the Polish initiative for moral disarmament. He addressed Yugoslavia's claims of the necessity of distinguishing between older and newer military branches and advocated a distinction between long-range vessels as offensive armaments and the naval units necessary for defending coastlines. Marinković put a fine point on compulsory sanctions against the production and usage of chemical and bacterial weapons, which were "ruthless and inhuman" and could eliminate the chances for the biological recovery of whole nations.²⁴⁴

234 Tardieu was re-elected Prime Minister on 20 February 1932.

235 Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 502–504; Carolyn Kitching, "The search for disarmament: Anglo-French relations, 1929–1934," in: *Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century: Rivalry and cooperation*, edited by Alan Sharp and Glyn Stone (London: Routledge, 2000), 164–167; Webster, "An Argument without End," 59, 60; Kitching, *Britain and the Geneva Disarmament Conference*, 51–64.

236 AJ, r. 85, b. 1, f. 2, folio 62.

237 Pavlović, *Dnevnik 1930–1932*, 336.

238 Ibid., 350.

239 Ibid., 338–340, 350.

240 Ibid., 359.

241 Pavlović, *Dnevnik 1930–1932*, 362; Tollardo, *Fascist Italy and the League of Nations, 1922–1935*, 39, 41.

242 Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 503.

243 AJ, r. 159, b. 17, f. 16, Fotić to the acting Deputy Foreign Minister Pavle Karović, Conf. No. 136, 12 February 1932.

244 Pavlović, *Dnevnik 1930–1932*, 369–373.

The legation in Sofia warned the MFA that the main tasks of the Bulgarian delegation would be to introduce conscription and to shift the responsibility for endangering peace in the Balkans on its neighbours.²⁴⁵ The German request for total equality in armaments was seconded by the head of Hungarian delegation Count Albert Apponyi, and the head of the Bulgarian delegation and president of the National Assembly Aleksandar Malinov. The latter asked for allowing the conscription in Bulgaria.²⁴⁶

After a general discussion at the Conference, the charge d'affaires of the Permanent Delegation in Geneva, Ivo Andrić, lauded the French proposal for international forces as an argument for the thesis that the necessary steps should be "security, arbitration, disarmament". A few elements were taken from Marinković's exposition for further discussions in the General Commission of the Conference: 1) the distinction between offensive and defensive armaments;²⁴⁷ 2) the maximum limitation of the air force as the newest military branch;²⁴⁸ 3) the possibility of total abolishment of long-range vessels; 4) the prohibition of chemical and biological warfare and the implementation of sanctions in case of violation.²⁴⁹

After the General Commission of the Conference founded particular committees, the Yugoslav delegation divided responsibilities. In the Land Committee, the delegate was Konstantin Fotić, the deputy was General Petar Kosić, and the technical advisor was Ivo Andrić. In the Sea Committee, the delegate was Ilija Šumenković, the deputy was Vice Admiral Nikola Stanković, and the technical advisor was Ivan Perne. In the Air Committee, the delegate was Konstantin Fotić, the deputy was General Dimitrije Živković, and the technical advisor was Lieutenant Colonel Branko Naumović. In the Budget Committee, the delegate was Želimir Mažuranić, the deputy was Ivan Perne, and the technical advisor was Major Borivoje Popadić. In the Political Committee, the delegate was Ilija Šumenković, the deputy was Konstantin Fotić, and the technical advisor was Ivo Andrić.²⁵⁰ After the creation of the Committee for Moral Disarmament, an anti-Yugoslav campaign began in Geneva. Fotić and Andrić advised the MFA to collect Hungarian and Bulgarian school textbooks, maps and other publications that could prove their intentions against Yugoslavia's territorial integrity and the policy of good neighbourly relations.²⁵¹

245 AJ, r. 159, b. 17, f. 16, acting head of the PD of the MFA Dragomir Kasidolac to the Permanent Delegation in Geneva, Conf. No. 1683 Dn.15, 2 February 1932.

246 Pavlović, *Dnevnik 1930–1932*, 366–368, 376.

247 This request was common among the participants, so it is most likely that this wasn't an acceptance of Marinković's argumentation. Rather, these were merely concessions between the Great Powers.

248 This was directly opposed to the Italian intention to keep the air force intact, in which they had an advantage over the other Great Powers.

249 Ivo Andrić, *Diplomatski spisi*, ed. Miladin Milošević (Beograd: IP Prosveta, 1992), document no. 38, pp. 98–100.

250 Pavlović, *Dnevnik 1930–1932*, 382.

251 AJ, r. 159, b. 16, f. 3, Fotić to the Legation in Budapest, Conf. No. 254, 15 March 1932; Andrić, *Diplomatski spisi*, doc. no. 40, pp. 100, 101.

During the discussions in the General Commission in May 1932, the Little Entente, Poland and the Latin American countries submitted a project for a resolution on the distinction between offensive armaments that should be prohibited and those that should be under the control and at the disposal of the LoN.²⁵² The newly appointed Yugoslav Prime Minister, Vojislav Marinković, repeated the main points from his exposition, adding the request that disarmament based on Article 8 of the LoN Covenant should take into account the geographical position and specific needs of particular states and the idea for dividing offensive armaments into three categories, of which only heavy artillery and armoured vehicles should be retained and placed at the disposal of the LoN.²⁵³ Šumenković further elaborated the idea of the principle of equality between states with and without a war industry.²⁵⁴

After forming a new cabinet in early June 1932, Édouard Herriot replaced André Tardieu as the head of the French delegation at the Conference. He took a more flexible approach towards Germany, but many differences persisted among the Great Powers. On 22 June 1932, US President Herbert Hoover attempted to break the deadlock at the Conference. His proposal for the abolition of specifically offensive weapons and the reduction of the rest by a third was presented at the general meeting of the Conference. It was seconded by Germany, Italy and the USSR, partially supported by Great Britain, while France opposed it and Japan rejected it. The Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and Czechoslovakia, Sir John Simon and Edvard Beneš, took the unpleasant duty of drafting a resolution that would reconcile the interests of the Great Powers with those of the Lesser Powers.²⁵⁵ Šumenković supported Hoover's project, albeit with some reservations, and supported the French approach to the whole issue of security and disarmament.²⁵⁶ At a meeting of the Yugoslav delegation with the plenipotentiary minister in Sofia, Aleksandar Vukčević, it was concluded that limitation based on Article 8 of the LoN Covenant would be unfavourable for Yugoslavia only regarding the navy. They decided to discuss with France and other partners if the guarantees for security constituted a genuine policy or merely a tactic.²⁵⁷

Mussolini replaced Grandi as Foreign Minister in July 1932, promptly reverting to his previous practice regarding the international order. Italy abstained from voting on the Simon-

252 *Izveštaji Ministarstva inostranih poslova Kraljevine Jugoslavije za 1932. godinu*, vol. III, ed. Nada Petrović (Beograd: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2008), 158, 159 (*Izveštaji*, III).

253 Ibid., 159; Pavlović, *Dnevnik 1930–1932*, 402.

254 *Izveštaji*, III, 160.

255 Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 508–511; Kitching, "The search for disarmament," 168; Webster, "An Argument without End," 60, 61; Kitching, *Britain and the Geneva Disarmament Conference*, 77–88; Tollardo, *Fascist Italy and the League of Nations, 1922–1935*, 41.

256 *Izveštaji*, III, 262.

257 AJ, r. 159, b. 58, f. 3, the strictly confidential Minutes of the Meeting of the Royal Delegation at the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments held on 10 July 1932.

Beneš resolution, with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey following suit. Mussolini supported Berlin's claim that it could not continue to participate without a recognition of the principle of equality. The negotiations among the four European Powers and the US dragged on until 11 December 1932, when a formula for equal rights among the Great Powers was reached.²⁵⁸ This process changed the existing model of cooperation between France and its partners. At his meetings and in private conversations with Paul-Boncour, Fotić concluded that Paris was not prepared to defend the existing international system without support from other Great Powers. Therefore, collaboration with the Little Entente lost its previous significance for France.²⁵⁹ The situation was compounded by the differences between Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia regarding the means for preserving international order and peace. Belgrade's stand was that neither the LoN Covenant nor the Kellogg-Briand Pact for the prohibition of war had prevented Japan's military intervention in China.²⁶⁰

Fotić was not completely satisfied with the new French proposal, which aimed for the total abolition of bombing if civil aviation were internationalised.²⁶¹ He was concerned that the plan did not include all of Yugoslavia's vital interests, particularly those regarding Bulgaria, and disliked the change made to the prior proposal for the creation of international forces. Fotić saw it as a compromise between the Herriot government's leftist ideology and the French General Staff's intention to organise national security.²⁶² Nenadović was also dissatisfied with the proposed plan, particularly because it did not align with Yugoslavia's national security policy.²⁶³ He warned the Foreign Minister, Bogoljub Jevtić, of the possibility that the consultations between the five Great Powers could lead to a discussion on revising the peace treaties.²⁶⁴ Fotić reported a possible French-Italian rapprochement.²⁶⁵ The real setback was the recognition of equal rights in armaments for Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria. Fotić criticised the Great Powers before the General Commission because they had made some decisions of paramount importance for other states without even consulting them first. He emphasised their neglect of other nations' interests and indicated that this could jeopardise the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments.²⁶⁶ He informed Paul-Boncour that Belgrade would never accept decisions resulting from

separate discussions and would continue to seek ways to ensure national security.²⁶⁷ The MFA's officials concluded that the future work of the Conference would increase in importance for Yugoslavia's national interests.²⁶⁸

The Great Powers' agreement left an unsatisfactory impression on the Little Entente. It raised anxiety regarding a revision of peace treaties, i.e. international order and national security, and the resurrection of the European Directory. The three Foreign Ministers of the Little Entente, Jevtić, Beneš and Titulescu, agreed to hold a conference in Belgrade on 18–19 December 1932 to reconstruct the alliance. The goals were to emancipate their respective countries from all Great Powers – including France – and prevent any new imposition of their will not only on the Little Entente but also on the regions in which they had vital national interests. They wanted to emphasise their commitment to the LoN's structure of order and peace. The reorganisation, modelled after the structure of the LoN, formally took place in Geneva in February 1933.²⁶⁹ During the second phase of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, from February to May 1933, the three member-states vigorously worked on obtaining British and French consent for ensuring national security through regional pacts.²⁷⁰

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was one of many countries dissatisfied with the failure of the Disarmament Conference, one of the most important tasks of the LoN that stemmed from the peace treaties. Belgrade's view of the LoN's efficiency and impact changed significantly in the short term. The main reasons were the meek reaction of the Council to the assassination of King Alexander in 1934 and 1935 and the disunity between Britain and France and other member-states regarding the economic sanctions against Italy in 1935 and 1936. After that, Geneva's role in Yugoslavia's foreign policy rapidly deteriorated. This was evident during the tenures of Milan Stojadinović as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.²⁷¹

258 Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 511–515; Kitching, *Britain and the Geneva Disarmament Conference*, 89–105; Tollardo, *Fascist Italy and the League of Nations, 1922–1935*, 43, 44.

259 Srđan Mičić, "The influence of France and Italy's (Central)European projects on Yugoslavia's re-evaluation of Regional Pacts (1927–1933)," *Istorija 20. veka*, no. 2 (2020): 47.

260 Ibid., 47, 48.

261 Kitching, *Britain and the Geneva Disarmament Conference*, 94.

262 A.J., r. 159, b. 46, f. 4–1, Fotić to Jevtić, Str. Conf. No. 19, 5 November; Str. Conf. No. 21, 12 November 1932.

263 A.J., r. 159, b. 17, f. 16, head of the PD of the MFA Božidar Purić to the Permanent Delegation in Geneva, Conf. No. 19594 Dn.15, 19 November 1932.

264 A.J., r. 159, b. 46, f. 4–1, Fotić to Jevtić, Str. Conf. No. 22, 19 November 1932.

265 Ibid., Fotić to the MFA, personally for Jevtić, Str. Conf. No. 23, 22 November 1932.

266 *Izveštaji*, III, 455.

267 A.J., r. 159, b. 17, f. 16, Fotić to Jevtić, personally, Conf. No. 851, 11 December 1932.

268 *Izveštaji*, III, 456.

269 Campus, *Mica Întelegere*, 114, 115, 121–125; Vanku, *Mala antanta 1920–1938*, 75–79; Ádám, *Richtung selbstvernichtung*, 94; Sládek, *Malá dohoda 1919–1938*, 121.

270 Mičić, "The influence of France and Italy's (Central)European projects on Yugoslavia's re-evaluation of Regional Pacts (1927–1933)," 49.

271 For further reading: Živko Avramovski, *Balkanske zemlje i velike sile 1935–1937. Od italijanske agresije na Etiopiju do jugoslovensko-italijanskog pakta* (Beograd: IP "Prosveta," 1968); Jacob B. Hoptner, *Jugoslavija u krizi 1934–1941* (Rijeka: "Otokar Krešovani," 1972); Ladislav Deák, "Jugoslovensko-italijanski odnosi 1932–1937," u: *Istorija XX veka*, zbornik radova, vol. XIV–XV, odgovorni urednik Živko Avramovski (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju – IRO "Narodna knjiga," 1982), 191–196; Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Francuska između dva svetska rata*; Enes Milak, *Jugoslavija i Italija 1931–1937* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1987); Jędrzej Paszkiewicz, *Jugostawia w polityce Włoch w latach 1914–1941* (Poznań: Wydawnictwi Poznańskie, 2004); Branislav Gligorićević, *Kralj Aleksandar Karađorđević u evropskoj politici*, drugo izdanje (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike, 2010); Gordana G. Ristić, *Spoljna politika Kraljevine Jugoslavije od 1934. do 1939. godine* (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike, 2015); Bojan Simić, *Milan Stojadinović i Italija. Između diplomatije i propaganda* (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2019); Nil Balfur and Sali Makej, *Knez Pavle Karađorđević. Jedna zakasnela biografija*, drugo izdanje (Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2021).

Summary

The first actions of the Kingdom of SCS regarding the LoN were the result of relying on the support of US President Woodrow Wilson during the Paris Peace Conference. Since this was a novel type of body in international relations, experienced statesmen and diplomats were either sceptical or indifferent about its creation and functioning. The opposite was the case with inexperienced politicians and new generations of statesmen. This was evident in the discussions between the members of the Yugoslav delegation at the Peace Conference and the members of the government, who advocated different ideas regarding the future role of the LoN in international relations and its significance for Yugoslavia's future foreign policy. Momčilo Ninčić was the first Yugoslav Foreign Minister to make a strong effort to meet all international obligations deriving from Geneva's initiatives. Vojislav Marinković was the first and only Yugoslav Foreign Minister whose reputation as a statesman was made in the LoN.

A major concern for Yugoslavia was securing and preserving territorial integrity through the support of the international system based on peace treaties and other international legal acts. As the system was very new, Yugoslav statesmen and diplomats needed some time to adapt to the new circumstances. Cases in point were the admissions of some states to the LoN and loans for surmounting economic problems. Yugoslavia's actions in Geneva reflected its foreign policy in this period. Its main supporters were the Little Entente and France, and the greatest menace was Italy. The United Kingdom's role in Yugoslavia's activities differed on a case-by-case basis. These factors were evident during the work of the LoN's Preparatory Commission and the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments in Geneva.

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